Field v. Trigg County Hosp., Inc., 02-6440.
| Decision Date | 15 October 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-6440.,No. 02-6517.,02-6440.,02-6517. |
| Citation | 386 F.3d 729 |
| Parties | Tina K. FIELD; Norman Thomas Field, Jr., Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. TRIGG COUNTY HOSPITAL, INC., Defendant, William B. Anderson, M.D., Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, Edward H. Johnstone, Senior District Judge.
Dan L. Nolan, Jr., Batson, Nolan, Brice, Harvey & Williamson, Clarksville, TN, for Appellants. E. Frederick Straub, Jr., Whitlow, Roberts, Houston & Straub, Paducah, KY, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF:
Dan L. Nolan, Jr., Suzanne G. Pearson, Batson, Nolan, Brice, Harvey & Williamson, Clarksville, TN, W. Douglas Myers, William J. Sweeten, Deatherage, Myers, Self & Lackey, Hopkinsville, KY, for Appellants. E. Frederick Straub, Jr., Joe H. Kimmel, III, Whitlow, Roberts, Houston & Straub, Paducah, KY, for Appellee.
Before: SILER, MOORE, and COLE, Circuit Judges.
COLE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which MOORE, J., joined. SILER, J. (p. 737-38), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
Plaintiffs-Appellants, Tina and Norman Field, appeal the district court's denial of their motion for a new trial after a jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendant-Appellee, Dr. William B. Anderson, following a trial for medical malpractice in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to a new trial because the district court improperly admitted prejudicial hearsay evidence when it permitted Dr. Anderson to testify about the statements made by two unnamed, undisclosed physicians with whom he allegedly consulted concerning Tina Field's medical care.
Because the statements of the two unknown physicians were classic hearsay and do not fall into any of the hearsay exceptions contained in the Federal Rules of Evidence, and because the statements' admission was highly prejudicial and more than mere harmless error, we VACATE the jury's verdict and REMAND the case to the district court for a new trial.
At approximately 9:20 p.m. on September 1, 1998, Tina Field sought treatment at the Trigg County Hospital emergency room, in Cadiz, Kentucky, immediately after being bitten twice in her right foot by a copperhead snake. Defendant-Appellee, William B. Anderson, was the physician on call when Field arrived at the hospital. Dr. Anderson is a family practitioner with a solo practice, but he also works shifts at the Trigg County Hospital emergency room. Upon learning that a snake bite victim was coming to the emergency room, Dr. Anderson reviewed the emergency room textbook concerning the treatment of snake bites and called a hospital in Murray Kentucky, to have antivenin delivered to Trigg County Hospital. The antivenin arrived shortly after Tina Field checked into the emergency room. Dr. Anderson had experience with only one venomous snake bite prior to treating Tina Field's injury, and he had no experience administering antivenin.
When she arrived at the emergency room, Tina Field reported that she felt sick to her stomach, faint, dizzy, and numb, and Dr. Anderson noted significant swelling in her right foot and that the foot was warm. Dr. Anderson determined that Field had a "wet" copperhead snake bite, which meant that there had been envenomation. His plan was to monitor her, administer intravenous fluids and a tetanus shot, and look for any progression of the bite's severity. Dr. Anderson checked on Field periodically during the night, but did not give her any antivenin. When Dr. Anderson next saw her, at 9:00 a.m. on September 2, Field had swelling above her right knee, and her right foot was becoming cold and had a bluish color to it.
At 5:00 p.m. on September 2, Field complained of pain in her right big toe and coldness in her right foot. At this point, Nurse Stephen P'Poole checked Field's right foot for a pulse, but did not feel one. As a result, P'Poole called Dr. Anderson. At no time after 5:00 p.m. did Tina Field have a pulse in her right foot.
Three hours later, at 8:10 p.m., Dr. Anderson made his first call for assistance. He phoned an attending emergency room physician at the Vanderbilt University Medical Center, who then referred him to a Vanderbilt toxicologist. The Vanderbilt physicians were never deposed and they never testified at trial. Indeed, their identities, names, and credentials remain completely unknown. Nevertheless, Dr. Anderson was permitted to testify at trial that he telephoned these individuals and gave them a patient history and condition assessment of Tina Field; however, there was no evidence that Dr. Anderson told the Vanderbilt physicians that Tina Field lacked a pulse in her right foot. Moreover, Dr. Anderson was permitted to testify — over Plaintiffs' objections — as to what the Vanderbilt physicians said over the telephone. According to Dr. Anderson, the Vanderbilt emergency room physician and toxicologist told him that he was "doing everything appropriately," that "they would be doing the same thing;" and that the main treatment is to elevate and monitor the leg. Dr. Anderson's testimony concerning the Vanderbilt physicians' alleged statements is the crux of this appeal and will be discussed in more detail below.
Tina Field remained in the Trigg County Hospital, under the care of Dr. Anderson, through September 6. On that date, despite Field's foot remaining cool and without a pulse, Dr. Anderson believed the snake bite was improving, discharged Field from the hospital, and instructed her to keep her right leg elevated and to return for an appointment two days later. At the September 8 checkup, Field's foot was still cool and there was still no pulse in her right foot.
The Fields were growing more concerned about Ms. Field's condition and so, on September 9, they sought treatment at the Blanchfield Army Hospital emergency room in Fort Campbell, Kentucky. (Ms. Field was entitled to medical care at the military hospital pursuant to benefits received by her husband, who is retired from the United States Army). Tina Field stayed at Blanchfield until September 15, when she was transported by a medical helicopter to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio. Upon her arrival at Wright-Patterson, Field's treating physician, Dr. Christopher Spieles, knew that Ms. Field was in need of some sort of amputation. In an effort to lessen the amount of amputation, Field underwent hyperbaric dives — which are designed to deliver large amounts of oxygen to body tissue — in an attempt to revive the tissue in her right foot. Unfortunately, these treatments did not improve her condition. As a result, Field's right foot was surgically amputated on October 1, 1998. During the surgery, Dr. Spieles observed that the condition of Field's leg tissue was such that a second surgery would be necessary. Accordingly, on October 6, 1998, Field underwent a below-the-knee leg amputation. She subsequently required two additional surgeries to modify the stump in order to accommodate a prosthetic device.
The Fields filed this diversity action against Trigg County Hospital and Dr. Anderson on February 5, 1998, alleging malpractice and negligence. The hospital settled with the Fields prior to trial and was dismissed as a defendant. A jury trial concerning the claims against Dr. Anderson commenced on March 4, 2002, and lasted four days. At issue was whether Dr. Anderson breached the standard of care for treating a copperhead snake bite. Plaintiffs alleged that Anderson was inexperienced in treating venomous snake bites and that Tina Field should have been transferred to physicians and facilities more capable of treating her serious injury.
Each side presented three expert medical witnesses concerning the standard of care administered by Dr. Anderson. In addition, as explained above, Dr. Anderson testified that on September 2, 1998, he telephoned the Vanderbilt University Medical Center to seek advice concerning how to treat Tina Field's snake bite. At this point in the trial, Anderson's attorney halted Anderson's direct examination to consult with the trial judge about the proper scope of the testimony he could elicit from Anderson — that is, whether Anderson could relay to the jury what the Vanderbilt physicians told him on the telephone.
At a hearing outside the presence of the jury, the trial judge stated that he would permit Anderson to testify as to the Vanderbilt physicians' statements. It is difficult to discern the rationale used by the district court to admit the testimony; and, at times — as is evident from the hearing transcript excerpted below — the rationale appears somewhat contradictory. The judge seems to have ruled that the testimony was admissible under the hearsay exception in Fed.R.Evid. 803(4), which permits statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment to be admitted for the truth of the matter asserted. (In its order denying Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial, the district court again appears to have relied on Fed.R.Evid. 803(4) to justify the statements' admission). Subsequently, however — and this is what leads us to find the district court's rationale somewhat confusing — the court instructed the jury that the statements were not to be considered for their truth (that is, that Dr. Anderson was administering proper care). The Fields's attorney objected on the grounds that the testimony was classic hearsay, that it did not fall under the Fed.R.Evid. 803(4) exception, and that Vanderbilt physicians' statements constituted expert opinions, which, if admitted, would go wholly unchallenged because the physicians could not be cross-examined.
Following is the colloquy among the parties and the judge — outside the presence of the jury — during which...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
U.S. v. White
...see also Whittington, 455 F.3d at 738 (quoting United States v. Cope, 312 F.3d 757, 775 (6th Cir.2002)); Field v. Trigg County Hosp., Inc., 386 F.3d 729, 736 (6th Cir.2004) (citing Argentine v. United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO, 287 F.3d 476, 486 (6th Cir.2002)). "An error affects a defen......
-
Barnes v. City of Cincinnati
...admission of hearsay evidence only if the testimony's admission amounted to more than harmless error. Field v. Trigg County Hosp., Inc., 386 F.3d 729, 736 (6th Cir.2004)(citing Argentine v. United Steelworkers of Am., 287 F.3d 476, 486 (6th Cir.2002)). The improper admission of hearsay evid......
-
Thakore v. Universal Mach. Co. of Pottstown, Inc.
...prove the truth of the matters asserted. See, e.g., Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, 92 F.3d 560 (7th Cir.1996); Field v. Trigg County Hosp., Inc., 386 F.3d 729 (6th Cir.2004). Of course, plaintiff may testify about her own pain and suffering, and so too may other testimonially competent w......
-
Hanson v. Belveal
...made by the person seeking medical treatment and not to statements made by the person providing medical care. Field v. Trigg County Hosp., Inc., 386 F.3d 729, 735–36 (6th Cir.2004); Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 564 (7th Cir.1996). Nonetheless, as we noted above, Fath......
-
Witness
...so long as the documents , most of which included brief responses written by prison staff, were relevant . Field v. Trigg County Hosp., 386 F.3d 729, 735 (6th Cir. 2004). Testimony by defendant physician in medical malpractice action that two experts from esteemed medical institution told h......
-
§ 33.08 MEDICAL TREATMENT-DIAGNOSIS: FRE 803(4)
...See Fed. R. Evid. 805 (multiple hearsay). See also supra § 31.10 (discussing double hearsay).[73] See Field v. Trigg County Hosp., Inc., 386 F.3d 729, 735 (6th Cir. 2004) ("The rationale behind this exception is that statements made by an individual to physicians for purposes of diagnosis o......
-
§ 33.08 Medical Treatment-Diagnosis: FRE 803(4)
...See Fed. R. Evid. 805 (multiple hearsay). See also supra § 31.10 (discussing double hearsay).[74] See Field v. Trigg County Hosp., Inc., 386 F.3d 729, 735 (6th Cir. 2004) ("The rationale behind this exception is that statements made by an individual to physicians for purposes of diagnosis o......