Field v. Astrue
| Decision Date | 02 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 10-4056-SAC |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
| Parties | TERRI A. FIELD, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
This is an action reviewing the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying the plaintiff disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income payments. The matter has been fully briefed by the parties.
The court's standard of review is set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which provides that "the findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." The court should review the Commissioner's decision to determine only whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence and whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards. Glenn v. Shalala, 21 F.3d 983, 984 (10th Cir. 1994). Substantial evidence requires more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance, and is satisfied by such evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support theconclusion. The determination of whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's decision is not simply a quantitative exercise, for evidence is not substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence or if it really constitutes mere conclusion. Ray v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 222, 224 (10th Cir. 1989). Although the court is not to reweigh the evidence, the findings of the Commissioner will not be mechanically accepted. Nor will the findings be affirmed by isolating facts and labeling them substantial evidence, as the court must scrutinize the entire record in determining whether the Commissioner's conclusions are rational. Graham v. Sullivan, 794 F. Supp. 1045, 1047 (D. Kan. 1992). The court should examine the record as a whole, including whatever in the record fairly detracts from the weight of the Commissioner's decision and, on that basis, determine if the substantiality of the evidence test has been met. Glenn, 21 F.3d at 984.
The Social Security Act provides that an individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if the claimant can establish that they have a physical or mental impairment expected to result in death or last for a continuous period of twelve months which prevents the claimant from engaging in substantial gainful activity (SGA). The claimant's physical or mental impairment or impairments must be of such severity that they are not only unable to perform their previous work but cannot, considering their age, education, and work experience, engage inany other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d).
The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine disability. If at any step a finding of disability or non-disability can be made, the Commissioner will not review the claim further. At step one, the agency will find non-disability unless the claimant can show that he or she is not working at a "substantial gainful activity." At step two, the agency will find non-disability unless the claimant shows that he or she has a "severe impairment," which is defined as any "impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [the claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." At step three, the agency determines whether the impairment which enabled the claimant to survive step two is on the list of impairments presumed severe enough to render one disabled. If the claimant's impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment, the inquiry proceeds to step four, at which the agency assesses whether the claimant can do his or her previous work; unless the claimant shows that he or she cannot perform their previous work, they are determined not to be disabled. If the claimant survives step four, the fifth and final step requires the agency to consider vocational factors (the claimant's age, education, and past work experience) and to determine whether the claimant is capable of performing otherjobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Barnhart v. Thomas, 124 S. Ct. 376, 379-380 (2003).
The claimant bears the burden of proof through step four of the analysis. Nielson v. Sullivan, 992 F.2d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir. 1993). At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can perform other work that exists in the national economy. Nielson, 992 F.2d at 1120; Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1993). The Commissioner meets this burden if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Thompson, 987 F.2d at 1487.
Before going from step three to step four, the agency will assess the claimant's residual functional capacity (RFC). This RFC assessment is used to evaluate the claim at both step four and step five. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 404.1520(e,f,g); 416.920(a)(4), 416.920(e,f,g).
This case has a very long history. Plaintiff filed applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income on June 13, 2003. Plaintiff had previously filed an application for disability benefits on July 31, 2002, which was denied on November 26, 2002. This application was subject to reopening if the plaintiff was found to be disabled (R. at 13).
On August 16, 2005, administrative law judge (ALJ) George M. Bock issued his 1st decision (R. at 13-24). The ALJ found thatplaintiff can perform other work in the national economy, and was therefore not disabled (R. at 22-23). Plaintiff sought judicial review of the ALJ decision. On June 19, 2007, the court issued an order reversing the decision of the Commissioner and remanding the case for further hearing (R. at 408-410, 412-436; Field v. Astrue, Case No. 06-4126-SAC (). In Field I, the court found numerous errors by the ALJ in his analysis of the opinions of Dr. Spangler, a treating physician (R. at 428-432); the court also found errors in the ALJ's credibility analysis (R. at 434-436).
On April 23, 2008, ALJ George M. Bock issued his 2nd decision (R. at 400-407). Again, the ALJ found that plaintiff can perform other work in the national economy, and was therefore not disabled (R. at 406-407). Plaintiff sought judicial review of the 2nd ALJ decision. On May 5, 2009, the court issued an order reversing the decision of the Commissioner and remanding the case for further hearing in the analysis of plaintiff's depression (R. at 1161-1172), 2) in the analysis of the medical opinions of Dr. Spangler, Dr. Curtis, and two nonexamining physicians (R. at 1172-1180), and 3) by failing to explain why the medical expert's opinion should be accorded greater weight than the opinion of thetreating physician (R. at 1183-1184).
On March 18, 2010, a 3rd ALJ decision was reached by ALJ Guy E. Taylor (R. at 1121-1135). Plaintiff alleges that she has been disabled since May 11, 2003 (R. at 1121). Plaintiff is insured for disability insurance benefits through December 31, 2008 (R. at 1123). At step one, the ALJ found that plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of disability (R. at 1124). At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff had the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease (DDD) of the lumbar spine, coccydynia, asthma, obesity, and depression (R. at 1124). At step three, the ALJ determined that plaintiff's impairments do not meet or equal a listed impairment (R. at 1124). After determining plaintiff's RFC (R. at 1125), the ALJ found at step four that plaintiff is unable to perform past relevant work (R. at 1133). At step five, the ALJ found that plaintiff could perform other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy (R. at 1134-1135). Therefore, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff was not disabled (R. at 1135). Plaintiff has again sought judicial review of the ALJ decision.
The opinions of physicians, psychologists, or psychiatrists who have seen a claimant over a period of time for purposes oftreatment are given more weight than the views of consulting physicians or those who only review the medical records and never examine the claimant. The opinion of an examining physician is generally entitled to less weight than that of a treating physician, and the opinion of an agency physician who has never seen the claimant is entitled to the least weight of all. Robinson v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d 1078, 1084 (10th Cir. 2004). When a treating source opinion is inconsistent with the other medical evidence, the ALJ's task is to examine the other medical source's reports to see if they outweigh the treating source's reports, not the other way around. Treating source opinions are given particular weight because of their unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual examinations, such as consultive examinations. If an ALJ intends to rely on a nontreating physician or examiner's opinion, he must explain the weight he is giving to it. Hamlin v. Barnhart, 365 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 2004). The ALJ must provide a legally sufficient explanation for rejecting the opinion of treating medical sources in favor of non-examining or consulting medical sources. Robinson, 366 F.3d at 1084.
A treating physician's opinion about the nature and severity of the claimant's impairments should be given controlling weight by the Commissioner if well supported by clinical and laboratorydiagnostic techniques and if it is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record. Castellano v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 26 F.3d 1027, 1029 (10th Cir. 1994); 20 C.F.R. §§...
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