Fields v. Sperry Rand Corp.

• Citation: 343 So.2d 339
• Decision Date: 14 February 1977
• Docket Number: No. 13158,13158
• Parties: Henry FIELDS, Administrator of the Estate of William S. Fields and Anita Fields, Tutrix of the minor, William Kyle Fields, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SPERRY RAND CORPORATION and the Travelers Insurance Company, Defendants- Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana (US)

Page 339

343 So.2d 339

Henry FIELDS, Administrator of the Estate of William S.

Fields and Anita Fields, Tutrix of the minor, William Kyle Fields, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SPERRY RAND CORPORATION and the Travelers Insurance Company,

Defendants- Appellees.

No. 13158.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.

Feb. 14, 1977.

En Banc. Rehearing Denied March 21, 1977. ^*

Writs Refused May 26, 1977.

Campbell, Campbell & Johnson by John T. Campbell, Minden, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Blanchard, Walker, O'Quin & Roberts by William Timothy Allen, III, Shreveport, for defendants-appellees.

Before PRICE, HALL and JONES, JJ.

HALL, Judge.

This is a workmen's compensation case. The deceased workman suffered a heart attack on the job resulting in disability. About eight months later he suffered a second heart attack at home resulting in death. The administrator of his estate sued the employer and its insurer for disability benefits from the date of the first attack to date of death. The tutrix of the decedent's minor child sued for death benefits from the date of death. The defendants denied liability and, after trial, the district court rejected plaintiffs' demands. We reverse and award both disability and death benefits.

Issues

The issues are:

(1) Was the first heart attack an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the decedent's employment, entitling him to disability benefits?

(2) If so, was decedent's death from the second heart attack a consequence of the on-the-job accidental injury so as to entitle his dependent child to death benefits?

Facts

William S. Fields, age 41, was employed by Sperry Rand Corporation as a shot blast worker on the assembly line of defendant's ordnance plant in Webster Parish. He had been working for Sperry Rand for about two months at the time of the first heart attack on June 9, 1972. Fields also worked as a self-employed automobile mechanic at a service station in Shreveport.

Fields' job at the ordnance plant required him to pull 80 pound 'bullets' from the main conveyor belt onto a smaller conveyor which runs through the shot blast machine, and then return them to the main conveyor belt. He handled one bullet every 25 or 30 seconds. He was not required to lift the full weight of the bullets but had to pick up one end. The work was strenuous and hot. The temperature in the area where he worked was at least ten degrees hotter than outside.

On the day of the first heart attack, a summer day, Fields reported to work about 3:30 in the afternoon, having already worked most of the day at the service station. He complained to his foreman of having a little indigestion. After he had been at work about 40 minutes, it was noticed that he was pale, sweating profusely, and complained of pain in his chest and shortness of breath. At the foreman's suggestion he went outside for some fresh air and then returned to work on the assembly line. A few minutes later, when he was still not feeling well, it was decided that he should go to the first aid station. He complained to the nurse of chest pains and told her he thought he got overheated. His clothing was saturated with perspiration and he was pale. She had him lie down, took his blood pressure, which was low, gave him salt tablets, and applied ice packs to bring his body temperature down. Fields stayed at the first aid station until about 8:00 p.m. when he went home with instructions from the nurse to see his doctor if he continued to feel badly.

The next day Fields went to see Dr. Jason Sanders, who was out of town, and was admitted to the Schumpert Hospital and placed in intensive care by Dr. Knapp, who was handling Dr. Sanders' patients while he was away. Dr. Sanders saw Fields within the next few days and diagnosed his condition as myocardial infarction due to arteriosclerotic heart disease with a coronary occlusion. This diagnosis was confirmed by Dr. Herbert Tucker, a heart specialist, who also examined Fields on one occasion. Dr. Sanders described the arteriosclerotic myocardial infarction as probably massive in character and defined massive as meaning 20% To 25% Of the heart muscle was affected. Infarction is the destruction of the muscle or tissue of the heart due to the fact that the blood supply has been cut off to that particular tissue. Arteriosclerosis is hardening of the arteries which is generally a process which takes place over a period of years. An occlusion is usually caused by plaque which breaks off and blocks the flow of blood through the artery to the heart.

Fields was discharged from the hospital on June 20, after about 11 days. The doctor told him to take a little exercise, not to overdo it, and to come back in about two weeks.

Dr. Sanders subsequently saw Fields in his office on July 3, July 17 and October 19. After the last visit, Dr. Sanders was of the opinion Fields was still unable to return to work and the doctor advised him not to do so. Dr. Sanders felt like it would be at least three more months before Fields would be able to return to work and then maybe not to the heavy work he had been doing. He did not see Fields again after October 19.

About a month after Fields got out of the hospital he returned to doing automobile mechanic work at the service station but not at the same pace as previously and he avoided heavy work. During the next several months persons who saw Fields observed that he looked pale and tired, suffered from dizzy spells, and was generally in a poor state of health.

During the night of February 28, 1973, Fields died at home. He was not attended by a physician. The coroner listed the cause of death on the death certificate as myocardial infarction due to arteriosclerotic heart disease.

Fields was survived by a widow from whom he was legally separated and a four year old son. The mother had custody of the child and Fields was under a court order to pay child support of $30 per week, but was actually paying $15 per week. The mother was employed as a nursing instructor at an annual salary of more than $7,000 per year.

This suit was filed June 7, 1973.

Disability Benefits

Compensation benefits are due if an employee receives personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. LSA-R.S. 23:1031.

' Accident' and 'injury' are defined by LSA-R.S. 23:1021(1) and (7) . It is well settled in Louisiana jurisprudence that a heart attack is 'injury by accident.' Roussel v. Colonial Sugars Company, 318 So.2d 37 (La.1975); Bertrand v. Coal Operators Casualty Company, 253 La. 1115, 221 So.2d 816 (1969); Barnes v. City of New Orleans, 322 So.2d 821 (La.App.4th Cir. 1976), writ denied 325 So.2d 584 (1976). See also Parks v. Insurance Company of North America, 340 So.2d 276 (La.1976)--acute bronchitis; Leleux v. Lumbermen's Mutual Insurance Company, 318 So.2d 15 (La.1975)--stroke; Ferguson v. HDE, Inc., 270 So.2d 867 (La.1972)--stroke; Francis v. Gerlach Meat Company, Inc., 319 So.2d 534 (La.App.2d Cir. 1975)--ruptured intracranial aneurysm.

Louisiana has adopted the accidental result approach as distinguished from the accidental cause approach in determining whether there is injury by accident. Louisiana is among many jurisdictions that look to the employee, that is, the result to the employee, to determine whether there was an unexpected and catastrophic effect upon him. See Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law § 37.20. Extraordinary physical stress and strain is not essential to the definition of disabling accident. When the performance of the usual and customary duties of a workman cause or contribute to a physical breakdown, the statutory requirements for an accidental injury are present. An injury is accidental if it is unexpected and unforeseen and happens suddenly and violently, producing objective symptoms of injury at the time. Ferguson v. HDE, Inc., supra and the other cases cited above.

It is equally well settled, however, that disability is compensable only if it results from a work-related accident. The question presented is generally factual in nature: is plaintiff's disability causally related to an employment accident? Prim v. City of Shreveport, 297 So.2d 421 (La.1974), and the other cases cited above. It is not necessary that the accident be caused by extraordinary activities of an employee or that the employment activities be the exclusive cause of an accidental injury. It is only necessary that the accidental injury be caused, precipitated, aggravated or contributed to by the actions, exertion or other factors directly connected with the employment. It is immaterial that the disability could have been brought on by causes other than a work-related accident. Parks v. Insurance Company of North America, supra, and other cases cited above.

Roussel recognizes the difficulty in proving causation in a heart attack case, arising from the fact that a preexisting heart infirmity can produce disability irrespective of any outside influence. Roussel recognizes that it is of no significance that the heart attack could have occurred at another time and place if, in fact, the accidental injury occurred on the job. It is only necessary that the death or disability resulting from the accidental injury be caused or precipitated by the usual and customary actions, exertions or other factors directly connected with the employment.

While adhering to the preponderance of the evidence rule, the court in Roussel found that the medical testimony established the myocardial infarction 'could have been caused or precipitated by' the decedent's duties as a machinist and 'causal connection was thus clearly established by a preponderance of the evidence.' The holding takes a realistic approach to the difficulty posed by the vagueness of the medical testimony in most of the heart attack and similar cases.

The cases are not clear as to whether the causation inquiry is part of the 'accident' determination or is part of the 'arising out of' determination....