Fiengo v. General Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 30 May 2007
• Docket Number: No. 05-06-00587-CV.,05-06-00587-CV.
• Citation: 225 S.W.3d 858
• Parties: Madison FIENGO and Martha Padilla, Appellants v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

225 S.W.3d 858

Madison FIENGO and Martha Padilla, Appellants v.GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Appellee.

No. 05-06-00587-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.

May 30, 2007.

James L. Johnson, The Johnson Law Firm, Dallas, Appellant.

Anthony Alan Avey, Kathleen A. Post, Brendan K. McBride, Prichard, Hawkins,

FcFarland & Young, L.L.P., San Antonio, for Appellee.

Before Justices MORRIS, FRANCIS, and MAZZANT.

OPINION

Opinion by Justice FRANCIS.

In this products liability case, Madison Fiengo and Martha Padilla appeal the trial court's summary judgment in favor of General Motors Corporation.In three issues, appellants generally assert the trial court erred in granting GM's motion for summary judgment because (1) GM is equitably estopped from asserting the statute of repose, (2)the statute of repose violates the "open courts" doctrine, and (3) GM's motion did not attack all claims.In a fourth issue, appellants argue the trial court erred in impliedly denying its motion for summary judgment.For the reasons set out below, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

In February 2004, Fiengo was driving a 1990 Pontiac Grand Prix when he was involved in an automobile accident.Appellants contended the automobile contained a design or manufacturing defect that was a producing cause of the accident and caused their damages.In August 2004, appellants' counsel contacted GM's legal department to determine "whether a settlement could be negotiated without the necessity of filing a lawsuit."GM began an investigation and, over the course of several communications, sought various information from appellants.During the course of the investigation, appellants assert that GM asked that they not file a lawsuit "as doing so would bring settlement negotiations to a complete halt."

In March 2005, the fifteen-year statute of repose for product liability claims expired without appellants filing a lawsuit.SeeTEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 16.012(b)(Vernon Supp.2006)(generally requiring claimants to bring products liability action against manufacturer or seller before the end of fifteen years after date of sale of product).In late April, GM notified appellants that it had completed its investigation into the accident and was denying the claim.Appellants filed suit two months later, alleging the vehicle contained a design and manufacturing defect.

GM filed an answer generally denying the allegations and also asserting that the claims were time barred by the statute of repose.Later, it filed a traditional motion for summary judgment asserting the same ground.In their response to the motion, appellants countered with the doctrines of equitable estoppel and open courts.Appellants also filed their own motion for summary judgment raising these same issues.The trial court granted GM's motion for summary judgment.This appeal ensued.

In their first issue, appellants argue the trial court erred in granting GM's motion for summary judgment because equitable estoppel prevents GM from raising its statute of repose affirmative defense.GM responds that the statute of repose "unequivocally bars"appellants' products liability suit against GM and that ordinary equitable principles that might apply to a statute of limitations do not apply to a statute of repose, as a matter of law.

We have found no published Texas case addressing the precise issue of whether an equitable principle, such as estoppel, can be asserted to prevent a defendant from raising a statute of repose as an affirmative defense.We need not decide that issue today because, even if we assume it can, appellants have failed to produce sufficient evidence on each element of equitable estoppel so as to raise a fact issue.

When a defendant moves for summary judgment on an affirmative defense and establishes that defense as a matter of law, the plaintiff/nonmovant must raise a fact issue on any matter injected by the plaintiff in confession and avoidance of the affirmative defense.Prodigy Commn's Corp. v. Agric. Excess & Surplus Ins. Co.,195 S.W.3d 764, 768(Tex.App.-Dallas2006, pet. filed).There is no dispute between the parties that the automobile was originally sold more than fifteen years before appellants filed suit.Thus, to avoid summary judgment, appellants had to produce sufficient summary judgment evidence to raise a question of fact as to each element of equitable estoppel.SeeBrandes v. Rice Trust, Inc.,966 S.W.2d 144, 146(Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.]1998, pet. denied).After reviewing the record, we conclude they have failed to meet their burden.

Equitable estoppel is based on the principle that "one who by his conduct has induced another to act in a particular manner should not be permitted to adopt an inconsistent position and thereby cause loss or injury to another."City of Fredericksburg v. Bopp,126 S.W.3d 218, 221(Tex.App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.).It is established when (1) a false representation or concealment of material facts, (2) is made with knowledge, actual or constructive, of those facts, (3) with the intention that it should be acted upon, (4) to a party without knowledge or means of obtaining knowledge of the facts, (5) who detrimentally relies on the representations.Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc.,962 S.W.2d 507, 515-16(Tex.1998);Sefzik v. City of McKinney,198 S.W.3d 884, 895(Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).

Appellants first argue they presented evidence that "GM made false representations that it would negotiate a settlement if Fiengo did not file a lawsuit and that Fiengo should delay filing suit while GM prepared to negotiate, while concealing the fact that it would not negotiate or even make any settlement offer."In particular, they rely on counsel's affidavit, in which counsel asserted that a GM representative, Michael Schulte, "asked that I not file a lawsuit, as doing so would bring settlement negotiations to a complete halt."Additionally, counsel points to another GM representative twice asking him to postpone filing a lawsuit "while GM continued an engineering analysis so that it could negotiate a settlement."

Initially, we note there is no evidence in the record that settlement negotiations had begun in this case; rather, the evidence demonstrated that GM was in the process of investigating appellants' claim of a product defect.There is nothing in the record to show that GM's statements regarding future settlement negotiations were false.Specifically, there is no evidence that settlement negotiations would not come to a complete halt if appellants filed a lawsuit.Similarly, that GM asked appellants to "be patient" and to wait for the engineering analysis so that it could negotiate a settlement is not a representation that GM would negotiate a settlement irrespective of what its investigation showed.SeeDuncan v. Lisenby,912 S.W.2d 857, 859(Tex.App.-Houston[14th Dist.]1995, no writ)(plaintiff's attorney's statement that he believed case was settled, based on representations of defendants, did not raise fact issue on false representation and thus would not estop defendants from relying on statute of limitations defense).

Moreover, estoppel requires a reasonable or justified reliance on the conduct or statements of the person sought to be estopped by the person seeking the benefit of the doctrine.Simpson v. MBank Dallas, N.A.,724 S.W.2d 102, 108(Tex.App.-Dallas1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).A plaintiff may not "blindly rely upon a situation as being what it seemed rather than as being what it in reality was."Dean v. Frank W. Neal & Assocs., Inc.,166 S.W.3d 352, 358(Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.).He must be diligent to file the cause of action he knows he has; he may not continue to rely upon the defendant's original inducement beyond a point when it becomes unreasonable to do so.Id.For appellants to raise a fact issue on estoppel, they must have presented some evidence that appellees' statements affirmatively induced them into delaying filing suit beyond the statute of repose, unmixed with any want of diligence on their part.Seeid.

The summary judgment evidence showed that GM began investigating appellants' claim of a defect in the car in August 2004...