Fiano v. Old Saybrook Fire Co.

• Decision Date: 25 June 2019
• Docket Number: SC 20135
• Citation: 209 A.3d 629,332 Conn. 93
• Parties: Michael A. FIANO v. OLD SAYBROOK FIRE COMPANY NO. 1, INC., et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

332 Conn. 93

209 A.3d 629

Michael A. FIANO

v.OLD SAYBROOK FIRE COMPANY NO. 1, INC., et al.

SC 20135

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued February 20, 2019

Officially released June 25, 2019

James J. Healey, with whom was Douglas P. Mahoney, Bridgeport, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Michael F. O'Connor, North Haven, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).

Robinson, C.J., and McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn and Vertefeuille, Js.

VERTEFEUILLE, J.

The issue that we must resolve in this certified appeal is whether the trial court properly determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant James M. Smith, a junior volunteer firefighter with the named defendant, the Old Saybrook Fire Company No. 1, Inc. (fire company), was acting within the scope of his employment with the fire company at the time that the motor vehicle that he was driving collided with a motorcycle being driven by the plaintiff, Michael A. Fiano. The plaintiff brought this action alleging that he had been injured as the result of Smith's negligent operation of his motor vehicle and that the fire company and the defendant town of Old Saybrook (town) were vicariously liable for Smith's negligence pursuant to General Statutes §§ 7-308¹ and 7-465.² The fire company and the town (collectively, municipal defendants) filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that, because Smith had left the firehouse and was on his way home to attend to personal matters when the collision occurred, there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Smith was acting within the scope of his employment with the fire company at that time. The trial court ultimately granted that motion and rendered judgment in favor of the municipal defendants. Thereafter, the plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court. See Fiano v. Old Saybrook Fire Co. No. 1, Inc. , 180 Conn. App. 717, 744, 184 A.3d 1218 (2018). We then granted the plaintiff's petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Court, limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court properly uphold the trial court's granting of summary judgment on the ground that there is no genuine issue of material fact that an agency relationship did not exist between the [municipal] defendants and [Smith] at the time of his motor vehicle accident with the plaintiff?" Fiano v. Old Saybrook Fire Co. No. 1, Inc. , 329 Conn. 910, 186 A.3d 14 (2018). We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following facts, which we have supplemented and viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff for purposes of reviewing the trial court's grant of summary judgment. "Smith became a junior member of the fire company in 2012.³ As a junior member, he was authorized to fight exterior fires and respond to other emergency calls. Smith possessed an electronic key fob that enabled him to enter the firehouse during the day. Smith, along with the other members of the fire company, was encouraged [by the fire company's chiefs and other officers] to spend time at the firehouse monitoring the radio for emergency calls in order to quicken response times, perform training exercises, and to build comradery with one another. In order to entice members to spend time at the firehouse, the fire company provided televisions, computers, a weight room, laundry facilities, and showers." (Footnote added.) Fiano v. Old Saybrook Fire Co. No. 1, Inc. , supra, 180 Conn. App. at 734, 184 A.3d 1218.

John Dunn, the chief of the fire company at the time of the accident, testified at his deposition that, "[d]epending on the incident," it can be advantageous for firefighters to be at the firehouse so that they are available to respond immediately to any calls that come in. Dunn further testified that, if an adult firefighter who is authorized to drive a fire truck were at the firehouse, it would be beneficial to the fire company for firefighters to be there when an emergency call came in because "the fire truck could leave the building quicker than if [the firefighters] came from their home[s] ...."

"The fire company utilized a ‘points system’ in order to track a firefighter's participation, and the firefighters were required to obtain a minimum number of points in order to maintain active membership. Firefighters earned points by responding to emergency calls, staffing the firehouse during emergencies, and, at the fire company's discretion, spending time at the firehouse waiting for a call. Additionally, although the fire company is a volunteer department, the town's firefighters received monetary compensation for their duties. Full members of the fire company are eligible for pensions and receive tax abatements from the town. Members are also paid in the event they respond to a brush fire. Prior to the accident, Smith personally received payment for his time spent staffing the firehouse during emergencies.

"As a junior member, Smith was not allowed to drive any of the fire company's vehicles. Thus, Smith used his personal vehicle to respond to emergency calls, [to] travel to and from the firehouse, and to attend training. Using this vehicle, Smith also would transport other members of the company to emergencies and other fire company related events. The fire company instructed how its members were to use their personal vehicles when responding to emergencies, such as how to properly park at the scene. In his personal vehicle, Smith kept his company issued firefighting equipment, which included a helmet, coat, bunker pants, and fire boots. His vehicle was adorned with a special license plate that identified him as a member of the fire company, which grants him access to closed roads during emergencies."

"On [October 26, 2013] the day of the accident, Smith went to the firehouse [on Main Street in Old Saybrook] because he had a ‘couple [of] extra hours to spare.’ Smith's girlfriend at the time, who also was a junior member of the fire company, and two other members of the fire company, were also present at the firehouse that day. Smith spent his time at the firehouse monitoring the radio for emergency calls. After spending approximately three and one-half hours at the firehouse, Smith left with the intention to go home to change his clothing in order to have his picture taken for his senior yearbook. Smith departed the firehouse in his personal vehicle, and, as Smith pulled out of the firehouse driveway onto Main Street, his vehicle and the plaintiff's vehicle collided." Fiano v. Old Saybrook Fire Co. No. 1, Inc. , supra, 180 Conn. App. at 734–35, 184 A.3d 1218.

Thereafter, the plaintiff, who was seriously injured in the collision, brought this action alleging that the collision was the result of Smith's negligent operation of his vehicle, and the municipal defendants were vicariously liable for Smith's negligence because he was their agent or employee and was performing duties within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. The municipal defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that there was no genuine issue of material fact that Smith was not acting as the agent or employee of the fire company at the time of the accident because he had left the firehouse and was on his way home to attend to personal matters. Accordingly, they argued, there was no basis for vicarious liability. After the trial court summarily denied the motion, the municipal defendants filed a motion to reargue and for articulation. The trial court also denied that motion. On the day before jury selection was scheduled to commence, the municipal defendants filed a second motion to reargue and for reconsideration. The trial court granted that motion the same day. The next day, the trial court vacated its prior decision denying the municipal defendants' motion for summary judgment, granted the motion and rendered judgment in favor of those defendants.⁴

The plaintiff then appealed to the Appellate Court. That court concluded that, because Smith was "in the process of leaving [the firehouse] to attend to his personal affairs" when the accident occurred, "he was no longer furthering the [municipal] defendants' interests at that time." Id., at 739, 184 A.3d 1218. Accordingly, the Appellate Court concluded that the trial court properly had determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact that Smith was not acting as the fire company's employee, and it affirmed the judgment of the trial court. See id., at 744, 184 A.3d 1218.

This certified appeal followed. The plaintiff contends that, contrary to the conclusions of the trial court and the Appellate Court, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Smith was furthering the fire company's interests at the time of the accident and, therefore, was acting within the scope of his employment, because there was evidence that would support a finding that the fire company benefited from his presence in close proximity to the firehouse when he was "ready, willing and able" to respond immediately to any emergency calls that might come in. We disagree.

We begin with the standard of review. "In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact. The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle[s] him to a judgment as a matter of law. The courts hold the movant to a strict standard. To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact.... As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent.... When documents submitted in support...