Fertilizer Institute v. Browner
| Decision Date | 05 October 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-7494,97-7494 |
| Citation | Fertilizer Institute v. Browner, 163 F.3d 774 (3rd Cir. 1998) |
| Parties | 29 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,349 FERTILIZER INSTITUTE, a Delaware non-profit corporation, Appellant, v. Carol M. BROWNER, Administrator, United States Environmental Protection Agency; The United States Environmental Protection Agency. . Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Peter L. Gray, McKenna & Cuneo, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Appellant.
Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, Steve C. Gold, John T. Stahr, Mary F. Edgar, Environment and Natural Resources Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.Of Counsel: Laurel Celeste, Office of General Counsel, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C., for Appellees.
Before: SLOVITER and COWEN, Circuit Judges and POLLAK, District Judge.*
The Fertilizer Institute ("TFI") appeals the decision of the district court upholding the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") addition of nitrate compounds to the Toxic Release Inventory ("Inventory").We will affirm for the reasons discussed herein.
In January 1994, the EPA proposed a rule adding 313 chemicals to the Inventory pursuant to the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act of 1986 (the "EPCRA").See42 U.S.C. §§ 11023(c)-(d).In November 1994, the EPA adopted a final rule which included 286 of the 313 chemicals originally proposed.Nitrate compounds were among the chemicals added based on chronic health effects, specifically because nitrate compounds cause human infants to develop methemoglobinemia, a condition that prevents proper transportation throughout the body of oxygen via red blood cells and causes damage to vital organs.The EPA characterized this consequence to be a "severe or irreversible ... chronic health effect," one of the criteria in the statute.See42 U.S.C. § 11023(d)(2)(B).
In May 1996, TFI, a trade association representing the fertilizer industry whose members use nitrate compounds, filed a complaint in the district court challenging the EPA's placement of nitrate compounds on the Inventory.TFI gave three reasons for its challenge to the nitrates listing: inadequate notice of the EPA's intent to place nitrates on the list under the EPA's interpretation and application of chronic health effects; inadequate response to the comments submitted by TFI; and misapplication of the statutory criteria, which resulted in the EPA's overstepping its authority under § 11023(d).Both TFI and the EPA filed motions for summary judgment.
Reviewing the overall record, the district court held that the EPA provided adequate notice to the parties, including "particularly sophisticated commenters like TFI who are familiar with nitrate compounds."Dist. Ct. Mem. Op.at 19.The district court also concluded that the EPA adequately responded to the comments submitted by several organizations, including TFI.Id. at 22.The court observed that the criticisms challenged the EPA's conclusions, but not the evidence the agency relied on in reaching them.Id. at 21-22.Finally, the district court concluded that the EPA had shown that the record supported the decision to include nitrates because of the chronic health effects they can produce in infants.Id. at 24-25.Thus, the district court upheld the agency's addition of nitrates to the Inventory, and granted summary judgment in favor of the EPA.
TFI filed a timely notice of appeal.We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
In considering summary judgment decisions, we review the case de novo, applying the same standard that the district court did.SeeCarlisle Area Sch. v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520, 526(3d Cir.1995).In the context of agency decision making, we review the agency record directly.SeeTroy Corp. v. Browner, 120 F.3d 277, 281(D.C.Cir.1997).
Courts review agency decision making with deference.The Administrative Procedure Act provides that a court should "set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).Grounds for concluding that the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously include its reliance on factors outside those Congress intended for consideration, a complete failure by the agency to consider an important aspect of the problem, or an agency's explanation contrary to, or implausible in light of, the evidence.SeeMotor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443(1983);see alsoPennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. United States Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 101 F.3d 939, 943(3d Cir.1996)().
We have often stated that in assessing the record, the court should not substitute its own judgment for the scientific expertise possessed by the agency.See, e.g., Southwestern Pa. Growth Alliance v. Browner, 121 F.3d 106, 117(3d Cir.1997).Furthermore, the courts are deferential to an agency's interpretation of a statute in situations in which "Congress has been either 'silent or ambiguous' " on the question under consideration.Id. at 116(quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694(1984)).
The Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act authorizes the EPA to add chemicals and compounds to the Inventory under three general criteria, broadly described as acute effects, chronic effects, and environmental effects.Only the first two are relevant to the analysis here.The relevant provision states:
A chemical may be added if the Administrator determines, in his judgment, that there is sufficient evidence to establish any one of the following:
(A) The chemical is known to cause or can reasonably be anticipated to cause significant adverse human health effects at concentration levels that are reasonably likely to exist beyond facility site boundaries as a result of continuous, or frequently recurring, releases.
(III) heritable genetic mutations, or
(IV) other chronic health effects.
§ 11023(d)(2)(emphasis added).Subsection (A) governs chemicals that have acute effects and imposes two determinations on the EPA: significant adverse human health effects and a minimum level of exposure.In contrast, the chronic effects standard of subsection (B) requires only a determination of "serious or irreversible ... chronic health effects," and does not refer to any level of exposure.
We consider TFI's challenge to the EPA's addition of nitrate compounds to the Inventory under the "chronic health effects" language of subsection (B)(ii)(IV).
First, TFI asserts that the EPA changed its definition and then applied the new definition of "chronic health effects" when adding nitrates to the Inventory, but without explaining the reasons for doing so.TFI compares the language in the EPA's Hazard Assessment Guidelines for Listing Chemicals on the Toxic Release Inventory, Revised Draft (26 May 1992)("Draft HAG"), with the determination made in the final rule.The Draft HAG states that chronic health effects "result from long-term exposure to a chemical."Draft HAGat 29(emphasis added).By contrast, the EPA's listing for nitrates is premised on the long-term (i.e., chronic) consequences of methemoglobinemia.
It is well-established that an agency may not depart from "established precedent without announcing a principled reason for such a reversal."Donovan v. Adams Steel Erection, Inc.766 F.2d 804, 807(3d Cir.1985)(citingLocal 777, Democratic Union Organizing Committee v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862(D.C.Cir.1978)).Nor may an agency "chang[e] course by rescinding a [promulgated] rule" without providing "a reasoned analysis for the change."Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 42, 103 S.Ct. 2856.Either of these actions would be arbitrary and capricious.
However, we are not persuaded that the EPA has abandoned its prior practices here in the way that the precedents require to trigger an explanation.In Adams Steel, the agency departed from a series of agency-established and court-established precedential standards, and in Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, the agency departed from an already promulgated rule, as distinguished from the unpromulgated Draft HAG, upon which TFI relies.Significantly, TFI did not challenge the evidence on which the EPA relied either in the rulemaking or in the district court.We conclude that the EPA was free to exercise its discretion and expert judgment in relying on a definition of other chronic effects that does not require long-term exposure.We agree with the D.C. Circuit's conclusion that the EPA did not abandon any long-held policy in promulgating this rule.SeeTroy Corp., 120 F.3d at 287.
However, TFI also contends that the EPA has used the phrase "other chronic effects" inconsistently within the final rule at issue.TFI apparently argues that because the EPA now views persistence beyond the period of exposure as a characteristic of chronic effects, four chemicals that it listed under acute effects (subsection (A))(methyltrichlorosilane, trimethyltrichlorosilane, brucine, and phosphine) should have been listed under chronic effects (subsection (B)), because they may cause permanent injury.TFI Br.at 22.
The EPA concedes that it withdrew voluntarily two of the chemicals (methyltrichlorosilane and trimethyltrichlorosilane) from the Inventory.EPA Br.at 31(citing...
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