Fields v. State

Decision Date27 November 2013
Docket NumberNo. 40586.,40586.
Citation314 P.3d 587,155 Idaho 532
CourtIdaho Supreme Court
Parties Zane Jack FIELDS, Petitioner–Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent.

Federal Public Defender Services of Idaho, Boise, attorneys for Appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, attorneys for Respondent.

WALTERS, Justice pro tem.

I. NATURE OF THE CASE

Appellant Zane J. Fields was sentenced to death for first degree murder on March 7, 1991. On July 28, 2011, Fields filed his sixth successive petition for post-conviction relief in the Ada County district court. He raised claims of actual innocence, prosecutorial misconduct, and violations of the right to counsel, due process, and the right to a fair trial. The district court granted the State's motion to dismiss Fields's petition because his claims were barred by I.C. § 19–2719(5), the statute governing post-conviction procedure in capital cases. Fields now appeals the district court's dismissal of his petition. We affirm.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 11, 1988, Fields stabbed 69–year–old Mary Katherine Vanderford to death while stealing about $50 from the store in which she was working. Vanderford was alone in the store at the time, and there were no eyewitnesses to the murder. She bled to death due to a stab wound in her neck. See Fields v. State, 154 Idaho 347, 348, 298 P.3d 241, 242 (2013) (Fields V ).

At Fields's preliminary hearing, an inmate Harold Gilcrist testified that Fields confessed to the crime and made other incriminating remarks to him. At Fields's trial, Gilcrist did not testify, but three other inmates did: Jeffrey Acheson, Joe Heistand, and Scott Bianchi. Each inmate testified that Fields made incriminating statements to them about the crime while they were housed in Ada County Jail. The jury found Fields guilty of felony murder and the trial court sentenced him to death. At Fields's motion for a new trial, Gilcrist again testified and he also testified at Fields's first post-conviction proceeding. Fields has previously filed five petitions for post-conviction relief. See id. at 348–49, 298 P.3d at 242–43.

Fields's sixth petition for post-conviction relief, filed on July 28, 2011, is now before this Court. According to Fields, on June 17, 2011, Gilcrist met with Greg Worthen, an investigator assigned to Fields's post-conviction case, and Gilcrist verbally recanted his testimony. Then, on July 8, 2011, Gilcrist signed a non-notarized declaration stating that his testimony and previous statements were false. He claimed he was motivated by a "desire to burn Fields" for assaulting him. Gilcrist also stated he learned about Fields's crime from Detective Smith. Further, Gilcrist explained that he shared the information he learned from Detective Smith with inmates Heistand and Bianchi. Gilcrist claimed neither Heistand nor Bianchi could have testified against Fields without the information from him. Based on these facts, Fields's petition raised claims of actual innocence based on Gilcrist's recantation, prosecutorial misconduct based on Detective Smith's "manipulation of witnesses," and "violations of right to counsel, due process and fair trial rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments." To support these claims, Fields attached to his petition an affidavit by Worthen, Gilcrist's declaration, an affidavit by Acheson, and the transcript of Bianchi's testimony from a proceeding on Fields's motion for a new trial.

The State moved to dismiss the petition on numerous grounds. In response to the State's arguments that the petition failed to provide material facts and was untimely, Fields submitted a notarized affidavit by Gilcrist dated September 30, 2011, with the same information as the original declaration. Fields also submitted an affidavit by his former counsel Bruce Livingston. Later, Fields submitted another affidavit by Gilcrist dated March 14, 2012, stating that Gilcrist would not have come forward with his recantation but for a major medical crisis in 2009.

The district court granted the State's motion to dismiss Fields's petition on three grounds. First, the district court determined the petition was untimely because the petition did not meet the burden of alleging facts to show when his claims were known or reasonably should have been known as required by I.C. § 19–2719(5). Second, the district court determined Fields's petition was not supported by material facts stated under oath or affirmation as required by I.C. § 19–2719(5)(a) and I.C. § 19–4903. Third, the district court determined the matters in the petition were merely impeaching under I.C. § 19–2719(5)(b). Based on these grounds, the district court entered an order dismissing Fields's petition on November 29, 2012. Fields timely appealed to this Court.

III. ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Did the district court err in dismissing Fields's successive petition for failing to meet the heightened pleading standard under I.C. § 19–2719(5) ?

2. Did the district court err in dismissing Fields's successive petition for failing to provide material facts as required by I.C. § 19–2719(5)(a) ?

3. Did the district court err in dismissing Field's successive petition for offering impeaching evidence under I.C. § 19–2719(5)(b) ?

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under I.C. § 19–2719, "a defendant is deemed to have waived any claims if he or she fails to apply for relief within the statutory time limits, and that ‘the courts of Idaho shall have no power to consider any such claims for relief as have been so waived...." Pizzuto v. State, 134 Idaho 793, 795, 10 P.3d 742, 744 (2000) ( Pizzuto 2000 ) (quoting I.C. § 19–2719(5) ). " ‘Whether a successive petition for post-conviction relief was properly dismissed pursuant to I.C. § 19–2719 is a question of law. This Court reviews questions of law de novo.’ " Fields V, 154 Idaho at 349, 298 P.3d at 243 (quoting Pizzuto 2000, 134 Idaho at 795, 10 P.3d at 744).

V. ANALYSIS
A. The District Court Properly Dismissed Fields's Successive Petition For Failing To Meet The Heightened Pleading Standard Under I.C. § 19–2719(5).

The Uniform Post–Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA), I.C. §§ 19–4901 to –4911, generally governs post-conviction proceedings.

Pizzuto v. State, 149 Idaho 155, 160, 233 P.3d 86, 91 (2010) ( Pizzuto 2010 ). For post-conviction procedure in capital cases, however, I.C. § 19–2719 governs to the extent that the statute conflicts with the UPCPA. Id.

I.C. § 19–2719 requires that the petitioner follow its time limitations to obtain post-conviction relief. I.C. § 19–2719(4) ; see also Pizzuto 2010, 149 Idaho at 160, 233 P.3d at 91. Under the statute, "[w]ithin forty-two (42) days of the filing of the judgment imposing the punishment of death, and before the death warrant is filed, the defendant must file any legal or factual challenge to the sentence or conviction that is known or reasonably should be known." I.C. § 19–2719(3). "Any known challenges or claims not raised within 42 days are deemed waived. Our Court strictly construes the waiver provision of I.C. § 19–2719." Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 57, 106 P.3d 376, 383 (2004) (internal citation omitted).

Successive petitions are allowed only in "unusual cases." State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795, 807, 820 P.2d 665, 677 (1991). For successive petitions, I.C. § 19–2719(5) " ‘places a heightened burden on petitioners to make a prima facie showing that the issues raised after the forty-two day time period were not known or could not reasonably have been known.’ " Fields V, 154 Idaho at 350, 298 P.3d at 244 (quoting Pizzuto 2010, 149 Idaho at 160, 233 P.3d at 91); see also I.C. § 19–2719(5). Moreover, the petitioner must raise the newly discovered issues " ‘within a reasonable time.’ " Fields V, 154 Idaho at 350, 298 P.3d at 244 (quoting Pizzuto 2010, 149 Idaho at 160, 233 P.3d at 91). "A reasonable time for filing a successive petition for post-conviction relief is forty-two days after the petitioner knew or reasonably should have known of the claim, unless the petitioner shows that there were extraordinary circumstances that prevented him or her from filing the claim within that time period." Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 727, 202 P.3d 642, 649 (2008) (Pizzuto 2008 ). " ‘Any petition for post-conviction relief that fails to meet the above requirements must be summarily dismissed.’ " Fields V, 154 Idaho at 350, 298 P.3d at 244 (quoting Pizzuto 2010, 149 Idaho at 161, 233 P.3d at 92).

In this case, Fields first contends that the appropriate date to determine the timeliness of his successive petition is the date of Gilcrist's recantation. Based on this contention, Fields asserts his petition was timely filed because he filed his petition within forty-two days of the date of Gilcrist's declaration. Contrary to Fields's argument, however, this Court has repeatedly examined when the petitioner reasonably should have known of his claim to determine the petition's timeliness. See, e.g., Fields V, 154 Idaho at 350–51, 298 P.3d at 244–45; Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 35, 42, 232 P.3d 813, 820 (2010) ; Pizzuto 2010, 149 Idaho at 161–62, 163–64, 233 P.3d at 92–93, 94–95; Pizzuto 2008, 146 Idaho at 727, 202 P.3d at 64; McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 703–04, 992 P.2d 144, 152–53 (1999) ; Paz v. State, 123 Idaho 758, 760, 852 P.2d 1355, 1357 (1993). Thus, even if Fields arguably knew about his claim on the date of Gilcrist's recantation, this has no bearing on when Fields's claim was "knowable." Pizzuto 2008, 146 Idaho at 727, 202 P.3d at 649. For Fields's petition to be timely filed, he must establish that he raised these newly discovered issues within forty-two days of when he knew and reasonably should have known of the claims. See id.; Paz, 123 Idaho at 760, 852 P.2d at 1357; Rhoades, 120 Idaho at 807, 820 P.2d at 677. In addition, Fields must meet this heightened pleading standard of I.C. § 19–2719(5) before we may consider merits of his claims. Stuart, 149 Idaho at 41, 232 P.3d at...

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