Ferreira v. Secretary, Dept. of Corrections

• Decision Date: 07 August 2007
• Docket Number: No. 04-15761.,04-15761.
• Citation: 494 F.3d 1286
• Parties: Anthony FERREIRA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Attorney General, State of Florida, Respondents-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

494 F.3d 1286

Anthony FERREIRA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Attorney General, State of Florida, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 04-15761.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

August 7, 2007.

Michael N. Loebl (Court-Appointed), Fulcher Hagler, LLP, Augusta, GA, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Rebecca Roark Wall, Daytona Beach, FL, for Respondents-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before BLACK, PRYOR and COX, Circuit Judges.

BLACK, Circuit Judge:

Following its decision in Burton v. Stewart, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 793, 166 L.Ed.2d 628 (2007), the Supreme Court vacated this Court's opinion in Ferreira v Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 183 Fed.Appx. 885 (11th Cir.2006), and remanded it for further consideration in light of Burton. Previously, we held that Ferreira's petition for a writ of habeas corpus was time-barred. Ferreira, 183 Fed.Appx. at 886. We reasoned that when a petitioner who had been resentenced challenged only his underlying conviction in a habeas petition, the one-year statute of limitations in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) runs from the date the conviction became final, regardless of when the petitioner's corrected sentence became final. Id. at 887. After a thorough consideration of Burton and reconsideration of our relevant precedent, we now hold that AEDPA's statute of limitations runs from the date the judgment pursuant to which the petitioner is in custody becomes final, which is the date both the conviction and sentence the petitioner is serving become final.

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Anthony Ferreira was tried and convicted in a Florida state court. He appealed his conviction through the state appellate system. On September 11, 1997, the Florida Supreme Court denied his appeal. Ninety days later, on December 10, 1997, his right to direct review terminated when he decided not to file a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.

On August 18, 1998, 251 days after his right to direct review ended, Ferreira filed a post-conviction motion in the Florida state system, tolling AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The state court denied the motion, and issued the mandate on February 8, 2002. On June 2, 2002, Ferreira's statute of limitations to file a federal habeas petition expired. Twenty days later, on June 24, 2002, Ferreira filed another post-conviction motion in the state system to correct his sentence, which the state court granted. Ferreira was resentenced, and the mandate finalizing that judgment issued on April 14, 2003. On June 10, 2003, 57 days after Ferreira's corrected sentence became final, he filed his federal habeas petition, including claims concerning only his original conviction and not his subsequent resentencing.

The district court found the petition was untimely and dismissed it. We granted a certificate of appealability (COA) limited to the following issue: "Whether the district court properly found that a habeas corpus petitioner who was resentenced and who only challenged the original trial proceedings [in his habeas petition] without raising any challenge based on resentencing procedures is not entitled to the benefit of a new statute of limitations period commencing from the date the resentencing judgment became final." Ferreira, 183 Fed. Appx. at 886.

Relying on Rainey v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corr., 443 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir.2006), we held that "[b]ecause Ferreira's habeas petition challenged only his judgment of conviction, without raising any challenge to his resentencing judgment, the AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations began when his judgment of conviction became final." Ferreira, 183 Fed.Appx. at 886. There is no dispute that Ferreira's habeas petition was filed more than 365 days after his conviction and original sentence became final on December 10, 1997. Therefore, unless the limitations period started anew when his corrected sentence became final, his petition would be barred by AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations. Our task, therefore, is to determine, in light of Burton, whether we measure the statute of limitations from the date Ferreira's conviction became final (December 10, 1997) or when his corrected sentence became final (April 14, 2003), when the only claims in his federal habeas application concern his original conviction.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo the district court's determination that a petition for federal habeas corpus relief was time-barred under AEDPA. Moore v. Crosby, 321 F.3d 1377, 1379 (11th Cir.2003).

III. DISCUSSION

AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitations on petitions for writs of habeas corpus. In particular, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) provides "[a] 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court." The limitation period in this case runs from "the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The question in this case is what constitutes the judgment for the statute of limitations when a petitioner has his sentence corrected.

We have examined this issue in two contexts. The first is where a petitioner challenges his custody by bringing claims concerning both the corrected sentence and the underlying conviction. See Walker v. Crosby, 341 F.3d 1240, 1241-42 (11th Cir.2003). The second is where a petitioner challenges his custody by bringing claims concerning only the underlying conviction. See Rainey v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corr., 443 F.3d 1323, 1325-26 (11th Cir. 2006). In both prior cases and the panel decision in Ferreira, this Court addressed the conviction and sentence as separate and distinct judgments, each triggering the statute of limitations depending on what claims the petitioner included in his habeas application.

This framework is altered by the holding in Burton. In light of Burton, the judgment reflects the sentence the petitioner is serving and the underlying conviction. A short discussion of both precedents is necessary to understand the issue in this case and specifically how Burton affects our analysis.

A. Walker v. Crosby

In Walker, the petitioner's statute of limitations began to run on AEDPA's effective date, April 24, 1996. The district court found, and this Court presumed, petitioner's statute of limitations period expired on April 23, 1997.¹ Walker, 341 F.3d at 1242. In October 1997, petitioner filed a motion to correct his sentence in state court, and the state court granted his motion. Id. at 1241.

On February 4, 1998, Walker was resentenced, and he subsequently appealed his resentencing. Id. On February 24, 1998, while the appeal was pending, Walker filed a federal habeas petition in the district court, which included claims only concerning his original conviction. Id. The district court dismissed the petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust remedies in state court. Id. at 1241-42. Thereafter, the mandate finalizing Walker's resentencing issued on June 5, 1998. After filing a host of state court post-conviction remedies tolling AEDPA's statute of limitations, Walker filed his second habeas petition on January 16, 2001. See id. at 1242 & n. 3. The district court dismissed the petition as time-barred. Id. at 1242.

This Court granted a COA on "whether individual claims within a single habeas petition may be reviewed separately for timeliness." Id. at 1241. This Court interpreted the word "application" in § 2244(d)(1) to include all claims within a single application. Id. at 1245; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) ("A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus . . . .") (emphasis added). Consequently, when computing the statute of limitations, we held the district court should determine if the "application" as a whole is timely, without looking individually at the claims comprising the application. Walker, 341 F.3d at 1245. In Walker, petitioner's sentencing claims, along with his claims regarding his underlying conviction, were a part of the timely application, therefore we held the entire application was timely. Id. at 1246. We noted that this interpretation of § 2244(d)(1) "allows for the resurrection of what seem to be time-barred claims tagging along on the coattails of a timely claim." Id. at 1247.

Walker, thus, held that so long as the petitioner challenges his custody by bringing claims concerning both the underlying conviction and the corrected sentence, the petitioner will get the benefit of the statute of limitations starting anew on the date the corrected sentence becomes final. Id. This is true even though both Walker's underlying conviction and original sentence had been final for more than one year before his sentence was corrected. Walker did not address what would happen if a petitioner was resentenced but challenged his custody by bringing claims only concerning his original conviction and did not include any claims based on his corrected sentence. We addressed that very question in Rainey.

B. Rainey v. Secretary for the Department of Corrections

In Rainey, the petitioner's conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal on September 28, 1999. Rainey, 443 F.3d at 1325. Rainey's federal statute of limitations had expired before he filed a state motion for post-conviction relief on February 13, 2001, asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and a right to resentencing. Id. He was subsequently resentenced, and his corrected sentence became final on December 13, 2002. Id. On March 27, 2003, after validly tolling AEDPA's statute of limitations, Rainey timely filed his federal habeas petition. Id.

Unlike Walker, Rainey did not challenge his custody by bringing claims concerning his corrected sentence, instead bringing...