Ferrazzano-Mazza v. Colvin
| Decision Date | 23 July 2015 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No. 14-239ML |
| Parties | JULIE FERRAZZANO-MAZZA, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Julie Ferrazzano-Mazza is an active young woman who completed her Ph.D., lived alone on her farm (which she managed), cared for her dogs, worked in her herb garden, practiced yoga, socialized with family and friends, attended a women's group, enjoyed reading and writing, exercised to lose weight and (as she told health providers, but now denies) worked at her family's restaurant, yet alleges that she did these activities while fully disabled by pain caused by fibromyalgia and disc degeneration, as well as by mental health issues. Her claim is complicated by a "profound alcohol problem."
Before the Court is her motion for reversal of the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner"), denying Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under §§ 205(g) and 1631(c)(3) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3) (the "Act"). Plaintiff contends that the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") committed reversible error by failing to find that fibromyalgia and other physical conditions are severe impairments at Step Two and by failing to giving sufficient weight to the opinions of her psychiatric nurse. Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin ("Defendant") has filed a motion for an order affirming the Commissioner's decision. The matter has been referred to mefor preliminary review, findings and recommended disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Having reviewed the record, I find that the ALJ's findings are well supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, I recommend that Plaintiff's Motion to Reverse the Decision of the Commissioner (ECF No. 10) be DENIED and Defendant's Motion for Order Affirming the Decision of the Commissioner (ECF No. 14) be GRANTED.
Plaintiff claims that she became disabled on June 9, 2009, when she was thirty-three years old, as a result of the limiting effects of the pain caused by fibromyalgia and degenerative disc disease, coupled with anxiety, depression, bipolar disorder and panic disorder. She contends that active substance abuse serious enough to require two periods of in-patient treatment for detoxification - one of her treating providers labelled it as "a profound alcohol problem" - is not a material contributing factor. Tr. 503.
Beginning prior to and continuing into the period of claimed disability, Plaintiff earned her Ph.D. in finance and organizational behavior, although she did not complete her dissertation. Tr. 53-54. At the beginning of the period of disability, she was married; by the time of the hearing on November 14, 2012, she had divorced, Tr. 56, and had been living alone without help in a house on a farm that she owns and manages (for example, arranging for logging that generated income "to pay bills").1 Tr. 53, 57, 63, 75; ECF No. 2-1 at 1. From 2003 through thefirst half of 2009, Plaintiff's annual reported income consistently exceeded $20,000 per year (except for 2006, when it was $19,025), Tr. 215-16, which she earned while working at Murphy's, her family's restaurant.2 At the hearing, she claimed that she stopped working after she tossed plates at a customer who was being very rude; she did not mention pain as a cause. Tr. 61. Although she stopped reporting income after 2009, the medical record reflects that she continued to work at the restaurant throughout the period of alleged disability. Tr. 354 ); Tr. 305 (); Tr. 333 (); Tr. 331 (); Tr. 502 ();3 Tr. 430 (Nurse Benson's note of September 13, 2011, "Job Murphy's"); Tr. 432 (Nurse Benson's note of May 18, 2012, "Job: Murphy's"). When asked about this evidence at the hearing, she admitted to going regularly to the restaurant, but claimed that she did not work while she was there. Tr. 61-62.
Despite her claim of disability, Plaintiff has continued to pursue a wide array of personal interests and activities, including yoga and meditation, walking regularly, writing, reading, caring for her dogs, hobbies and sports, exercising (such as working out on the elliptical to lose weight), socializing with friends and family, attending a woman's group, performing varioushousehold chores and going regularly to her chiropractor and to church. Tr. 77, 82-83, 250-51, 311, 519. While she claims that her panic attacks are so disabling that she cannot drive, Tr. 331 (), the record also reflects three arrests for drunk driving ("DUI") over the same period. Tr. 73-74. These support the inference drawn by the ALJ that she was driving and that her decision to stop driving is likely attributable to the legal consequences of these convictions, including the repeated loss of her license. Tr. 34. The third DUI plainly affected driving as it caused her to be incarcerated for ten days after arrest and to be placed on home confinement for a year, with probation beyond that. Tr. 73-74, 410.
Plaintiff contends that her relevant medical history began almost a year before the alleged onset of disability (June 2009), when Dr. George Cohen of Massachusetts General Hospital saw her on August 28, 2008, for musculoskeletal pain that had persisted since late 2006. Tr. 492. Plaintiff reported fatigue, exhaustion, poor sleep and problems with memory and concentration, "although she works hard." Id. On examination, while he saw neither swelling nor limits on her range of motion, Dr. Cohen found tenderness in various specified points. Id. He diagnosed "[f]ibromyalgia/myofascial pain syndrome," prescribed a muscle relaxant and suggested treatment with a "tricyclic, or possibly with an agent such as Lyrica." Tr. 493. Whatever pain Plaintiff was experiencing prior to and for the ten months following her appointment with Dr. Cohen was not disabling because she worked continuously and attended school full time throughout. Plaintiff never returned to Dr. Cohen, although she emailed him a few times about medication side effects in the fall of 2008; he suggested she see a psychiatrist. Tr. 537-40. After 2008, she continued treatment for fibromyalgia based on his diagnosis with medication prescribed by various providers at Atmed Primary Care ("Atmed").
Also during the pre-onset period, while she continued to work, Plaintiff saw three neurologists for back and rib pain; apart from an MRI that revealed a small disc protrusion, no significant abnormality was found and treatment was limited to injections and physical therapy, to which she responded well. Tr. 287-303. This pain was also treated by chiropractor Dr. Nancy Puth, whom Plaintiff saw somewhat regularly both pre- and post-onset, although there are few legible treating notes in the record reflecting this course of treatment. Tr. 380-85, 412-19, 508-10. Finally, in February 2009, Plaintiff began therapy at the Quality Behavioral Health Clinic ("QBH"); at her initial evaluation, she reported anxiety, depression, panic attacks, chronic pain, but also a "very busy life/schedule," with increased alcohol use. Tr. 386.
The first post-onset mental health treatment record, from November 2009, reflects a visit with psychiatrist Dr. Henry Mann for anxiety; Plaintiff told him that she had tried going without medication in favor of holistic treatment, but ended up drinking alcohol. Tr. 304. In April 2010, she complained to Dr. Mann of panic attacks. He continued her medication for anxiety, prescribed a muscle relaxant and added Adderall because attention deficit hyperactivity disorder ("ADHD") had been diagnosed when she was a child, although he also told her "the ADHD diagnosis is incorrect." Tr. 82, 305. The first physical health treating record after onset is Plaintiff's February 2010, visit to her primary care physician, Dr. Gregory Sadovnikoff at Atmed, for a cold. Tr. 356. In March, Plaintiff returned to Dr. Sadovnikoff for her annual physical; all findings were normal with no complaint of pain. Tr. 354.
Plaintiff's most significant treatment in 2010 was in mid-May, when she referred herself to Kent Hospital for anxiety and alcohol detoxification and was hospitalized for three days. Tr. 306. Staff noted she "started drinking about two years ago - binge pattern - drinking to point of blackout - last episode of drinking was this a.m." Tr. 306. A hospital-based psychiatristdiagnosed alcohol dependence and panic disorder; the mental status observations recorded at intake included "concentration: unremarkable." Tr. 307-11. At intake, her GAF4 was assessed as 30; at discharge, she was less anxious and her GAF was assessed at 55, with a GAF score of 65 as highest in the past year. Tr. 322-23. One of the strengths listed in her treatment plan included: "[a]ble to return to work." Tr. 316. As the ALJ noted, this is the only hospitalization during the period of alleged disability. Tr. 36.
Also in 2010, on May 26, Plaintiff started treating at QBH with Nurse Cristiana Rosa, PCNS; during intake, Nurse Rosa diagnosed anxiety disorder, alcohol dependence and assessed a GAF score of 60.5 Tr. 333-35, 544. In June 2010, Plaintiff denied recent alcohol use and said she was doing yoga, talked about anxiety caused by issues with her mother and husband and reported that she was "hardly working at family restaurant recently too anxiety ridden to drive." Tr. 331. Later that...
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