Ferrell v. Harvard Industries, Inc., Civil Action No. 00-2707 (E.D. Pa. 10/23/2001)
| Decision Date | 23 October 2001 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 00-2707. |
| Parties | ROBIN L. FERRELL; MARCUS B. MURRAY and MARK A. STEWART, Plaintiffs, v. HARVARD INDUSTRIES, INC. and POTTSTOWN PRECISION CASTING, INC., formerly DOEHLER JARVIS POTTSTOWN, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Plaintiffs Robin L. Ferrell, Marcus B. Murray and Mark A. Stewart ("Plaintiffs") sued their former employer, Pottstown Precision Casting, Inc., formerly Doehler Jarvis Pottstown ("PPC") and its parent company, Harvard Industries, Inc. ("Harvard") (collectively, "Defendants") under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e ("Title VII"), each plaintiff alleging several theories of discrimination as well as retaliation.1 All three allege that they were retaliated against for their involvement with Ferrell's original sexual harassment complaints. Plaintiff Stewart also alleges tortious retaliatory discharge at common law, stemming from a complaint he filed against PPC with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in June 1998.
We have before us Defendants' motions for summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs' claims and a separate summary judgment motion by Defendant Harvard contending that liability cannot be properly extended to it as PPC's parent company. We now find that triable issues of fact exist as to Plaintiff Ferrell's discrimination complaint and Ferrell's and Murray's retaliation complaints. On the other hand, Plaintiff Stewart's common law tortious wrongful discharge claim fails because he benefitted from a collective bargaining agreement, and because he was not discharged, but placed on temporary layoff and later recalled. Moreover, even if Plaintiff Stewart establishes a prima facie retaliation claim for associating with those who engaged in Title VII protected activity, we find that he has failed to raise any genuine issues of material fact regarding Defendant's legitimate, non-discriminatory explanations for the actions taken. Accordingly, we deny summary judgment as to Defendant's motions on Ferrell's and Murray's contested issues, but grant summary judgment as to Stewart's claims.
Finally, we deny summary judgment as to Harvard's motion to exclude itself from parental liability. As a matter of law, Harvard may be liable for any retaliation by its subsidiary, PPC, given Harvard's role in the allegedly faulty implementation of PPC's anti-discrimination policies. Whether or not Harvard is actually liable is a question for the trier of fact.
To avoid redundancy, rather than setting forth a separate discussion of the facts, we will discuss the relevant details of each Plaintiff's case below in connection with our legal determinations.
Our decision takes into account Plaintiffs' Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, filed on May 26, 2000 and amended on April 12, 2001, Motion by Defendant Harvard Industries for Summary Judgment and Memorandum, filed on July 13, 2001 ("Harvard SJ Mot."), Answer by Plaintiff Mark A. Stewart, Plaintiff Marcus B. Murray, Plaintiff Robin L. Ferrell, Plaintiff Barbara G. Chism to Defendant Harvard Industries, Inc. Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on July 27, 2001 ("Answer to Harvard SJ Mot."), Motion by Defendant Pottstown Precision, Defendant Harvard Industries for Summary Judgment on All Plaintiffs' Claims and Memorandum, filed on August 1, 2001 ("Def. SJ Mot."), Reply Brief by Defendant Harvard Industries to Plaintiff's Answer to Harvard's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on August 16, 2001 ("Harvard SJ Mot. II"), Answer by Plaintiff Mark A. Stewart, Plaintiff Marcus B. Murray, Plaintiff Robin L. Ferrell to Defendant Harvard Industries, Inc. Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on October 1, 2001 ("Answer to Def. SJ Mot."), and Letter by Defendants to Judge Franklin Van Antwerpen dated August 21, 2001, filed on October 15, 2001 ("Def. Letter").
We have original, subject matter jurisdiction over Title VII claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We consider Stewart's Pennsylvania common law tortious retaliation claim stemming from his OSHA complaint and Murray's and Ferrell's retaliation complaints under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. § 955(d) ("PHRA"), as well as Ferrell's sex discrimination complaint under PHRA, by exercising our supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
The court shall render summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). An issue is "genuine" only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A factual dispute is "material" only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Id. at 248, 477
U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202. All inferences must be drawn, and all doubts resolved, in favor of the non-moving party — in this case, Plaintiff. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962); Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 341 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1010, 106 S.Ct. 537, 88 L.Ed.2d 467 (1985). On motion for summary judgment, the moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the record that it believes demonstrate the absence of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). To defeat summary judgment, the non-moving party must respond with facts of record that contradict the facts identified by the movant and may not rest on mere denials. Id. at 321 n. 3, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)); see First Nat'l Bank of Pennsylvania v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 824 F.2d 277, 282 (3d Cir. 1987). The non-moving party must demonstrate the existence of evidence that would support a jury finding in its favor. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49, 106 S.Ct. at 2505.
In discrimination and retaliation cases, proof at summary judgment follows a well-established "burden-shifting" approach first set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817 (1973). Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation, the defendant must rebut an inference of wrongdoing with evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory, non-retaliatory reason for the action taken. Delli Santi v. CNA Ins. Co., 88 F.3d 192, 199 (3rd Cir. 1996); Weston v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 432 (3rd Cir. 2001).2 If a defendant successfully meets its burden in a discrimination or retaliation case, then in order to avoid summary judgment, Plaintiff must present evidence of pretext, or cover-up, or show that discrimination played a role in the employer's decision-making and had a determinative effect on the outcome. Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3rd Cir. 1994); Weston, 251 F.3d at 432.
Notwithstanding the non-moving party's burden, the Third Circuit urges special caution about granting summary judgment to an employer when its intent is at issue, particularly in discrimination and retaliation cases. Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson Medical, Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 321 (3rd Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff Ferrell alleges quid pro quo sexual harassment, retaliation for her rejection of sexual advances by her supervisor and for her complaints of sexual harassment, and hostile work environment sexual harassment. Complaint at Paragraphs 22-24, 32-40.
The Third Circuit requires that in order to prove quid pro quo sexual harassment, a plaintiff must show that her response to unwelcome advances was subsequently used as a basis for a decision about compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges or employment. Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Company, 206 F.3d 271, 281-282 (3rd Cir. 2000), citing Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1296-1297 (3d Cir. 1997). A quid pro quo sexual harassment claim may also allege that the defendant implicitly or explicitly threatened the plaintiff with retaliation when making the advance, but proving a prior threat is not necessary to establish a prima facie case of quid pro quo harassment. Id. Rather, the employer's actions subsequent to the advance are dispositive. Id. Moreover, the Third Circuit explained in Farrell, "While evidence of hostility or repeated demands for sexual favors would strengthen any plaintiff's case, the lack of such evidence does not render it fatally flawed." Id.
Plaintiff Ferrell's burden and the scope of evidence she may present are similar to those required for establishing a retaliation claim.4 Id. The Third Circuit explained, "The court can consider circumstantial evidence and draw inferences in favor of the non-moving party in reaching this determination on summary judgment." Id. Thus, we treat Ferrell's quid pro quo harassment and retaliation claims together, drawing all inferences in her favor based on her version of the facts.
Ferrell testified in her deposition that her shift supervisor, Michael Conrad, made sexual advances and insinuated that having a sexual relationship with him would be advantageous to her. Answer to Def. SJ Mot., Exhibit 1, "Deposition of Robin L. Ferrell," December 20, 2000 ("Ferrell Depo."), pp. 66:8-68:23, 586:1-5. Though Plaintiff Ferrell rejected Conrad, he remained persistent in his sexual advances and said he would "find a way to change [her] mind." Id. at 72:6-12, 73:2-10. After Ferrell refused Conrad's final invitation to "spend time with him" in about March 1997, he called her at home to say that Ferrell was making a mistake, in that she did not...
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