De Fernandez v. CMA CGM S.A.

• Decision Date: 12 July 2022
• Docket Number: 21-CV-22778-COOKE/DAMIAN
• Parties: ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ nee BLANCO ROSELL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CMA CGM S.A. a/k/a CMA CGM THE FRENCH LINE, a/k/a CMA CGM GROUP and CMA CGM AMERICA LLC, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ nee BLANCO ROSELL, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
CMA CGM S.A. a/k/a CMA CGM THE FRENCH LINE, a/k/a CMA CGM GROUP and CMA CGM AMERICA LLC, Defendants.

No. 21-CV-22778-COOKE/DAMIAN

United States District Court, S.D. Florida, Miami Division

July 12, 2022

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS PENDING INTERNATIONAL REQUEST

MELISSA DAMIANI UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant, CMA CGM (AMERICA) LLC's (“CMA America” or “Defendant”), Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending International Request, filed September 20, 2021 [ECF No. 32] (the “Motion to Stay”). This Motion was referred to the undersigned by the Honorable Marcia G. Cooke, United States District Judge, for appropriate resolution [ECF No. 47]. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).

The undersigned has reviewed the Motion, the Response and Reply thereto, the Notice of Joinder, the pertinent portions of the record, and the relevant legal authorities, and heard from the parties who appeared, through counsel, before the undersigned on June 16, 2022. As discussed below, Plaintiffs, Cuban exiles and their estates and heirs, sued Defendants, related French and American entities engaged in international shipping, for claims arising under the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, known as the

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Helms-Burton Act (22 U.S.C. § 6021, et seq.). Defendants seek a stay of these proceedings based on European Union and French Blocking Statutes. Defendants claim these blocking statutes prohibit the French entity from participating in these proceedings, and they claim it would be unfair and a waste of judicial resources to leave the American entity to defend itself without its French co-Defendant.

Plaintiffs have also requested that this Court compel Defendants to comply with the Court's procedural orders because the stay has not been granted, and, therefore, the parties are bound to comply but have not yet done so in light of the pending Motion to Stay. [ECF No. 42]. This Court addresses Plaintiff's motion by separate order.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies Defendants' Motion to Stay.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND AND FACTS

Plaintiffs' Complaint and the parties' pending motions set out lengthy and detailed facts regarding the merits of the underlying claims. The facts and background set forth below are limited to those relevant to the determination of the Motion now before the Court.

A. The Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs are fourteen individuals asserting claims on their own behalf, in their individual capacities, and in representative capacities as personal representatives and administrators of estates of decedents (collectively referred to as “Plaintiffs”). See Complaint [ECF No. 1]. One Plaintiff, Odette Blanco De Fernandez, is asserting claims individually on her own behalf (referred to herein as “Plaintiff De Fernandez”). The remaining thirteen Plaintiffs are asserting claims based on their representative capacities on behalf of Plaintiff De Fernandez's four siblings, all of whom are deceased (Ms. De Fernandez and her siblings are collectively referred to herein as the “Blanco Rosell Siblings”).

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According to the allegations in the Complaint, in 1960, the Cuban Government seized, without compensation, property and rights related to property which the Plaintiffs claim belonged to the Blanco Rosell Siblings. See Compl. at ¶¶ 2-4. After the seizure of their property in 1960, the Blanco Rosell Siblings all eventually fled from Cuba to the United States and became United States citizens. See Compl. at ¶ 5. All became United States Citizens prior to March 12, 1996, the effective date of the Helms-Burton Act. Id. With the exception of Plaintiff De Fernandez, all of the Blanco Rosell Siblings passed away after becoming United States citizens and prior to the filing of the Complaint in this case.

2. The Defendants

Defendant CMA CGM S.A. (“CMA CGM”) is a French entity, a Societe Anonyme, organized under French Law. CMA CGM is an international marine transportation company and, according to the Complaint, one of the world's leading container carriers. Compl. at ¶ 26. Plaintiffs allege Defendant CMA CGM, through subsidiaries and affiliates, calls at the Terminal de Contenedores del Mariel, which is part of the Port of Mariel in the Bay of Mariel, and has engaged in commercially beneficial transactions at the Port of Mariel and surrounding areas from which it has profited. See id. at 8-10, 33-42.

Defendant CMA CGM (AMERICA) LLC (“CMA America”) is a United States entity organized in New Jersey with its principal place of business in Virginia. Id. at ¶ 37. According to the Complaint, CMA America has transacted business in Florida since 2008 and acts as CMA CGM's agent for the carrying of containers from the Port of Miami to the Port of Mariel by way of Jamaica. See id. Plaintiffs allege that CMA America works with and assists CMA CGM in carrying out its commercially beneficial transactions involving the Port of Mariel

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and surrounding areas by acting as CMA CGM's agent and broker and signing bills of lading for CMA CGM containers heading to the Port of Mariel.

3. The Confiscated Property

According to the Complaint, the Blanco Rosell Siblings owned the Cuban Corporation Maritima Mariel SA (“Maritima Mariel”), which was established in 1954. Id. at ¶ 79. In August 1955, the Cuban Government granted Maritima Mariel a 70-year Concession to “plan, study, execute, maintain, and exploit public docks and warehouses in the Bay of Mariel, province of Pinar del Rio Province, and the construction of new buildings and works[.]” Id. at ¶ 80. The Complaint details a series of exceptional rights which Maritima Mariel was authorized to exercise in the Bay of Mariel pursuant to the 70-Year Concession. See id. at ¶ 81. Plaintiffs also allege that, in addition to the 70-year Concession and Maritima Mariel, the Blanco Rosell Siblings owned the companies Central San Ramon and Compama Azucarera Mariel, which held extensive land holdings surrounding Mariel Bay. Id. at ¶¶ 84-86.

Plaintiffs allege that when the Cuban Government seized their property in 1960, it seized Maritima Mariel and the 70-Year Concession rights, as well as Central San Ramon and Compama Azucarera Mariel and all of their land holdings, all of which were previously owned by the Blanco Rosell Siblings. Id. at ¶¶ 83, 86. The property confiscated by the Cuban Government is described in Resolution No. 436 published in the Cuban Official Gazette, dated September 29, 1960, at 23405-23406, as follows:

(a) their wholly owned company, Maritima Mariel SA, and the 70-Year Concession held by Maritima Mariel SA, to develop docks, warehouses and port facilities on Mariel Bay, a deep water harbor located on the north coast of Cuba; and

(b) their wholly owned companies, Central San Ramon and Compama Azucarera Mariel S.A., including those companies' extensive land holdings (approximately

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11,000 acres) on the southeast, south and west sides of Mariel Bay, which included a number of improvements such as roads, railways, buildings, and utilities.

See Resolution No. 436, published in the Cuban Official Gazette, September 29, 1960, at 23406 (English translation) (“Confiscated Property”); Compl. at ¶ 4.

According to Plaintiffs, the Cuban Government seized the Confiscated Property without the Blanco Rosell Siblings' permission and without providing adequate compensation. See, e.g., id. at ¶ 95. In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have been trafficking in the Confiscated Property by operating vessels that call, directly or through related entities, at the Port of Mariel and otherwise engage in profitable business activities within and benefitting from the Confiscated Property without compensating the Blanco Rosell Siblings and without their authorization. See generally id. at 33-42.

II. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs filed the Complaint on July 30, 2021, seeking damages pursuant to Title III of the Helms-Burton Act. [ECF No. 31]. On August 10, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a Return of Service indicating service of process on CMA America on August 6, 2021. [ECF No. 18]. On September 20, 2021, CMA America filed the Motion to Stay now before the Court. [ECF No. 32]. Although CMA America is not a French or European national directly subject to the EU or French Blocking Statutes, it argues in the Motion that the case should be stayed in its entirety because CMA CGM is subject to the Blocking Statutes, and it would be unfair for CMA America to proceed without its co-Defendant CMA CGM. Id. After CMA CGM was successfully served on November 9, 2021 [ECF No. 41], CMA CGM filed a Notice of Joinder in the Motion to Stay. [ECF No. 40].

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III. RELEVANT STATUTES

A. The LIBERTAD Act, Also Known As The Helms-Burton Act

As set forth in the Helms-Burton Act, since Fidel Castro seized power in Cuba in 1959, the communist Cuban Government has engaged in the systematic repression of the Cuban people through, among other things, “massive and systemic violations of human rights” and “deprivations of fundamental freedoms.” See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021(4), (24). In response, the United States has undertaken various measures to impose sanctions against the Castro regime and to deter foreign investors from investing in Cuba while protecting the claims of United States nationals who had property confiscated by the Cuban Government. In 1996, Congress passed Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. § 6021, et seq. (the “LIBERTAD Act,” “Title III,” or the “Helms-Burton Act”), “to strengthen international sanctions against the Castro government” and, relevant to the instant case, “to protect United States nationals against confiscatory takings and the wrongful trafficking in property confiscated by the Castro regime.” 22 U.S.C. §§ 6022(2), (6).

In Title III of...