Ferrara v. Walters, No. 2002-CA-02052-SCT.

Decision Date22 September 2005
Docket NumberNo. 2002-CA-02052-SCT.
Citation919 So.2d 876
PartiesChristopher A. FERRARA v. Nancy S. WALTERS and Dennis R. Strong.
CourtMississippi Supreme Court

Thomas E. Vaughn, Gulfport, attorney for appellant.

David A. Wheeler, Candace C. Wheeler, Biloxi, attorneys for appellee.

Before WALLER, P.J., GRAVES and RANDOLPH, JJ.

GRAVES, Justice, for the Court.

¶ 1. On or about December 4, 2001, Nancy S. Walters and Dennis R. Strong (the "Sellers") entered into a contract with Christopher A. Ferrara to sell certain real property located in Harrison County, Mississippi. Prior to closing, Ferrara discovered a defect in the chain of title which was not properly cured by the Sellers. Ferrara filed suit in the Chancery Court of Harrison County seeking, inter alia, declaratory judgment and specific performance. The Sellers counterclaimed alleging slander of title, an intentional interference with a contract, and abuse of process. Following a bench trial, the chancellor entered judgment denying any relief to Ferrara, but granting the Sellers compensatory damages in the amount of $15,358.97 and punitive damages in the amount of $30,000.00. Aggrieved by the chancellor's rulings, Ferrara appeals and asserts multiple assignments of error.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. Ferrara, a real estate venture capitalist, sought to purchase a large tract of land in Biloxi, Mississippi, for a substantial commercial project. Ferrara located a prime area for development and contracted for the purchase of contiguous properties within the tract. On or about December 4, 2001, the Sellers entered into a contract with Ferrara to sell one lot in a line of lots needed to provide access to the project. The subject property included a house located on a 50 feet by 85 feet lot which previously belonged to the Sellers' mother and father, Mr. and Mrs. J.W. Strong. Ferrara and the Sellers agreed to a purchase price of $37,500, with the closing date set for 45 days after the acceptance by the Seller. The contract also contained a provision that the possession date was upon the close of the sale and delivery of a warranty deed. Also, pursuant to the contract, Ferrara deposited $3000 with the Sellers' broker as earnest money. The contract further provided that the Sellers were to furnish a warranty deed to Ferrara and that a reasonable time would be permitted for an examination of the title. With regard to the title, the contract provided, "Should examination of the title reveal defect[s] which can be cured, the Seller[s] hereby obligates himself (themselves) to cure same as expeditiously as possible, and to execute and tender [a] Warranty Deed in accordance with the terms thereof."

¶ 3. After conducting a title search, Ferrara discovered that the subject property was previously owned by Cole R. Budd, who conveyed it via a warranty deed to Mr. and Mrs. J.W. Strong on July 11, 1950. The Budd-Strong conveyance was made without any reference to rights of survivorship or otherwise. Therefore, Ferrara concluded that the property was jointly owned by Mr. and Mrs. Strong as tenants in common. Mr. Strong died on December 12, 1974.

¶ 4. On January 6, 2002, David Crane, Ferrara's attorney, contacted the Sellers' realtor and discovered that a quitclaim deed had been filed on December 1, 2000, purportedly conveying the subject property to the Sellers, who were two of the children of Mr. and Mrs. J.W. Strong.1 This deed stated that the grantors were Mrs. Strong and all the heirs of Mr. Strong. Crane set out to discover whether there had been an adjudication of heirship or whether an estate had been opened on behalf of Mr. Strong. He wanted to determine whether those who executed the quitclaim deed to the Sellers had been adjudicated the sole heirs of Mr. Strong. Upon review, Crane determined that there was no record of any adjudication of the heirs of Mr. Strong, and there was no evidence of whether or not he died intestate. Ferrara then requested an updated title abstract on the subject property, which was not received until January 17, 2002.2 Sometime during the week of January 17, Ferrara's attorney sent a completed, but undated, HUD-1 Settlement form to the Sellers' attorney. However, according to undisputed testimony from witnesses on both sides, there was never a date and time set for the closing. Seven days outside the 45-day period initially provided for pursuant to the contract, on January 25, Ferrara's attorney (Crane) contacted the Sellers' realtor (Curtis Harrison) and requested an additional three (3) weeks to close. The Sellers denied this request, and their real estate agent so advised Ferrara's attorney by letter on January 26, 2002.

¶ 5. As soon as Crane had learned of the quitclaim deed from Strong's heirs, he advised Ferrara that, in his opinion, the title was in fact defective. Crane presented Ferrara with the options of going forward with the sale with a defective title or requiring the Sellers to cure the defects under the contract. Ferrara directed Crane to send a letter to Harrison addressing their concerns about the defective title. Although the record does not contain such letter, Crane's January 25 letter to Harrison confirms that they had previously discussed the defects. The Sellers advised Ferrara, after the time to close the transaction had expired, that they were moving forward with a subsequent closing with an unrelated buyer. Ferrara filed the present action seeking, inter alia, specific performance, declaratory judgment relief and damages. Ferrara also filed a lis pendens notice which the Sellers contend prevented a subsequent sale to the third-party buyer for the sum of $40,000.3 The Sellers counterclaimed for the loss of the sale of the property, out-of-pocket expenses, attorneys' fees and punitive damages for intentional interference with a contract.

¶ 6. This matter went to trial on July 17-18, 2002. The chancellor entered a judgment denying Ferrara any relief in this matter and granting relief to the Sellers on the counterclaim. The judgment provided for compensatory damages in the amount of $1,779.47 and attorneys' fees in the amount of $5,579.50. The final judgment was entered on November 14, 2002.

¶ 7. On December 4, 2002, some twenty (20) days after entry of judgment, the Sellers filed two motions. The first motion was for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(c) in order for the chancellor to determine whether punitive damages were recoverable. The second motion sought relief from the judgment pursuant to Rule 60 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, alleging that the chancellor had misapplied the law as set forth in § 11-1-65(1)(c). On September 12, 2003, some ten (10) months after the initial judgment, the chancellor entered an additional judgment, specifying the percentage of interest and awarding the Sellers punitive damages. The chancellor calculated interest on the $40,000 sale with the third-party buyer for 30 months at 8% or $8,000. The court then combined that number with the $1,779.49 compensatory damages award and the $5,579.50 attorneys' fees award, both of which had been awarded in the first judgment. Thus, the total award for compensatory damages, attorneys' fees and interest was set at $15,358.99. The court then entered a punitive damages award in the amount of $30,000. Ferrara timely appealed and asserted multiple assignments of error which have been consolidated for efficiency.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

¶ 8. Our standard of review regarding determinations of a chancellor is well-established.

This Court will reverse a chancellor only where he is manifestly wrong. Hans v. Hans, 482 So.2d 1117, 1119 (Miss.1986); Duane v. Saltaformaggio, 455 So.2d 753 757 (Miss.1984). A chancellor's findings will not be disturbed unless he was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied. Tinnin v. First United Bank of Miss., 570 So.2d 1193, 1194 (Miss.1990); Bell v. Parker, 563 So.2d 594, 596-97 (Miss. 1990). Where there is substantial evidence to support his findings, this Court is without the authority to disturb his conclusions, although it might have found otherwise as an original matter. In re Estate of Harris, 539 So.2d 1040, 1043 (Miss.1989). Additionally, where the chancellor has made no specific findings, we will proceed on the assumption that he resolved all such fact issues in favor of the appellee. Newsom v. Newsom, 557 So.2d 511, 514 (Miss.1990). The chancellor's decision must be upheld unless it is found to be contrary to the weight of the evidence or if it is manifestly wrong. O.J. Stanton & Co. v. Miss. State Highway. Comm'n., 370 So.2d 909, 911 (Miss.1979).

In re Savell, 876 So.2d 308, 312 (Miss. 2004); In re Johnson, 735 So.2d 231, 236 (Miss.1999). See also Williams v. Williams, 843 So.2d 720, 722 (Miss.2003); Cox v. F-S Prestress, Inc., 797 So.2d 839, 843 (Miss.2003); Holloman v. Holloman, 691 So.2d 897, 898 (Miss.1996). However, the chancery court's interpretation and application of the law is reviewed de novo. Weissinger v. Simpson, 861 So.2d 984, 987 (Miss.2003); Tucker v. Prisock, 791 So.2d 190, 192 (Miss.2001); In re Carney, 758 So.2d 1017, 1019 (Miss.2000).

I. Whether the Chancellor erred in refusing to require Sellers to correct defects in the title to the property and convey same.

¶ 9. Ferrara contends that the chancellor was manifestly wrong in failing to require the Sellers to correct the defect in the title to the property and convey the property pursuant to the terms of their contract. The standard of review for questions concerning the construction of a contract are questions of law that are committed to the court rather than to the fact-finder. Warwick v. Gautier Utility Dist., 738 So.2d 212, 215 (Miss.1999); Miss. State Highway Comm'n v. Patterson Enters., Ltd., 627 So.2d 261, 263 (Miss.1993). Because Ferrara calls into question the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
95 cases
  • G&B Invs., Inc. v. Henderson (In re Evans)
    • United States
    • U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Southern District of Mississippi
    • October 7, 2011
    ...that “neither party will do anything which injures the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement.” Ferrara v. Walters, 919 So.2d 876, 883 (Miss.2005); see also Lippincott v. Miss. Bureau of Narcotics, 856 So.2d 465, 467 (Miss.Ct.App.2003) (citing Hartford Accident & Indem.......
  • JOEL v. JOEL
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • September 23, 2010
    ...Whatever the explanation, that statement in City of Greenville is in error. 1. Mrs. Joel died before the trial. 2. Ferrara v. Walters, 919 So.2d 876, 880-81 (Miss.2005) (quoting In re Savell, 876 So.2d 308, 312 (Miss.2004) (internal citations 3. The phrase "erred in adopting" should probabl......
  • Jones v. Miss. Institutions Learning
    • United States
    • Mississippi Court of Appeals
    • August 14, 2018
    ... ... anything which injures the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement." Ferrara v. Walters , 919 So.2d 876, 883 ( 19) (Miss. 2005) (internal quotation mark omitted). As stated ... ...
  • McMahan Jets, LLC v. Roadlink Transp., Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee
    • December 18, 2014
    ...the Court accords words their plain and ordinary meaning. See Allmand v. Pavletic, 292 S.W.3d 618, 630 (Tenn.2009) ; Ferrara v. Walters, 919 So.2d 876, 882 (Miss.2005). If it can do so reasonably, the Court will construe all provisions in harmony with one another. See Guiliano v. Cleo, Inc.......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT