Fernandez v. Cruz
| Docket Number | 1:23-cv-0855 BAM (PC) |
| Decision Date | 09 August 2023 |
| Parties | ANTHONY SOTO FERNANDEZ, Plaintiff, v. PIO CRUZ, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE TO ACTION
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING DISMISSAL OF CERTAIN CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS
FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE
Plaintiff Anthony Soto Fernandez (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court screened Plaintiffs complaint, and he was granted leave to amend. Plaintiff's first amended complaint is currently before the Court for screening. (ECF No. 8.)
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Plaintiff's complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff's allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
To survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
Plaintiff is currently housed at the California State Prison at Corcoran, California. Plaintiff alleges the events in the complaint occurred while he was housed at Kern Valley State Prison. Plaintiff names as defendants: (1) Pio Cruz, Sergeant, (2) R. Charles, Sergeant, (3) S. Furlong, correctional officer, (4) D. Chavez, correctional officer, (5) R. Hernandez, correctional officer, and (6) R. Rodriguez, Lieutenant. Plaintiff sues the defendants in both their individual and official capacities.
In claim 1, Plaintiff alleges excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. On May 26, 2019, Sgt. Cruz, Sgt. Charles, correctional officers Furlong, Chavez, and Hernandez used excessive force by striking Plaintiff with batons, punching and kicking Plaintiff while Plaintiff was in the prone, submissive position. Plaintiff was beaten. When he turned his head upwards to beg them to stop, Defendant Furlong's foot kicked Plaintiff right in the face as he was continuing to hit Plaintiff on his back with his baton. Plaintiff pleaded with Defendant Cruz to stop as Plaintiff was handcuffed and in the prone position with no justification to be beaten. Sgt. Cruz kept swinging his baton at Plaintiff and told Plaintiff to shut up. Sgt. Cruz told the other officers to stop once Cruz hit Plaintiff in the back of the head cracking Plaintiff's skull open. Plaintiff was bleeding all over the place. For 45 seconds, all of the five officers, Cruz, Charles, Furlong, Chavez, and Hernandez, kicked Plaintiff in the ribs, back, and face and continued to assault Plaintiff even after Plaintiff was placed in handcuffs and on the ground in a prone position.
Plaintiff had rib fractures, back contusion, and head concussion.
In claim 2, Plaintiff alleges that after being assaulted on 5/26/19, Plaintiff was placed in a holding cell in medical. Plaintiff was having trouble breathing and was telling Cruz, Furlong, Charles and R. Rodriguez that Plaintiff needed a doctor and felt like Plaintiff's ribs were broken. Plaintiff was in extreme pain “as they could see.” Plaintiff had blurred vision and a migraine headache from his skull being cracked open. Cruz told Plaintiff to take it like a man and shut up because no one was going to help Plaintiff and that is what Plaintiff got for running into Cruz.
Plaintiff tried to call a nurse. Cruz or S. Furlong would tell the nurse to stay away and that Plaintiff was okay. Lt. Rodriguez came to the holding cell and Plaintiff told Rodriguez and Plaintiff was being denied medical attention. Rodriguez said that medical had already seen Plaintiff. Plaintiff said that he thought something was broken inside of Plaintiff and Lt. Rodriguez said that that is your problem. Furlong, Cruz, and Rodriguez said that Plaintiff better refuse the on camera interview and they put a beanie on Plaintiff's head to cover up Plaintiff's injuries. Plaintiff pleaded again for medical, but was threatened.
In claim 3, this claim is unclear if it is one for retaliation or for failure to protect. Plaintiff alleges Cruz, Charles, Furlong failed to protect Plaintiff from an inmate attack as part of retaliatory conduct and conspiring with gang members to harm Plaintiff. The allegations are unclear but Plaintiff alleges as follows. The retaliation stems from an inmate who visits Plaintiff's sister and correctional officers on “C” facility believed that the inmate and Plaintiff were engaged in criminal activity. Some female inmate had her wrist broken. On 5/26/19, Plaintiff was set up by Furlong, Cruz and Charles in a chain of events ending with Plaintiff being assaulted by a criminal gang known as independent riders set up by Furlong, Cruz and Charles.
On 5/26/19, Furlong was working the patio, security metal detector, body pat down, when the supervising “Sergeant” told him not to let these same inmates through the gate and secure Plaintiff in handcuffs in a holding cell in the program office. Plaintiff had already been targeted by these gang members for assault and “he” was aware that due to incidents over the prior weeks/months, Plaintiff had been jumped and stabbed 9 times. On 5/16/19, Plaintiff looked over his shoulder and saw the would be assailants and stated to Furlong “really” to which he stated it is not my call.
Plaintiff walked up to Cruz and Charles and told them that Plaintiff was about to be assaulted to which Cruz said I don't give a “fuck” and go back to the fence and handle your business. Cruz and Charles were regulars on the yard and know of Plaintiff's past issues with the criminal gang. They knew there was documentation in his file to keep Plaintiff away and safe from these inmates. Plaintiff was housed in the upper yard and these inmates were housed in the lower yard. The day prior, Furlong and Cruz told Plaintiff to be careful and watch his back. They had full knowledge that Plaintiff was going to get assaulted. When Plaintiff was assaulted, his ribs were broken and his skull cracked open.
As remedies, Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, and compensatory and punitive damages.
Plaintiff may not pursue his claims for monetary damages against the named defendants in their official capacities. “The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages in federal court against a state, its agencies, and state officials in their official capacities.” Aholelei v. Dep't. of Pub. Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). However, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits seeking damages against state officials in their personal capacities, Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30 (1991); Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 491 (9th Cir. 2003), or suits for injunctive relief brought against state officials in their official capacities, Austin v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 939 F.2d 676, 680 n.2 (9th Cir. 1991). Thus, Plaintiff may only proceed in this action for monetary damages against defendants in their individual capacities.
To the extent Plaintiff seeks to hold any defendant liable based solely upon their supervisory role, he may not do so. Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions or omissions of their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Simmons v. Navajo Cty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). “A supervisor may be liable only if (1) he or she is personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted); accord Lemire v. Cal. Dep't of Corrs. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013); Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). “Under the latter theory, supervisory liability exists even without overt personal participation in the offensive act if supervisory officials implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of a constitutional violation.” Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977 (citing Hansen v. Black, ...
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