Fields v. State
| Decision Date | 31 December 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A02-9503-CR-151,49A02-9503-CR-151 |
| Citation | 674 N.E.2d 613 |
| Parties | Anthony FIELDS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Anthony Fields (Fields) appeals his conviction for operating a motor vehicle while his driving privileges were suspended as an habitual violator of traffic laws as a class A misdemeanor.1 Fields contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he knew his driving privileges had been suspended as an habitual traffic offender. This argument is framed in the context of the adequacy of notice of suspension.
We hold that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate the requisite notice, and we therefore reverse.
On September 10, 1994, a police officer observed a motorcycle make an unsafe start through an intersection with a child on the passenger seat behind the operator. The officer pursued the vehicle. By the time the officer reached the motorcycle, it had stopped. Although the operator had dismounted before the officer arrived, Fields identified himself to the officer as the operator of the vehicle. Fields was unable to produce a driver's license, but provided the officer with sufficient information to run a computer check on Fields' driving record. This computer check revealed that Fields had been declared an habitual violator of traffic laws on November 21, 1989 and that his driving privileges were consequently suspended for a period of ten years effective June 2, 1990. The officer thus arrested Fields for operating a motor vehicle despite the fact that his driving privileges had been suspended as an habitual traffic offender.
A bench trial was conducted December 6, 1994. After hearing the testimony of both Fields and the officer, and accepting into evidence Fields' Indiana Official Driver Record as compiled by the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV), the court convicted Fields of operating a motor vehicle while his driving privileges had been suspended for being adjudged an habitual traffic violator, as a class A misdemeanor. Fields was sentenced to 365 days in jail, with 265 suspended, and his driving privileges were suspended for two years in addition to the ten year suspension to which Fields has been subject since 1990.
The statute under which Fields was convicted, I.C. 9-30-10-16 (Burns Code Ed. Repl.1991), forbids an individual whose driving privileges have been suspended upon a determination that he is an habitual offender of traffic laws from operating a motor vehicle. The three elements of a conviction under this statute are (1) the operation of a motor vehicle; (2) while one's driving privileges are suspended as an habitual traffic law violator; and (3) a showing that the defendant knew his driving privileges had been suspended as a result of having been determined to be an habitual traffic offender. Hendrickson v. State (1996) Ind.App., 660 N.E.2d 1068, trans. denied; Bishop v. State (1994) Ind.App., 638 N.E.2d 1278, reh'g denied. Fields does not dispute that he was operating a motor vehicle, or that his driving privileges were in fact suspended. Rather, he contends that insufficient evidence was presented at trial to prove that he had the requisite notice of his suspension.
I.C. 9-30-10-5 (Burns Code Ed. Repl.1991) requires the BMV to mail a notice of suspension to the last known address of individuals whose driving records subject them to habitual traffic offender status. The courts of this state have had numerous opportunities in recent years to inquire into the evidence necessary to establish the notice required. For example, our Supreme Court in Collins v. State (1991) Ind., 567 N.E.2d 798 held that a driver's knowledge of his suspension for habitual traffic offender status could be inferred from evidence that the BMV mailed a notice of suspension to the defendant's last known address. Building upon Collins, our Supreme Court subsequently held in Cruite v. State (1994) Ind., 641 N.E.2d 1264, that the defendant's Official Driver Record maintained by the BMV, which indicated that notification of suspension of driving privileges had been mailed by the BMV to the defendant, constituted sufficient evidence of mailing from which the defendant's knowledge of suspension could be inferred.
The situation presented here appears at first blush to be similar to that presented in Cruite. As in Cruite, Fields' Official Driver Record clearly indicates that letters of notification of suspension were mailed to Fields at different addresses. Fields' BMV records indicate that two letters of suspension were mailed to Fields on November 22, 1989, one to 233 North Parker Street, and one to 1425 North Alabama Street, both in Indianapolis. The defendant in Cruite unsuccessfully argued that the mere notation in BMV records that suspension notices had been mailed to the defendant at various addresses did not sufficiently evidence the mailing necessary to give rise to the inference of notice. However, Fields poses an argument apparently not forwarded in Cruite. Fields disputes neither the fact that his suspension letters were in fact mailed, nor that BMV records indicating that they had been mailed constitute proof of mailing. Rather, he contends that he never received notice of his suspension because he claims to have never resided at either of the two addresses to which the notices of suspension were mailed. Fields thus bases his argument that the state failed to adequately prove notice upon his assertion that the state presented insufficient evidence to prove that he had ever resided at either of the addresses to which notices of suspension were mailed.
Fields' position that the State, in order to prove notice of suspension, must prove that the defendant actually resided at the address to which a notice of suspension was mailed, does not appear to be the law in Indiana. Our Supreme Court's decisions in Collins and Cruite make it clear that proof of mailing a notice of suspension to an individual's last known address is sufficient evidence from which an inference of notice of suspension may be drawn, and that BMV records clearly indicating that a notice of suspension has been mailed to a suspended individual constitutes proof of mailing. This notion is reflected in the oft-repeated rule that proof of the BMV's mailing of a notice of suspension as required by statute is an evidentiary prerequisite to proving that a suspension is in fact valid. See, e.g. Brown v. State (1996) Ind.App., 668 N.E.2d 1262, trans. granted; Kinkade v. State (1989) Ind.App., 537 N.E.2d 541.
Predicating an inference of notice upon the mailing of suspension letters to an individual's last known address appears to be based upon the determination that concerns for administrative efficiency, along with an apparent faith in the reliability of the United States Postal Service, outweigh the need for more direct evidence of the actual notice required to sustain a conviction under I.C. 9-30-10-16. We do not, however, read our Supreme Court's implicit emphasis upon administrative efficiency to abrogate the requirement of actual notice. For while " 'proof of mailing [of a notice of license suspension] is ... permissible evidence from which a necessary element, a driver's knowledge of the suspension, may be inferred ...' ", Cruite, supra, 641 N.E.2d at 1265 (quoting Collins, supra, 567 N.E.2d at 800), proof of mailing does not itself constitute notice. It merely serves as a permissible basis from which an inference of notice may be drawn. Nor does evidence of mailing create a mandatory presumption, rebuttable or otherwise, that notice has been received, for to do so would unconstitutionally relieve the state of its burden to affirmatively prove notice. Collins, supra at 801. The state properly bears the burden to prove that a defendant had notice of his suspension.
To the extent that an inference of actual notice may be predicated upon proof of mailing, it appears to this court that such mailing must at the very least be reasonably calculated to provide an individual with actual knowledge of the suspension of driving privileges. Absent this minimal assurance of an attempt at actual notice, the element of notice required to sustain a conviction under I.C. 9-30-10-16 would be rendered meaningless. As the Court of Appeals recently recognized, "[d]ue process concerns are implicated when the State suspends drivers' licences," and that these "due process concerns dictate that one who is required to mail notice to another do so in a manner that makes it reasonably probable that the other will receive actual notice." Brown, supra, 668 N.E.2d at 1264. This necessarily means that the notice of suspension in question must not only be mailed in the name of the suspended individual, but must also be mailed to an address at which the individual is reasonably likely to be notified of his or her suspension.
The holdings in Collins and Cruite appear to proceed from the assumption that the BMV's statutory obligation to mail notice of suspension to the suspended individual's "last known address" sufficiently ensures a reasonable likelihood of notification. Accordingly, the State, in order to support an inference of actual notice, must demonstrate that a notice of suspension was mailed to an individual's last known address. We agree with Fields that the State failed to prove that Fields had notice of his suspension because we conclude that the state did not demonstrate that the BMV mailed a notice of suspension to Fields' "last known address" as that concept is properly understood.
As noted, Fields contends that he never resided at either 1425 North Alabama or 233 North Parker, the two addresses to which notices of suspension for habitual traffic offender status were...
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