Fickenwirth v. Lanning

• Jurisdiction: Idaho,United States
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: STEGNER, Justice.
• Citation: Fickenwirth v. Lanning, 538 P.3d 370 (Idaho 2023)
• Docket Number: Docket No. 49488
• Decision Date: 03 October 2023
• Parties: Kyle FICKENWIRTH and Ashley Fickenwirth, Husband and Wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Amy LANNING, a single person, Defendant-Appellant, and Norma Jean Dickey, a single person, Defendant.
• topic: Contracts,Civil Procedure,Real Estate

538 P.3d 370

Kyle FICKENWIRTH and Ashley Fickenwirth, Husband and Wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents,

v. Amy LANNING, a single person, Defendant-Appellant,andNorma Jean Dickey, a single person, Defendant.

Docket No. 49488

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, April 2023 Term.

Opinion Filed: October 3, 2023

Rehearing Denied: November 20, 2023

Blewett, Mushlitz, Hally, LLP, Lewiston, for Appellant, Amy Lanning. Jonathan D. Hally submitted argument on the briefs.

Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC, Lewiston, for Respondents, Kyle and Ashley Fickenwirth. Samuel T. Creason submitted argument on the briefs.

STEGNER, Justice.

This appeal involves a challenge to the district court's determination that a boundary by agreement fixed the boundary between two neighboring properties at a location other than what is shown in the deed to one of the neighbor's property. Kyle and Ashley Fickenwirth ("the Fickenwirths") and Amy Lanning ("Lanning") are the owners of the adjoining properties at the center of this dispute. The Fickenwirths own a gravel driveway that runs along the backside of Lanning's property. Lanning had previously maintained a decorative split-rail fence on her property. Until recently, there was a relatively small strip of grassy land between the Fickenwirths’ driveway and the split-rail fence in Lanning's backyard. This dispute arose when Lanning removed the split-rail fence and erected a new fence running directly along the western side of the Fickenwirths’ driveway that more closely adhered to the boundaries described in the deed.

The Fickenwirths brought suit to quiet title to the strip of land between the split-rail fence on Lanning's property and their driveway based on the theories of adverse possession or, alternatively, boundary by agreement. The district court concluded that the Fickenwirths had failed to prove their claims regarding adverse possession and boundary by agreement at the location of the split-rail fence. However, the district court found that the Fickenwirths had proved a claim of boundary by agreement at the location of the new fence, near the side of the driveway, but leaving a small strip of grass between the driveway and the fence.

Lanning appeals this determination, claiming there was never an agreement that the boundary line was at the location of the new fence. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Fickenwirths moved into their home in Lewiston, Idaho, in early 2017. On the southwestern corner of their property there is a gravel driveway in the shape of a lowercase "h" which provides the Fickenwirths with two access points to their home. The long side of the "h" runs parallel to the backyard of the neighboring duplex and the strip of land at the heart of this dispute. The Fickenwirths’ driveway has been in the same location since at least 1959 and has been used by the owners continuously since that time. Lanning moved into the southern unit of the duplex neighboring the Fickenwirths a few months after the Fickenwirths moved into their home in 2017. The deed to her parcel describes her property as "Lot 20, Scotch Pine Cluster Development, P.U.D., according to the recorded plat thereof, on file in the office of the County Recorder of Nez Perce County, Idaho." When Lanning moved in, there was a decorative split-rail fence in her grassy backyard. The split-rail fence began where her duplex-neighbor's fence to the north ended and extended diagonally towards the duplex and south, close to the Fickenwirths’ driveway. The fence was "decorative" in the sense it could easily be moved. Further, it allowed for Lanning's sprinklers, which were located outside the fence and near the Fickenwirths’ driveway, to water the lawn between the driveway and on both sides of the fence.

The northern half of the neighboring duplex is owned by Norma Dickey. Dickey was originally a party to this case but is not involved in this appeal. Before the inception of this case, Dickey removed a chain link fence located between her property and the Fickenwirths’ property. Dickey intended to erect a new fence when she took the old one down, but ceased the project after this litigation began. The Dickey fence ended at the northeastern corner of Lanning's fence.

There was a grassy strip of land between the driveway and the old fences. This strip was purportedly maintained by the Fickenwirths, their predecessors, and Lanning. The Fickenwirths and Lanning both claim that they were the primary caretakers of the land between the split-rail fence and the driveway. Neither party alleges that there was ever a discussion or agreement pertaining to the ownership of the strip of land in dispute.

Shortly after Lanning and the Fickenwirths moved into their respective homes, Lanning approached the Fickenwirths and discussed the possibility of building a new fence in her backyard. Kyle Fickenwirth testified that he believed Lanning intended for her new fence to be in line with the Dickey chain link fence. Kyle Fickenwirth further testified "[t]hat seemed fine with us. We didn't know exactly where the boundary line was; but what they were asking seemed reasonable, and so we agreed to it." Shortly after this discussion, the Fickenwirths went on vacation and later returned to find a new fence running near the western side of their driveway. The new fence was now behind Lanning's sprinkler heads and enclosed the bulk of the strip of grassy land which originally ran between the split-rail fence and the driveway.

Before erecting the new fence, Lanning hired a surveyor to determine the boundaries between her and Dickey's duplex and the Fickenwirths’ property. The resulting survey showed that the property line between the boundaries ran from where the Dickey and Lanning fences met and extended a few feet into the Fickenwirths’ driveway. Lanning claims that, instead of building her fence along the correct property line and effectively rendering the driveway unusable, she decided to be a "good neighbor" and put it along the side of the driveway instead. Today, Lanning's fence is near the side of the driveway and encompasses the strip of land originally at issue in this case. However, the Fickenwirths took issue with Lanning's survey indicating her property's boundary extended into the Fickenwirths’ driveway.

Unable to resolve the conflict with Lanning, the Fickenwirths filed suit to quiet title to the grassy strip of land originally between the driveway, the split-rail fence, and the Dickey fence based on the theory of adverse possession. The Fickenwirths also sought damages for Lanning's alleged trespass in positioning her fence where she did.

The matter proceeded to a bench trial. After the trial, the district court concluded that the Fickenwirths had failed to prove that they adversely possessed the grassy strip of land or that Lanning had trespassed. However, relying on Lanning's decision to erect her fence near the driveway instead of encroaching on it, the district court held that the parties had established a boundary by agreement at the location of the new fence. Thus, according to the district court, the legal boundary between Lanning and Dickey's duplex and the Fickenwirths’ property became the new Lanning fence line that runs near the western edge of the Fickenwirths’ driveway. The district court entered judgment decreeing ownership of the small triangular strip of land depicted in the diagram below to Lanning and establishing a boundary by agreement following the newly constructed fence. The following photograph depicts the disputed boundary where the new fence was erected.

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Lanning moved the district court to reconsider its decision, asserting that the parties had not presented any evidence or arguments that the boundary line was at the new fence near the western edge of the driveway. The district court denied the motion to reconsider because it had "treated the boundary by agreement claim in all respects as if it was raised in the pleadings, based upon the parties’ implied consent that the issue be tried." Implied consent, it explained, can be found in the record of the trial and from the briefing in the defendant's closing argument.

Lanning timely appealed.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

This Court "will not set aside findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous." Marshall v. Blair , 130 Idaho 675, 679, 946 P.2d 975, 979 (1997). If a district court's findings of fact are supported by substantial and competent evidence, this Court will not disturb the findings.

Hodgins v. Sales , 139 Idaho 225, 229, 76 P.3d 969, 973 (2003). "In contrast, this Court exercises free review over the district court's conclusions of law to determine whether the court correctly stated the applicable law and whether the legal conclusions are sustained by the facts found." Luce v. Marble , 142 Idaho 264, 270, 127 P.3d 167, 173 (2005).

As to the question of whether the trial court properly determined an issue that has been tried with the consent of the parties, it is "within the trial court's discretion, and such determination will only be reversed when that discretion has been abused." Lindberg v. Roseth , 137 Idaho 222, 226, 46 P.3d 518, 522 (2002).

When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court the sequence of inquiry requires consideration of four essentials. Whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.

Lunneborg v. My Fun Life , 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018).

III. ANALYSIS

A. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that the parties had consented to present a boundary by agreement claim to the court.

In denying Lanning's motion to reconsider its decision, the district court explained that its conclusion regarding the...