Fialka-Feldman v. OAKLAND UNIV. BD. OF TRUSTEES

• Decision Date: 23 December 2009
• Docket Number: No. 08-14922.,08-14922.
• Citation: 678 F. Supp.2d 576
• Parties: Mikah FIALKA-FELDMAN, Plaintiff, v. OAKLAND UNIVERSITY BOARD OF TRUSTEES, Gary D. Russi, Mary Beth Snyder, and Lionel Maten, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

678 F.Supp.2d 576

Mikah FIALKA-FELDMAN, Plaintiff, v. OAKLAND UNIVERSITY BOARD OF TRUSTEES, Gary D. Russi, Mary Beth Snyder, and Lionel Maten, Defendants.

No. 08-14922.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

December 23, 2009.

Chris E. Davis, Veena Rao, Michigan Protection and Advocacy Service, Livonia, MI, for Plaintiff.

Regan K. Dahle, Robert A. Boonin, Butzel Long, Ann Arbor, MI, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

PATRICK J. DUGGAN, District Judge.

Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit against Defendant Oakland University Board of Trustees on November 25, 2008, claiming that Defendant's denial of his request for housing in one of Oakland University's on-campus dormitory living spaces violates the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B), and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Plaintiff has since, with the Court's permission, amended his complaint to add University officials Gary D. Russi, Mary Beth Snyder, and Lionel Maten as defendants and the following claims:

(I) disparate impact discrimination in violation of the FHA;

(II) disparate treatment discrimination in violation of the FHA;

(III) disparate treatment discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation Act;

(IV) denial of a reasonable accommodation in violation of the Rehabilitation Act;

(V) disparate treatment discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213; and,

(VI) disparate impact discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation Act.

Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), filed November 13, 2009 (Doc. 37). Also before the Court is Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c), filed November 16, 2009 (Doc. 39). In his motion, Plaintiff also requests a permanent injunction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d) and seeks to substitute the current Oakland University Director of Housing as a defendant for Lionel Maten, who no longer serves in that position, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).¹ The parties' motions have been fully briefed and the Court held a motion hearing on December 17, 2009.

I. Applicable Standards

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c). The central inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). After adequate time for discovery and upon motion, Rule 56(c) mandates summary judgment against a party who fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The movant has an initial burden of showing "the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. Once the movant meets this burden, the "nonmoving party must come forward with `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). To demonstrate a genuine issue, the nonmoving party must present sufficient evidence upon which a jury could reasonably find for that party; a "scintilla of evidence" is insufficient. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512. The court must accept as true the non-movant's evidence and draw "all justifiable inferences" in the non-movant's favor. See id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513.

A plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 must demonstrate the following: "It has suffered irreparable injury, there is no adequate remedy at law, `that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted,' and that it is in the public's interest to issue the injunction." Audi AG v. D'Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 550 (6th Cir.2006) (quoting eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 126 S.Ct. 1837, 1839, 164 L.Ed.2d 641 (2006)). Additionally, to be entitled to a permanent injunction, the plaintiff actually must succeed on the merits of his or her claim(s). See Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1067. (6th Cir.1998); Duer Constr. Co. v. Tri-County Building Trades Health Fund, 132 Fed.Appx. 39, 45 (6th Cir.2005) (unpublished opinion).

II. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff is a twenty-four year old male with cognitive impairments that substantially limit a major life activity, specifically his ability to learn. Plaintiff has been attending classes at Oakland University (hereafter "Oakland" or "University") since 2003. He has been enrolled in the University's OPTIONS program since Fall 2007, when the University established the program ". . . to provide a fully inclusive, age appropriate postsecondary education experience for students with mild cognitive disabilities." (Doc.39, Ex. 6.)

Participants in the OPTIONS program are required to take a minimum of twelve credits per semester and pay the regular University tuition rate for undergraduate students; however, the program is not a degree-granting program. (Id.) Students in the program are categorized as "continuing-education" students. The proposal for the program developed and presented to the University by Robert Wiggins, the University's Associate Dean in the School of Education and Human Services, identified the various housing configurations available on-campus as one rationale for University involvement in the program. (Doc. 39, Ex. 3 at 2-3.) When the University approved the OPTIONS program, however, it did not consider on-campus housing as part of the program. (Doc. 45, Ex. 14 at 62-63.)

In Spring 2007, at Plaintiff's Person Centered Planning meeting, housing was discussed as a goal for the coming year. Thereafter, Plaintiff and his father, Rich Feldman, took a pre-arranged tour of Oakland's dormitory housing. At the start of the tour, they were greeted by Defendant Lionel Maten, then the Director of University Housing. Plaintiff submitted a completed housing application on November 1, 2007. (Doc. 39, Ex. 7.) The "Terms and Conditions" on the back of the application provide, with respect to "ELIGIBILITY": "To be eligible for University housing a student must be enrolled as a student at the University throughout the entire period of the Contract." (Id.)

In response to an inquiry from Mr. Feldman on November 8, 2007, Dean Wiggins indicated that he had spoken with Roxanne Fisher in the Housing Department and learned that Plaintiff's application "has been accepted and is being processed." (Doc. 39, Ex. 8.) Ms. Fisher is an Office Assistant in the University Housing Department who is responsible, when applications are first received by the department, for verifying that it is complete and that the required deposit has been submitted. (Doc. 37, Ex. 7.) Ms. Fisher does not determine whether applicants meet the eligibility requirements to live in on-campus housing. (Id.)

Mr. Feldman thereafter sent an e-mail to Ms. Fisher, inquiring as to whether there was anything more he needed to do so Plaintiff could begin living in on-campus housing in January 2008. On November 14, 2007, Ms. Fisher responded that "there is nothing else Plaintiff needs to do. He is all set." (Doc. 37, Ex. 8.) She then described the University's schedule for making housing assignments, the move-in procedure, and some of the personal items residents can possess in their dormitory rooms. (Id.) In an affidavit submitted in support of Defendants' motion, Ms. Fisher states that she did not intend to indicate that Plaintiff was qualified for on-campus housing when she wrote that he was "all set" in her e-mail to Mr. Feldman. (Id., Ex. 7.) Rather, she only intended to convey that Plaintiff's application was "all set" for her purposes (i.e. it was complete and a deposit had been paid). (Id.)

On November 29, 2007, Mr. Wiggins sent an e-mail to Mr. Feldman, indicating that he had been told that Plaintiff is not eligible for on-campus housing and that Plaintiff would be receiving a letter informing him of this. (Doc. 39, Ex. 9.) In a subsequent e-mail to Mr. Feldman on January 7, 2008, Mr. Wiggins wrote that he "had a conversation with our university council and found out that it has been university practice for some time that the dorm facilities are restricted to students who are pursuing a degree" and that "they have held to this firmly . . ." (Id.) Mr. Wiggins further wrote:

This is sort of what our VP for Student Affairs Ms. Snyder told me initially, but she either didn't explain it as well or I was not really hearing it. I am surprised that the folks in the housing office didn't recognize the conflict before we got so far but Lionel Mr. Maten is new and perhaps the others were not aware that OPTIONS was not a degree program.

(Id.)

Plaintiff and his representatives lobbied University officials throughout 2008, requesting that the University waive its policy of limiting housing to students enrolled in degree-granting programs and allow Plaintiff to live on campus. Plaintiff's request was denied at various levels. In the interim, in March 2008, the University modified the "Terms and Conditions" on the back of its "Contract for Residence Hall Services" to specify that residents are required to be enrolled as matriculating students. (Doc. 39, Ex. 13.) Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on November 25, 2008.

On December 15, 2008, Plai...