Ferran v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY

• Decision Date: 22 September 1961
• Docket Number: No. 18677.,18677.
• Citation: 293 F.2d 487
• Parties: Lawrence FERRAN, Appellant, v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY and Falstaff Brewing Corporation, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

293 F.2d 487 (1961)

Lawrence FERRAN, Appellant, v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY and Falstaff Brewing Corporation, Appellees.

No. 18677.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

August 16, 1961.

Rehearing Denied September 22, 1961.

C. Cyril Broussard, New Orleans, La., for appellant.

H. Martin Hunley, Jr., Lemle & Kelleher, New Orleans, La., for Illinois Central R. Co. J. H. Wright, Gen. Counsel, John W. Freels, Gen. Sol., Chicago, Ill., of counsel.

Stanley E. Leob, New Orleans, La., for Falstaff Brewing Co.

Before TUTTLE, Chief Judge, and CAMERON and WISDOM, Circuit Judges.

CAMERON, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Ferran brought this action against appellees Illinois Central Railroad Company and Falstaff Brewing Corporation claiming that, on September 19, 1956, he was injured by their joint and concurrent negligence. The trial court held that the affidavits, depositions and admissions before it on the motions for summary judgment filed by appellees presented no issue as to any material fact, and granted the appellees' separate motions for summary judgment. This appeal calls in question those actions by the trial court. We think that the court below correctly decided the questions raised by the pleadings and that its action with respect to each appellee should be affirmed.

Appellant first challenges the summary judgment granted the Railroad Company. This motion was based upon two affidavits and the depositions of five witnesses, including that of appellant Ferran. Certain requests for admissions and responses thereto were also placed before the court hearing the motion. The relevant facts placed before the trial court, as disclosed by the record and exhibits and arguments of counsel, are these:

Appellant Ferran was employed as a carpenter by Falstaff. While engaged about his duties he walked between two boxcars which were at rest upon a spur track installed and utilized exclusively to serve the Brewery's shipping needs. The cars had been spotted by the Railroad before the beginning of Falstaff's business day. There was a space of about three feet between the end car, which had been loaded by Falstaff employees, and the other two, which were empty and were coupled together. Appellant passed through this space en route to the water fountain and the toilet inside the warehouse. In a short time he returned towards his work and attempted to pass back through the same space between the parked cars. In the interim, several employees of Falstaff, on the opposite side of the cars, had hitched a cable to the cars and were in the process, by the use of a caterpillar tractor, of moving the two empty cars across the space so as to couple them with the loaded car and move the cut of three cars a few feet to a point where the door of the first empty car would be opposite the door of the warehouse, through which cases of beer were to be moved into the car and loaded for shipment. All of the men engaged in the movement were employed by and engaged in work for Falstaff, and all of the equipment used was its property. As appellant walked between the cars, the movement was begun and resulted in his being caught between the two cars and severely injured.

These cars had been spotted by the railroad employees in exact fulfillment of the orders received by it from Falstaff, and no employee of the Railroad was present at the time the casualty occurred or for several hours prior thereto. The entire procedure was in keeping with what was customarily done in connection with the placing of cars on the Falstaff spur track and their movement by Falstaff employees to a convenient spot for loading individual cars. The Railroad had no control over or connection with the movement which was taking place at the time of appellant's injuries.

A demurrage tariff was placed in evidence which entitled Falstaff to call for switching service by the Railroad to place the cars at the exact spots necessary for loading. The use of this service was an expensive one to Falstaff, and was attended by considerable delay, and Falstaff had for many years accomplished the slight movement of the cars through its own employees and its own equipment. This was permitted by the demurrage tariff.

When the court below first heard the Railroad's motion for summary judgment, it was denied. At a later date, the district court ex proprio motu granted the Railroad's motion, giving the following reasons:

"There is no dispute about the facts in this case. Plaintiff, an employee of the Falstaff Brewing Company, was injured when other employees of that company were moving a cut of the railroad\'s box cars on premises of the brewery with a tractor. No employees of the railroad were on the premises at the time.

"The public policy of Louisiana holds a railroad responsible for negligence in the permitted use of its rolling stock by others. This principle derives from the quasi-public functions which railroads perform under government authorization. Muntz v. Algiers & G. Ry. Co., 111 La. 423, 35 So. 624, 64 L.R.A. 222. But this obligation does not run to employees of the permitted user. Travis v. Kansas City, S. & G. Ry. Co., 119 La. 489, 44 So. 274, 10 L.R.A.,N.S., 1189; Williams v. Kansas City S. & G. Ry. Co., 120 La. 870, 45 So. 924. While it is true that in the Travis and Williams cases the plaintiff was employed in the operation of a railroad by the permitted user, whereas plaintiff here was not, on reconsideration, this factual difference would not require the application of the principle of Muntz over Travis."

In his Specification of Errors and argument, appellant devotes most of his efforts to an attempt to demonstrate that the trial court committed error in holding that the facts of this case are ruled by the Travis and Williams cases rather than by the Muntz case. We do not agree.

We start consideration of this question by according considerable weight to the decision of the trial judge as to the local law of his own state, in which he has had long experience. Sudderth v. National Lead Co., 5 Cir., 1959, 272 F.2d 259, 263, and the Supreme Court cases listed in Note 11. In addition, critical examination of the three cases listed by the court in giving reasons for its action convinces us that it could hardly have reached any other conclusion. The three cases were all decided within a six year period and all more than a half century ago. The district court correctly stated that the Supreme Court of Louisiana had, in Muntz, held the railroad responsible for negligence in the permitted use of its rolling stock by others, as the result of which a twelve year old child was killed.

But the Louisiana Supreme Court announced a few years later that the rule of the Muntz case applied only "in favor of the public; that is to say, of carrying...