Fifield Manor v. Finston

Citation354 P.2d 1073,7 Cal.Rptr. 377,54 Cal.2d 632
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (California)
Decision Date06 September 1960
Parties, 354 P.2d 1073, 78 A.L.R.2d 813 FIFIELD MANOR (a Corporation), Appellant, v. Sidney S. FINSTON et al., Respondents. L. A. 25858.

Overton, Lyman & Prince and George W. Prince, Jr., Los Angeles, for appellant.

Betts, Ely & Loomis and Richard F. Runkle, Los Angeles, for respondent.

DOOLING, Justice.

Plaintiff brought this action to recover the cost of essential medical care rendered by it to George A. Ross, deceased, pursuant to a 'life-care contract.' Ross' injuries and death resulted from an automobile accident allegedly caused by defendants' negligence. A general demurrer to the complaint was sustained without leave to amend. From the judgment of dismissal accordingly entered, plaintiff appeals.

The essential allegations of plaintiff's complaint, accepted as true for purposes of this appeal (Terry v. Bender, 143 Cal.App.2d 198, 201, 300 P.2d 119), show the following situation: Plaintiff, a nonprofit corporation, had entered into a life-care contract with Ross whereby it had 'expressly agreed to provide to * * * Ross all essential medical care.' Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 2350, 2353. Thereafter, Ross was struck by an automobile negligently operated by defendant Sidney Finston and died some six weeks later as the result of his injuries. Pursuant to its contract, plaintiff provided essential medical services for Ross 'including treatment by doctors, nursing care, medication and hospitalization' valued at $6,250. Plaintiff alleged its damage in that amount as a direct right of recovery from defendants; and it also alleged a right of subrogation, expressly assigned under the life-care contract, for 'all expenses (it) incurred as the result of any injuries inflicted upon * * * Ross by reason of the negligence or carelessness of a third party.'

There is no question as to the validity of the life-care contract. Welf. & Inst.Code, Div. 3, ch. 3, §§ 2350-2360. Defendants however contest their liability to plaintiff either (1) on the basis of plaintiff's direct right of recovery for the financial loss it suffered in providing medical care for Ross because of defendants' negligence or (2) on the basis of the subrogation agreement in the life-care contract.

1. Plaintiff's direct right of recovery.

The life-care contract between plaintiff and Ross made plaintiff responsible for furnishing Ross essential medical treatment, nursing care and hospitalization; and Ross had a right to these services when necessary. Therefore, plaintiff contends, when defendants' negligent act necessitated plaintiff's furnishing medical services to Ross pursuant to the life-care contract, plaintiff's primary right to recover the resulting medical expenses sustains its direct cause of action against defendants as the wrongdoers responsible for plaintiff's damage. Civ.Code, § 3281. As analogous situations, plaintiff argues that it was in no different position in its duty to Ross and its direct right to recover its damages from defendants as wrongdoers than the parents of a minor child seeking recovery of medical expenses incurred because of wrongful injuries to the child (Civ.Code, § 196; 14 Cal.Jur.2d Damages, § 53, p. 681; McManus v. Arnold Taxi Corp., 82 Cal.App. 215, 223, 255 P.2d 755); a husband seeking recovery of medical expenses similarly incurred for his wife because of wrongful injuries (Code Civ.Proc. § 427; Walling v. Kimball, 17 Cal.2d 364, 371, 110 P.2d 58); or an employer seeking the recovery of medical expenses incurred for an employee wrongfully injured in his employment (Lab.Code, § 3852).

In Follansbee v. Benzenberg, 122 Cal.App.2d 466, 265 P.2d 183, 42 A.L.R.2d 832, plaintiff's husband was fatally injured in an automobile accident caused by defendants' negligence. Plaintiff had incurred hospital and medical expenses for her husband's care and treatment. It was held that these expenses were not recoverable by decedent's estate under section 956 of the Civil Code, for such expenses were incurred by plaintiff wife pursuant to her legal obligation to care for her husband, rather than by the husband; nor were they recoverable by the husband's heirs under section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the wrongful death statute, for such expenses were not sustained by reason of the death of the husband. It was therefore concluded that plaintiff wife had sustained the expenses in her own right pursuant to her legal obligations to her husband and 'as an individual,' she was entitled to recover them from the defendants as the persons whose negligence proximately caused the injuries necessitating the medical services and expenses.

Plaintiff argues that its position is similar to the wife's in the Follansbee case: it was under a legal duty, pursuant to its life-care contract, to provide the medical care for Ross necessitated by defendants' negligent conduct; the medical expenses so incurred were neither recoverable by Ross' estate (Civ.Code, § 956) nor his heirs under the wrongful death statute (Code Civ.Proc. § 377); and therefore defendants' negligent act was a tort against plaintiff as well as against Ross, the physically injured person.

Plaintiff's alleged direct right of recovery depends upon its contractual obligation to decedent. The courts in common-law jurisdictions have long recognized that an action will lie for the intentional interference by a third person with a contractual relation either by unlawful means or by means otherwise lawful in the absence of sufficient justification. Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 18 Cal.2d 33, 35, 112 P.2d 631; see Prosser on Torts, 2d Ed., pp. 722-725, where the development of this rule is traced. The most general application of this rule is to cases where one party to the contract has been induced to breach it, but it has been extended to cases where performance has been rendered more expensive or burdensome by the third party's intentional act. Prosser on Torts, 2d Ed., p. 730, and cases cited in note 92. However, with the exception of an action by the master for tortious injuries to his servant, thus depriving the master of his servant's services, which traces back to medieval English law (Prosser on Torts, 2d Ed., pp. 723, 729, 732; see Civ.Code, § 49, subd. (c), codifying this common-law rule; cf. Earley v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 176 Cal. 79, 82, 167 P. 513, L.R.A.1918A, 997; Darmour Productions Corp. v. H. M. Baruch Corp., 135 Cal.App. 351, 352-353, 27 P.2d 664), the courts have quite consistently refused to recognize a cause of action based on negligent, as opposed to intentiolnal, conduct which interferes with the performance of a contract between third parties or renders its performance more expensive or burdensome. Prosser on Torts, 2d Ed., pp. 732-733, collecting many of the cases; Harper and James, Vol. 1, The Law of Torts, § 6.10, pp. 501-510; note 23 Cal.L.Rev. p. 420.

In a comparatively recent opinion (1946) the Court of Appeals of Ohio in Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d 200, refused recovery to a workman who claimed to have lost eight days wages under his contract with his employer because of conditions caused by a negligent gas explosion in defendant's plant. The court, after noting that plaintiff had failed to find a single case supporting such a cause of action, and after citing and discussing many of the cases in which recovery for negligent interference with contract had been denied, concluded at page 204: 'It is our opinion that the courts generally have reached a wise result in limiting claims for damages in this class of cases to who (sic) may have sustained personal injuries or physical property damage and in refusing to open their doors in such cases to claims of loss of wages and other economic loss based on contract.' Cf. Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 9 Cir., 1946, 153 F.2d 958, 960.

No case has been cited to us which would support plaintiff's contention that, because under its contract with the decedent plaintiff was compelled to expend sums for his medical care and treatment by reason of the injuries negligently inflicted upon decedent, plaintiff has a direct cause of action against defendants based upon such negligent injuries, and we are satisfied that to so hold would constitute an unwarranted extension of liability for negligence.

The analogy which plaintiff attempts to draw between this case and Follansbee v. Benzenberg, supra, 122 Cal.App.2d 466, 265 P.2d 183, must fail because the wife's recovery in Follansbee depended upon familial status and the duty of support of her husband imposed upon her by statutory law (Civ.Code, §§ 171, 176) while plaintiff's claim for recovery is based solely upon a contractual liability between itself and the decedent. A similar attempted analogy between the obligation imposed by familial status and a strictly contractual obligation was made in Anthony v. Slaid, 11 Metc. 290, 52 Mass. 290. In that case the plaintiff had a contract to support all the poor of a town and was compelled by defendant's injury to one of the paupers to expend under his contract an increased amount for the pauper's care. His right to recover from the tort-feasor was denied, the court saying at page 291: 'It is not by means of any natural or legal relation between the plaintiff and the party injured, that the plaintiff sustains any loss by the act of the defendant's wife, but by means of the special contract by which he had undertaken to support the town paupers. The damage is too remote and indirect.' Cf. Dennis v. Clark, 2 Cush. 347, 354, 56 Mass. 347, 354.

Nor is it true, as plaintiff argues, that because it paid for the medical care and treatment under its contract, the decedent's estate has no cause of action for the cost of such treatment against the defendants. The fact that either under contract or gratuitously such treatment has been paid for by another does not defeat the cause of action of the injured par...

To continue reading

Request your trial
142 cases
  • Rodriguez v. McDonnel Douglas Corp.
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • 21 December 1978
    ...of the injured party to recover the reasonable value of such treatment from the tort-feasor." (Fifield Manor v. Finston (1960) 54 Cal.2d 632, 637, 7 Cal.Rptr. 377, 380, 354 P.2d 1073, 1076.) E. Admissibility of Evidence of Inflation It is claimed that, in making its award, it was improper f......
  • S. Cal. Gas Co. v. Superior Court of L. A. Cnty.(In re S. Cal. Gas Leak Cases), S246669
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • 30 May 2019
    ...conclusion on very similar facts — another explosion causing the closure of a nearby workplace. (See Fifield Manor v. Finston (1960) 54 Cal.2d 632, 636, 7 Cal.Rptr. 377, 354 P.2d 1073, citing Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co. (Ohio Ct.App. 1946) 73 N.E.2d 200, 201-204.)Federal courts sitting i......
  • North American Chemical Co. v. Superior Court, B109904
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • 1 December 1997
    ...cases which had rejected such a recovery. (Id. at pp. 806-807, 157 Cal.Rptr. 407, 598 P.2d 60, citing Fifield Manor v. Finston (1960) 54 Cal.2d 632, 7 Cal.Rptr. 377, 354 P.2d 1073; Adams v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co. (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 37, 123 Cal.Rptr. 216.) As the court stated: "[......
  • LiMandri v. Judkins, D022106
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • 28 January 1997
    ...for negligent interference with contractual relations (as opposed to prospective economic advantage). In Fifield Manor v. Finston (1960) 54 Cal.2d 632, 7 Cal.Rptr. 377, 354 P.2d 1073, the California Supreme Court noted: "[W]ith the exception of an action by the master for tortious injuries ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Business torts and actions
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books California Causes of Action
    • 31 March 2022
    ...with the plaintiff who had contracted to provide lifetime medical care to a passenger in the defendant’s car. Fifield Manor v. Finston , 54 Cal. 2d 632, 7 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1960). Although it was reasonably foreseeable that the defendant’s negligent driving might cause injury to a passenger, ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT