Ferrell v. Fla. Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 21 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 4:21cv397-WS-MAF |
| Parties | LEROY FERRELL, as Executor de son Tort of the Estate of LARIAN FERRELL, and on behalf of survivors LEROY FERRELL and JULIE FERRELL, Plaintiff, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, RICKY D. DIXON, in his official capacity as SECRETARY JOHN DOES 1-5, MILTON HICKS, in his individual capacity, and CENTURION OF FLORIDA, LLC, a health services Corporation, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
THIRD REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION[1]
Pending is an amended motion to dismiss, ECF No. 19, filed by Defendants Ricky D. Dixon, [2] Milton Hicks, and the Florida Department of Corrections [“FDOC”]. Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion, ECF No. 23, and the motion is ready for a ruling. This case has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(C) and this Report and Recommendation concerns only the amended motion to dismiss the complaint brought by the FDOC Defendants.[3]
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A complaint's well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true, but “conclusory allegations” unsupported by facts are “not entitled to an assumption of truth.” Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709-10 (11th Cir. 2010). A complaint must allege sufficient facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” to support a plaintiff's claims. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 ().
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965). A complaint does not need detailed factual allegations; however, pleadings which contain “no more than conclusions” are “not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” 129 S.Ct. at 1950. A complaint is insufficient “if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.'” 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965).
Following the death of their son Larian Ferrell, Leroy Ferrell, as Executor de son Tort of the Estate of Larian Ferrell, filed this action on behalf of survivors and parents Leroy and Julie Ferrell, alleging deliberate indifference and wrongful death. ECF No. 5 at 2. Mr. Ferrell had been incarcerated at Cross City Correctional Institution when he was fatally stabbed in the stomach by another inmate. Id. at 3. On May 18, 2019, [4]Mr. Ferrell died from his injuries. Id.
Cross City C.I. is a correctional institution operated under the authority of the Florida Department of Corrections [F“DOC”]. Defendant Milton Hicks was the Warden of Cross City C.I. at the time of the events at issue, and is sued in his individual capacity only. The Secretary of the FDOC, Ricky Dixon, is sued in his official capacity only. ECF No. 5 at 2.
The complaint alleges that Mr. Ferrell was attacked because the correctional facility was understaffed and lacked “policies and procedures and security . . . to protect the inmates.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff claims that the prisoner “would not have been able to fatally injure Mr. Ferrell except for constitutional violations by prison officials, including medical officials.” Id.
As it pertains to the claims brought against Defendants Hicks Dixon, and the FDOC, it is alleged that “all Defendants knew that FDOC did not have a sufficient inmate classification policy; they did not have a sufficient safety, security and protection policy; they did not have sufficient security checks; and they did not have sufficient security training.” Id. at 4. Plaintiffs contends that there was a 25% increase in inmate gang members in the year before Mr. Ferrell's attack and 90 inmate homicide deaths between 2015 and 2021. Id. at 5. Thus, Plaintiffs assert that FDOC employees, agents, policymakers, and supervisors knew that inmate violence was occurring, and they “knew that there was a serious need for more staff, better training of correctional officers, and better policies and procedures regarding the safety and security of inmates at Cross City Correctional Institution and at other correctional facilities in the state of Florida.” ECF No. 5 at 5. The complaint alleges that Mr. Ferrell's “life could have been saved” if better policies and procedures were implemented. Id. at 6. Further, it is alleged that “Defendants cooperated in a policy to short-staff corrections security positions such that there was not a full, adequate and or competent staff in the prison dormitories, including the Cross City Correctional Institution on the day of the incident.” Id. Defendants allegedly allowed “inmates to travel freely throughout the correctional facility when in fact, the inmates were not authorized to do so.” Id.
Defendants were aware of “unauthorized visits of inmates and did nothing about it.” Id.
It is also claimed that the FDOC “ratified or condoned the concealing or covering up of violence against inmates and suspicious circumstances surrounding inmate deaths, which made further deaths more likely.” Id. at 7. FDOC allegedly also condoned “the practice of destroying evidence or failing to preserve evidence in regard to inmate deaths.” Id. FDOC is also alleged to “condone the practice of failing to conduct effective investigation and/or conduct investigations in good faith in regard to inmate deaths.” Id.
As it pertains to the instant motion to dismiss, the complaint asserts five (5) counts against the FDOC Defendants. Count I of the complaint raises a failure to protect claim under § 1983 against John Doe Correctional Officer and Sergeant Defendants. ECF No. 5 at 8-10. Count II is a failure to protect claim under § 1983 against Defendants Hicks and Dixon. Id. at 10-12. Count III is a deliberate indifference claim under § 1983 against Defendants Dixon, Hicks, and John Doe Supervisory Officers. Id. at 13-14. Count V is a state law claim brought against the FDOC pursuant to the Florida Wrongful Death Act, FLA. STAT. § 768.16, et seq. Id. at 17-21.
Count VII is an alternative claim for negligence against the FDOC, brought pursuant to state law. Id. at 25.
Defendants contend that the complaint is an impermissible shotgun pleading that “does not give the Defendants proper notice of which allegations are levied against them” and should be dismissed. ECF No. 19 at 6-8. Defendants claim that it is “impossible for each Defendant to determine the claims and factual assertions made against him.” Id. at 8. They argue that if the “Court were to eliminate the legal conclusions in this Complaint . . . there would be very little left of the Complaint to consider.” Id. at 7.
In response, Plaintiff contends that the ”Complaint alleges facts sufficient to state each claim.” ECF No. 23 at 5. He asserts that the “Complaint adequately specifies the policy and customs that constituted deliberate indifference.” Id. at 6.
Shotgun pleadings violate Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)'s “short and plain statement” requirement by “failing ... to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1294-95 (11th Cir. 2018) (quotations and alteration omitted). Shotgun pleadings are characterized by: (1) multiple counts that each adopt the allegations of all preceding counts; (2) conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts that do not clearly connect to a particular cause of action; (3) failing to separate each cause of action or claim for relief into distinct counts; or (4) combining multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which defendant is responsible for which act. Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Ofc., 792 F.3d 1313, 1321-23 (11th Cir. 2015).
Clifford v. Federman, 855 Fed.Appx. 525, 528 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 338 (2021).
Although the complaint does re-allege “Common Allegations of Fact” for each count, it also includes specific facts listed under each separate count which give notice of the specific claims against Centurion and the grounds upon which those claims rest. The counts are separated into distinct causes of action, identify the Defendants sued under those causes of action, and at least generally points to facts which support the claims. Defendants have adequate notice of the claims against them and an asserted basis upon which each claim rests. Some assertions are, indeed, conclusory, but that in and of itself does not transform the complaint into a shotgun pleading. The motion to dismiss, ECF No. 19 at 6-8, should be denied as to that argument.
Defendants contends that Counts II and III are brought against Defendant Dixon “in his official capacity only, which is the functional equivalent of suing the FDOC itself.” ECF No. 19 at 9. Because Plaintiff seeks money damages as relief, Defendant Dixon contends such damages are unavailable under § 1983 because Defendant Dixon has Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id.
It has been well established that when state officials named as defendants...
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