Fields v. Thaler

• Decision Date: 12 November 2009
• Docket Number: No. 07-10627.,07-10627.
• Parties: Emanual Deleon FIELDS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Rick THALER, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

588 F.3d 270

Emanual Deleon FIELDS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Rick THALER, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 07-10627.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

November 12, 2009.

Emanual Deleon Fields, Tennessee Colony, TX, pro se.

Elizabeth A. Goettert, Austin, TX, for Thaler.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before REAVLEY, JOLLY, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:

This court granted a certificate of appealability ("COA") authorizing Emanual Deleon Fields to appeal the district court's denial of his federal habeas claims under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), with respect to the prosecution's peremptory strikes of three black prospective jurors. The district court held that the state court's decision that the prosecutor did not strike the jurors for racial reasons was not unreasonable and denied habeas relief. In this opinion we address various Batson related issues including comparative analysis of reasons given by the prosecutor for excluding blacks while retaining whites as jurors, the effect of faulty and silent transcripts, and the interplay between specific state court findings of fact under § 2254(e)(1) and state court determinations of fact under § 2254(d)(2). After thorough consideration we conclude that Fields has failed to demonstrate a Batson violation. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

I.

Fields was charged with aggravated robbery. His first jury trial ended in a mistrial. At his second trial, seventy persons were in the venire. Juror Number 8 was dismissed for cause before voir dire began. At the end of voir dire, Juror Number 42 was dismissed for cause. From the sixty-eight remaining individuals, there were seventeen agreed strikes. The parties then used their peremptory strikes (ten each), focusing on the group that remained, up through Juror Number 51. The trial court observed that there had been five black persons within the group remaining after the agreed strikes and that the prosecution had struck all five of them. At the court's invitation, Fields's counsel made a Batson challenge.

The prosecutor said that he struck Cathy Green (Juror Number 15) because her son had been convicted of assault in Dallas and because she had agreed with defense counsel that if a person stuttered that could indicate that the person was lying. The prosecutor said that he struck Randy Williams (Juror Number 22) because he had gold teeth, wore gold chains, and refused to express an opinion about the accused's right not to testify. The prosecutor said that he struck Kent Peterson (Juror Number 24) because he fell asleep during the prosecutor's voir dire examination and because he said that the accuser's credibility should be evaluated. The prosecutor said that he struck Darrell McAlpin (Juror Number 40) because he had a brother who had been convicted of robbery and because he had not admitted that he had a conviction for driving while intoxicated ("DWI"). The prosecutor said that he struck Wanda Brigham (Juror Number 49) because she "has a brother that's in the penitentiary right now doing a two-year sentence."

Fields's counsel declined the court's invitation to cross-examine the prosecutor. He offered further objections to the strikes of Green, Williams, and Peterson. He did not challenge the prosecutor's reasons for striking McAlpin and Brigham. Defense counsel pointed out that Green said that she was not involved in her son's court proceedings, did not think that her son had been treated unfairly, and had not given any indication that she could not be fair in Fields's case. He argued that the strike of Williams was racially motivated because blacks and Hispanics are more likely to have gold teeth and wear gold chains than whites and Asians. With respect to the strike of Peterson, defense counsel pointed out that he had noticed another panel member, Ms. Haas (Juror Number 35), falling asleep and that he did not know if the prosecution had struck her. Defense counsel then stated: "Specifically those individuals we would object to them being struck by the State, and we allege that those strikes are based on racial reasons."

The trial court stated that it was satisfied with the State's explanations and overruled the Batson challenge. Fields told the judge that he felt that it was unfair that he had no blacks on his jury panel. The judge responded: "Your right is to not have them excluded on the basis of their race, and I see no evidence that that has occurred."

On direct appeal, Fields asserted a Batson claim with respect to the strikes of Green, McAlpin, and Brigham. He argued that the prosecution struck them for having relatives who had been arrested, charged, or convicted of crimes, but did not strike three whites who also had relatives who had been arrested, charged, or convicted of crimes. With respect to Green and McAlpin, the Texas court held that because the State gave additional, race-neutral reasons for striking them, Fields had not shown disparate treatment. With respect to Brigham, the court stated that the white jurors who had relatives with criminal involvement were not similarly situated because none of them had a relative currently in prison as did Brigham. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused Fields's petition for discretionary review.

The district court denied Fields's federal habeas petition and denied a COA. This court granted a COA for the following issues: (1) whether the state court's resolution of Fields's Batson claims as to Green, McAlpin, and Brigham was reasonable; and (2) whether the lack of record support for the prosecutor's reason for striking Brigham was sufficient to rebut the presumption of correctness under § 2254(e)(1).

II.

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") governs a federal habeas court's review of a state prisoner's claims that were adjudicated on the merits in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Under the AEDPA, a federal court must defer to a state court's resolution of questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact unless the state court's "adjudication of the claim . . . resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A state court's decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if it "applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth" in Supreme Court cases or "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Court's] precedent." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). A state court's decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law if the state court "correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner's case." Id. at 407-08, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Two provisions of the AEPDA deal with factual determinations of state courts. Relief is warranted under § 2254(d)(2) if the state court's "adjudication of the claim . . . resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." The second provision, § 2254(e)(1), provides that a state court's factual findings are presumed to be correct, unless the petitioner rebuts them with clear and convincing evidence.

The law governing Batson claims is clearly established. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits purposeful racial discrimination in the use of peremptory strikes of prospective jurors. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Batson claims are evaluated using a three-step analysis:

First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race. Second, if that showing has been made, the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question. Third, in light of the parties' submissions, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.

Miller-El v. Cockrell (Miller-El I), 537 U.S. 322, 328-29, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (citations omitted). The third step of Batson is at issue in this case. When the process reaches this step, the "defendant may rely on `all relevant circumstances' to raise an inference of purposeful discrimination." Miller-El v. Dretke (Miller-El II), 545 U.S. 231, 240, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. 1712); see also Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 363, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (an "invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "[T]he critical question in determining whether a prisoner has proved purposeful discrimination at step three is the persuasiveness of the prosecutor's justification for his peremptory strike. At this stage, implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination." Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 338-39, 123 S.Ct. 1029 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "Whether a prosecutor intended to discriminate on the basis of race in challenging potential jurors is, as Batson recognized, a question of historical fact." Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 367, 111 S.Ct. 1859. "If a prosecutor's proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination to be considered at Batson's third step." Miller-El II...