Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York v. Stacey's Ex'rs

• Decision Date: 06 February 1906
• Docket Number: 626.
• Citation: 143 F. 271
• Parties: FIDELITY & CASUALTY CO. OF NEW YORK v. STACEY'S EX'RS.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

143 F. 271

FIDELITY & CASUALTY CO. OF NEW YORK v. STACEY'S EX'RS.

No. 626.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

February 6, 1906

C. P Sanders and T. P. Cothran (Sanders & Depass and W. S. Hall on the brief), for plaintiff in error.

H. J Haynsworth (J. C. Jeffries, on the brief), for defendants in error.

Before PRITCHARD, Circuit Judge, and PURNELL and KELLER, District judges.

PRITCHARD Circuit Judge.

This is an action at law based on what is known as an accident insurance policy, and was brought by the defendants in error against the Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York, to recover $5,000 on an accident policy which the plaintiff in error had issued to Frederick G. Stacey, the testator of the defendants in error.

The complaint alleges that, on the 23d day of February, 1903, the plaintiff in error issued to Frederick G. Stacey, the testator of the defendants in error, its policy of insurance and thereby insured the said Stacey 'against disability or death resulting directly, and independently of all other causes, from bodily injuries sustained through external, violent and accidental means (suicide, sane or insane, not included), and it thereby promised to pay to the executors, administrators, or assigns of the said Frederick G. Stacey, the sum of $5,000 if death should result within 90 days from said injuries. ' It also alleges that while said policy was still in force the said Stacey departed this life, and that his death resulted directly, and independently of all other causes, from bodily injuries sustained through external, violent, and accidental means, to wit: an injury to his hand which was received on or about June 8, 1904. The answer of the plaintiff in error admitted that it issued the policy mentioned in the complaint, and that the said Stacey departed this life while the policy was in force. It, however, denied the other allegations of the complaint and set up the defense that the death of the said Stacey was caused or brought about by a violent act of his while he was committing an assault and battery on one of the citizens of South Carolina. The case was tried, resulting in a verdict and judgment for defendants in error.

In order to comprehend the questions involved in this case, it is necessary to recur to the testimony upon which defendants in error base their cause of action. The testimony, about which there is no contention, is as follows:

'Stacey was president of the National Bank of Gaffney. He and one Porter had some business transaction in the bank, during which Porter charged Stacey with having required him upon a former occasion to accept less then the face value of a certain check issued by J. A. Carroll & Company (of which firm Stacey was a partner), in the conduct of their lime business, and that he (Stacey) would not pay his debts, specifying one Jones as the party whom Stacey owed and would not pay. Stacey then insisted that Porter accompany him to Jones' place of business, where he could face Jones with the charge. On the way they met W. C. Carpenter, another member of the firm of J. A. Carroll & Co. Then this conversation occurred:

'Stacey: 'That man says that we beat him out of some money.'

'Carpenter: 'How?'

'Stacey: 'He says he had a lime check and Carroll discounted it 10 per cent.'

'Carpenter: 'I don't think so. Those checks are always at par.'

'About that time Carroll, the other member of the firm, came in sight and was about to pass them, when Stacey called him to come to where they were talking. When he got to them, Stacey repeated to Carroll, in substance, what he had said to Carpenter. Carroll denied it, making about the same explanation as Carpenter had made. Stacey then said: 'I knew that he was telling a lie about it.' Porter replied: 'You are another liar.' As soon as Porter said that, Stacey struck him with right hand, staggering him, and immediately followed it up with a blow from his left hand upon or about the mouth, knocking him down. Porter made no resistance, but got up and walked off. Stacey immediately looked at his finger and showed it to Carroll, where he had cut his knuckle. He gave it some immediate attention, but it grew steadily worse, developing into blood poison, followed by amputation of the arm and death, on the 28th of June, 1904.'

This being an action at law, if the defendant in error is entitled to recover at all, it must be upon his contract of insurance, and not otherwise. The contract provides for the liability of the plaintiff in error for the death of the insured, provided that such death results 'directly, and independently of all other causes, from bodily injuries sustained through external, violent and accidental means. ' According to the evidence, the insured, while in a fit of temper on account of something that Porter had said about him in connection with a transaction at his bank, accosted him on the street and engaged in a conversation, and, at a time when Porter was making no demonstration of violence, assaulted him on the face, first with his right hand and then with his left; the last blow landing in Porter's mouth, coming in contact with one of his teeth, thereby causing a slight abrasion of the skin of one of the fingers of the insured. Subsequently thereto the finger became infected, which resulted in blood poison, and from the effect of which he died in about 20 days thereafter. It thus appears that the insured, at a time when he was in full possession of his mental faculties, accosted Porter and engaged in a controversy in consequence of which he committed an assault on the body of Porter, evidently for the purpose of punishing him for what had just occurred between them. Everything connected with the transaction clearly indicates that the insured intended to do exactly what he did on that occasion. Therefore the injury which he received at the time was the natural and logical result of an intentional act on his part. He was a man of intelligence, and it must be presumed that he knew that in making an assault with his fist in the manner described he would probably sustain more or less injury to himself.

If, in this instance, it had been shown that, instead of striking an individual, the insured had deliberately struck a tree or a wall with his fist, it could not have been successfully contended that an injury received in consequence thereof would be due to an accident. It would be...