Fields' Estate, Matter of

• Citation: 588 S.W.2d 50
• Decision Date: 07 August 1979
• Docket Number: No. 40307,40307
• Parties: In the Matter of the ESTATE of Elbert C. FIELDS, Deceased.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)

Page 50

588 S.W.2d 50

In the Matter of the ESTATE of Elbert C. FIELDS, Deceased.

No. 40307.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Four.

Aug. 7, 1979.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied

Sept. 17, 1979.

Application to Transfer Denied Nov. 14, 1979.

Thomas E. Toney III, Fordyce & Mayne, St. Louis, for appellant.

Michael A. Markenson, Rosenblum, Goldenhersh, Silverstein & Zafft, Clayton, for respondent.

SATZ, Judge.

This cause was tried before the trial court without a jury. The facts are not in dispute.

In 1972, the Probate Court of St. Louis County appointed Olive Fields the executrix of the estate of her deceased husband, Elbert C. Fields. Subsequently, as her deceased husband's personal representative, she filed suit in the United States District Court, Eastern District of Missouri, under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act against the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Company for the wrongful death of her husband, which had occurred in Illinois. She lost that cause at trial and on appeal, and both the federal district and appellate courts taxed costs against her, as plaintiff, Olive Fields, Executrix of the Estate of Elbert C. Fields, in accord with the caption and style of that cause.

To satisfy these costs, the railroad secured a writ of garnishment from the federal district court against a checking and a savings account, both of which carried the name of the Estate of Elbert C. Fields, Deceased. Because the garnishment only partially satisfied the assessed costs, appellant, William M. Gibbons, as trustee for the railroad, petitioned the Probate Court of St. Louis County to allow the remainder of the costs assessed in the wrongful death action as costs of administration of the Estate of Elbert C. Fields (Fields Estate). The Probate Court denied appellant's petition, and the Circuit Court of St. Louis County affirmed the denial. We affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court.

Appellant Gibbons contends that the collective costs assessed in the wrongful death action, when reduced to judgment, became a judgment entered by the federal court against Olive Fields as the Executrix of the Estate of Elbert C. Fields and that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. 4, § 1, required the Probate Court of St. Louis County to enforce the federal judgment, as a foreign judgment, against the Fields Estate. We do not agree.

At the outset, we note that jurisdiction of the federal court was invoked on the grounds of diversity of citizenship. Thus, the federal court, in effect, sat as a Missouri Court, Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079 (1945); Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), and implemented Missouri's choice of laws to the wrongful death action, Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941), which, in the instant case, required the application of Illinois law to the substantive issues raised. See State ex rel. Kan. City Stock Yards v. Clark, 536 S.W.2d 142, 145-146 (Mo. banc 1976); State ex rel. Broglin v. Nangle, 510 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. banc 1974). From this, it follows that the judgment of the federal court, in effect, would be nothing more than a judgment of a Missouri Court, and enforcement of that judgment, in the present circumstances, would rest on the doctrine of res judicata rather than full faith and credit. However, both parties apparently consider the full faith and credit doctrine as being the only relevant doctrine. Without explicit reasoning, they apparently consider the assessment of costs by the federal court to be a procedural matter, which, they agree, is controlled by federal law. From this, they apparently conclude that when the costs were reduced to judgment, the judgment for costs was a judgment of the federal court implementing federal statutory law, which, insofar as a Missouri Court is concerned, would be a judgment of a foreign court, not merged with the judgment on the merits.

For our purposes here, the legal effect of the differences between the two doctrines would be insignificant and the two doctrines can be considered as functional equivalents. See Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 349, 62 S.Ct. 608, 86 L.Ed. 885 (1942); See also Jackson v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, 484 S.W.2d 315 (Mo.1972). Furthermore, application of either doctrine to the present issues would not cause the legal results urged by appellant. Thus, we do not decide which of the two doctrines is the relevant doctrine but assume, as the parties do, that the doctrine of full faith and credit is appropriate.

As a general rule, giving full faith and credit to a foreign judgment precludes any inquiry into the merits of the underlying cause of action, and, also, precludes any questioning of the logic or consistency of the decision or the validity of the legal principles upon which the judgment is based, E. g., Gibson v. Epps, 352 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Mo.App.1961). Also, generally speaking, a foreign judgment, given full faith and credit, may be attacked only for lack of jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter, for failure to give proper notice, or, for fraud in the procurement of the judgment, E. g. Scott v. Scott, 441 S.W.2d 330 (Mo.1969); Young Elec., Inc. v. Susman, 533 S.W.2d 625 (Mo.App.1975). Nonetheless, the court giving full faith and credit to a foreign judgment must still determine what party was concluded by the foreign judgment, because the foreign judgment can be enforced only against the party bound by that judgment. See First Nat. Bank of Brush, Colo. v. Blessing, 231 Mo.App. 288, 98 S.W.2d 149 (1936), and First Nat. Bank v. Dowdy, 175 Mo.App. 478, 161 S.W. 859 (1913).

We first determine, then, whether the Fields Estate was a party to the federal litigation. Certainly, a decedent's estate can act only by and through the decedent's personal representative. In re Estate of Cromwell, 522 S.W.2d 36 (Mo.App.1975). However, the converse does not necessarily follow, and every act of the personal representative does not necessarily bind the estate. See Blessing and Dowdy, supra. More specifically, in the instant case, if the acts of the executrix were not an exercise of rights on behalf of the Fields Estate to secure benefits for the estate, then, the Fields Estate would not be a party to those acts and would not be bound to satisfy the costs of those acts. In re Peters, 128 Mo.App. 666, 107 S.W. 406, 408 (1908). Thus, to determine whether the Fields Estate was a party to the wrongful death action, we look initially to that cause of action to determine what rights Olive Fields sought to enforce and what benefits she sought to gain. As previously noted, on the present facts, the definitions of these substantive rights and these benefits are found in the Illinois Wrongful Death Act, Ch. 70, §§ 1-2.1, Ill. R.S. (1973), creating that cause of action. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., supra; State ex rel. Broglin v. Nangle, supra. The pertinent provisions of that Act provide that the person responsible for the death is liable for the death, if that person would have been liable for the injuries had the decedent lived, Ch. 70, § 1, Ill. R.S. (1973) and that where, as here, the decedent leaves a widow and children, the wrongful death action "shall be brought by and in the names of the personal representatives of (the) deceased person, and, . . ., the amount recovered in every such action shall be for the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse (formerly widow) and next of kin of such deceased person and . . . the jury may give such damages as they shall deem a fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death, to the surviving spouse and next of kin of such deceased person". Ch. 70, § 2, Ill. R.S. (1973). The damages recovered are not required to be distributed or administered by a probate court, but, rather, "(t)he amount recovered in any such action shall be distributed by the court in which the cause is heard . . .", and distribution is not made according to any directions of the decedent, but, rather, the damages are to be distributed "to each of the surviving spouse and next of kin . . . in the proportion, . . ., that the percentage of dependency of each such person upon the deceased person bears to the sum of the percentages of dependency of all such persons upon the deceased person." Ch. 70, § 2, Ill. R.S. (1973).

As can readily be seen, these provisions simply reflect the basic provisions of Lord Campbell's Act, the prototype of most wrongful death acts. 2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts, Ch. XXIV (1974). The provisions create a new cause of action on behalf of the surviving spouse and next of kin to compensate them for the loss they suffer through the death of the decedent. Although the cause of action is brought in the name of the personal representative of the decedent, the action is not one on behalf of his estate nor is it a remedy for the wrong done to the decedent. The Act seeks rather to protect the interests of specifically named survivors and the action brought under it is for the exclusive benefit of those so named. Thus, Olive Fields, proceeding under this Act, was merely a nominal party. She did not act in her general capacity as Executrix of the Estate of Elbert C. Fields, but, rather, sued as a statutory trustee on behalf of herself, individually, as the widow of Elbert C. Fields, and for her two children, as his next of kin. Van Meter v. Goldfarb, 317 Ill. 620, 148 N.E. 391, 392 (1925); City of Chicago v. Major, 18 Ill. 349, 358 (1857); Wright v. Royse, 43 Ill.App.2d 267, 193 N.E.2d 340, 351 (1963); McDavid v. Fiscar, 342 Ill.App. 673, 97 N.E.2d 587, 589 (1951). ¹ This concept is no different than and fits comfortably within Missouri's concept of the rights which are enforced by a wrongful death action when brought by the personal...