Fife v. Bosley
| Decision Date | 08 November 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-1150,96-1150 |
| Citation | 100 F.3d 87 |
| Parties | 132 Lab.Cas. P 33,456, 3 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 961 Harold L. FIFE, et al, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Freeman BOSLEY, et al, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Michael Alan Garvin, St. Louis, MO, argued (Tyrone A. Taborn, on the brief), for Defendants-Appellants.
Paul E. Ground, Manchester, MO, argued (Rodney J. Stevens, on the brief), for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Before BOWMAN, BRIGHT and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.
In this action, Airfield Operations Specialists at Lambert-St. Louis International Airport (the "Specialists") seek damages from the City of St. Louis and City officials (collectively, the "City") for overtime violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(a)(1) & 216(b). The City claims that the Specialists are exempt "executive, administrative, or professional" employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). The district court granted summary judgment for the Specialists on the ground that the City is collaterally estopped to assert these FLSA defenses by a January 1994 decision of the Missouri State Board of Mediation, which held that the Specialists are non-managerial employees for collective bargaining purposes. The City appeals. We reverse.
When a state administrative agency has acted in a judicial capacity concerning a matter properly before it, and has provided the parties an adequate opportunity to litigate, "federal courts must give the agency's factfinding the same preclusive effect [in subsequent litigation] to which it would be entitled in the State's courts." University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 799, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 3226, 92 L.Ed.2d 635 (1986); see Alexander v. Pathfinder, 91 F.3d 59, 62-63 (8th Cir.1996). Missouri courts give collateral estoppel effect to the final decisions of state agencies, so long as the general criteria for applying collateral estoppel are satisfied. See Bresnahan v. May Dept. Stores Co., 726 S.W.2d 327, 329-30 (Mo. banc 1987). "Collateral estoppel forecloses a party from litigating only those exact issues unambiguously decided in the earlier case." Davis v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 695 S.W.2d 164, 165 (Mo.App.1985) (quotation omitted).
In the administrative decision in question, the Mediation Board determined, over the City's objection, that the Specialists should be added to a collective bargaining unit of airport employees. Under Missouri law, the Board is authorized to decide contested cases regarding the "appropriateness of bargaining units" of public employees, subject to judicial review that the City did not seek. See Mo.Rev.Stat. § 105.525. The City argued that the Specialists are supervisory or managerial employees and thus ineligible to join the bargaining unit. In rejecting the City's position, the Board considered non-statutory factors such as whether the Specialists have "the authority to direct and assign the work force, including a consideration of the amount of independent judgment and discretion exercised in such matters."
The ultimate issue decided by the Mediation Board--whether the Specialists are eligible to join a union--is different than the ultimate issue in this case--whether they are exempt employees under FLSA. However, the Mediation Board's decision included subsidiary findings that the Specialists "do not supervise anyone," that they "have not disciplined or fired anyone," that they exercise little if any independent judgment and discretionary power, and that they are paid under an hourly pay schedule. The district court concluded that these findings preclude the City from establishing that the Specialists are exempt employees under the governing FLSA regulations. We disagree.
Under the FLSA, to determine whether an employee is an exempt "executive, administrative, or professional" employee, a court must apply Department of Labor regulations that have been judicially construed in over fifty years of litigation. See, e.g., Murray v. Stuckey's, Inc., 50 F.3d 564 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 174, 133 L.Ed.2d 114 (1995), and cases cited. The Department's regulations and accompanying Interpretations fill more than fifty pages in the Code of Federal Regulations. See 29 C.F.R. Part 541. The exemptions require consideration of factors such as whether the employee "customarily and regularly exercises discretion and independent judgment," performs "work directly related to management policies or...
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...those facts have been analyzed under significantly different criteria than would be used in federal or state court. Fife v. Bosley, 100 F.3d 87, 89-90 (8th Cir.1996). But when both federal or state law find the same conduct prohibited, then preclusive effect can be given to that determinati......
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Ely v. Dolgencorp, LLC
...regulations that contain factors that guide the Court in determining whether an employee qualifies for an exemption. See Fife v. Bosley, 100 F.3d 87, 89 (8th Cir.1996) (citing 29 C.F.R. pt. 541). These regulations were amended by the DOL on August 23, 2004. Prior to these amendments, the re......
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Ely v. Dolgencorp, LLC
...regulations that contain factors that guide the Court in determining whether an employee qualifies for an exemption. See Fife v. Bosley, 100 F.3d 87, 89 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541). These regulations were amended by the DOL on August 23, 2004. Prior to these amendments, the reg......
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...of an organized fire department apart from the airport fire department. 5. Defendant places great emphasis on the case of Fife v. Bosley, 100 F.3d 87 (8th Cir.1996), an FLSA case in which the court declined to give collateral estoppel effect to a decision by a state agency. However, the Cou......