Fifield v. Farmers' Nat. Bank of Princeton

Decision Date29 November 1893
Citation35 N.E. 802,148 Ill. 163
PartiesFIFIELD et al. v. FARMERS' NAT. BANK OF PRINCETON et al.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from appellate court, second district.

Bill by the Farmers' National Bank of Princeton and others against Robert W. Day, C. S. Fifield, C. H. Morse, and others. Complainants obtained a decree, which was affirmed by the appellate court. Defendants Fifield and Morse appeal. Affirmed.Aldrich, Payne & Defrees, for appellants.

Owen G. Lovejoy, Richard M. Skinner, and George S. Skinner, for appellees.

The other facts fully appear in the following statement by CRAIG, J.:

On July 1, 1891, Robert Montgomery and nine other residents of Wyanet, in Bureau county, entered into a written contract with Robert Day, by which they agreed to convey to him lots 13, 14, 15, and 16, in block 20, in Brown's addition to said village, and pay Day $6,000; and, in consideration thereof, Day, on his part, agreed to erect on the lots a factory building 40x100 feet, two stories high, and to put in the necessary machinery and equip the same for a shoe factory, the deed to provide that the building and machinery to be placed thereon should not be torn down or removed therefrom for five years. On July 15, 1891, Orson K. Tuttle, in whom the title was vested, and his wife, by their deed of that date, conveyed said lots 13, 14, 15, and 16 to said Robert Day, and which deed was filed for record in the recorder's office of said Bureau county on July 23, 1891. The deed, as required by the terms of the contract, contained this provision: ‘This deed is made in pursuance of an agreement with the grantee and Robert Montgomery, (and nine others), dated July 1st, 1891, in relation to the erection and maintenance of a shoe factory in the village of Wyanet, and it is executed upon the express condition, and as a part of the consideration for this conveyance, that the building, improvements, and machinery to be placed on said lots shall not be torn down or removed from said premises by said grantee or his assigns for the space of at least five years from said first day of July, A. D. 1891, and that said lots shall be used for manufacturing purposes alone.’ For the purpose of getting the factory ready for manufacturing in the month of September, 1891, Day purchased of the appellants a large quantity of machinery to be placed in the building. The machinery was sold on a credit of 30, 60, and 90 days, with a provision in the contract of sale that the machinery should remain the property of C. S. Fifield & Co., the vendees, until paid for. The machinery was shipped to Day, and placed in the factory, being attached to the floor or benches by long screws, and belted to the shafting overhead. The machines were made of iron, and some of them weighed from 800 to 1,100 pounds. Cast holes were made in the legs, so that the screws could be inserted in order to screw the machinery to the floor of the building; belt wheels were placed in the machines, so they could be attached by belts to the shafting. The machinery was placed in the plant to be used in the manufacture of shoes, and with the intention that it should remain therein as a part of the plant. Day started his factory, but it was only in operation a short time when the concern was found to be insolvent. The appellants, having received no payment on the machinery sold, on November 24, 1891, commenced an action of replevin to recover the machinery which they had sold. On November 23, 1891, Day, being indebted to appellee the Farmers' National Bank of Princeton, executed a trust deed on the lots upon which the factory was erected to secure the bank. In the month of December, judgments were entered against Day in favor of a large number of creditors. Before the machinery had been taken on the writ of replevin sued out by the appellants, the Farmers' National Bank of Princeton filed a bill in equity, claiming a lien on the lots and machinery as fixtures under the trust deed which Day had executed. The appellants and the various creditors of Day were made parties to this proceeding, a receiver was appointed to take charge of the property, and, on a final hearing on the pleadings and evidence, the court held that the machinery sold by appellants were fixtures, and appellants had no lien thereon. The property was ordered sold, and the proceeds divided among the creditors.

CRAIG, J., (after stating the facts.)

The principal, and indeed the only, question of any importance presented by this record, is whether the machinery which Day purchased of appellants and placed in the manufacturing building, as shown by the evidence, became fixtures. If the machinery, when attached to the building, became fixtures and a part of the realty, then such machinery passed to the bank under the trust deed executed by Day, and such machinery could not be taken under the writ of replevin sued out by the appellants. It will be observed that the deed under which Day acquired title to the lots upon which the factory was erected provided that ‘the building, improvements, and machinery to be placed on the lots shall not be torn down or removed from the premises by the grantee or his assigns for a period of at least five years from the 1st day of July, 1891, and the lots shall be used for manufacturing purposes alone.’ This deed was executed July 15, 1891, and recorded July 25, 1891. When, therefore, appellants, in September, 1891, sold machinery to be placed in the building, they had notice of the contents of the deed, and, having such notice, they knew that the machinery to be placed therein as a part of the plant could not be removed at such time as they might elect, or at the will or pleasure of Day, the purchaser. Moreover, the agent of appellants who sold the machinery was at the factorybetween the 1st and 10th of September, after the factory building had been erected, and learned from Day the nature of the contract between him and the people of Wyanet, under which the factory was established; hence they knew, or at least were in law chargeable with knowledge, that the machinery sold by them could not be removed from the factory. But, in addition to the provisions of the deed, the manner in which the machines were placed in the building manifest an intention that they should become fixtures, and remain there as a part of the shoe factory. Ten of the machines were fastened to the floor, or plank nailed to the floor, by long screws, and belted to the shafting overhead. Six were fastened to benches by wood screws, and belted to the shafting, the benches having been nailed to the floor of the building. The witness Cass, who had charge of placing the machinery in the factory, testified: ‘None of the machinery was in at the time I went to Wyanet, and I superintended the...

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28 cases
  • In re Danville Hotel Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Illinois
    • June 15, 1929
    ...carpeting comes within the definition of a fixture as defined by the Supreme Court of Illinois in Fifield v. Farmers' National Bank et al., 148 Ill. 163, 35 N. E. 802, 39 Am. St. Rep. 166. The court there stated the elements to be considered in determining what are to be regarded as fixture......
  • Sweiss v. Ramadani
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • February 9, 2016
    ...39 N.E.3d 337, 355 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (noting that real estate fixtures are not subject to replevin); see also Fifield v. Farmers Nat. Bank, 35 N.E. 802, 805 (Ill. 1893). Plaintiff offers no authority, either in pleading or in briefing, to support her replevin claim. Furthermore, "[a]n ac......
  • Red Diamond Clothing Co. v. Steidemann
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • December 31, 1912
    ...v. Sheldon, 34 Hun (N. Y.), 38; Friedley v. Gildings, 119 F. 438; Langdon v. Buchanan, 62 N.H. 657; Harlan v. Harlan, 15 Pa. 507; Field v. Bank, 148 Ill. 163; Deal Palmore, 72 N.C. 582; McRae v. Bank, 66 N.Y. 489; Bank v. Adams, 138 Ill. 483; Williams' App., 16 A. 810; Pea v. Pea, 35 Ind. 3......
  • FirstMerit Bank, N.A. v. Antioch Bowling Lanes, Inc., Case No. 12 C 9567
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • June 5, 2015
    ...doctrine, although not called by its current name, can be seen in an early Illinois Supreme Court case, Fifield v. Farmers' Nat'l Bank of Princeton, 148 Ill. 163, 35 N.E. 802 (1893). In this litigation between a shoe manufacturer, whose shoe factory had become bankrupt, and the bank which h......
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