Figgs v. City of Milwaukee
| Decision Date | 27 November 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 83-395,83-395 |
| Citation | 121 Wis.2d 44,357 N.W.2d 548 |
| Parties | Mary FIGGS, Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, v. The CITY OF MILWAUKEE, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
Harvey Jay Goldstein (argued), Milwaukee, for plaintiff-respondent-petitioner; Harvey Jay Goldstein and Goldstein & Goldstein, Milwaukee, on briefs.
Joseph H. McGinn, Asst. City Atty. (argued), for defendant-appellant; James B. Brennan, City Atty., on brief.
Howard A. Davis, Patrick O. Dunphy and Habush, Habush & Davis, S.C., Milwaukee, amicus curiae for the Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers.
This is a review of a decision of the court of appeals, 116 Wis.2d 281, 342 N.W.2d 254 (Ct.App.1983), which reversed a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee county, Michael D. Guolee, Circuit Judge, in favor of the plaintiff, Mary Figgs, and against the defendant, city of Milwaukee. We reverse the court of appeals.
The court of appeals concluded that the plaintiff's claim against the city was deficient because, after reciting the circumstances of the injury, it stated only, "That satisfaction therefor is claimed from the city of Milwaukee, in the sum of Four Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($4,500.00)." The court of appeals concluded that, because the claim did not contain "an itemized statement of the relief sought," in the manner it believed was required by sec. 893.80(1)(b), Stats., 1 the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction and, hence, the judgment was void even though the city had not raised the jurisdictional defense until after the case was fully tried and was ready for submission to the jury. Because we conclude the claim was sufficient, the question of jurisdiction need not be addressed. We reverse, because the claim contained an "itemized statement of the relief sought"--money damages. The judgment of the circuit court is, accordingly, reinstated.
The chronology and procedural steps leading to this review are undisputed and are as follows. On October 15, 1980, the petitioner on this review, Mary Figgs, hereinafter referred to as Figgs or as plaintiff, filed a document captioned "Claim" with the city clerk of the city of Milwaukee. 2
In this document Figgs alleged that, on September 30, 1980, she fell into a hole negligently left by city employees after they removed a parking-control sign. She alleged and particularized the injuries she sustained and stated that they were caused by the city's negligence in failing to fill or cover the hole. The claim recited, "That satisfaction therefor is claimed from the City of Milwaukee, in the sum of Four Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($4,500.00)."
The claim was disallowed by the Milwaukee Common Council on November 17, 1981. Figgs then commenced an action in the circuit court for Milwaukee county on November 24, 1981, demanding judgment against the city in the sum of $10,000. The answer of the city denied any negligence by its employees. The only affirmative defense alleged was that, if any injuries were in fact incurred, they were the result of the plaintiff's own negligence.
The case was tried before a jury on October 21 and 22, 1982. At the close of testimony, a conference was held to formulate the jury instructions.
At 1:30 P.M. on October 22, after the jury instructions had been agreed upon in conference and the case was ready for final submission to the jury, the assistant city attorney for the first time asserted that the court was without jurisdiction, because the claim, filed over two years before, was deficient because of "the lack of itemization of the damages." He moved to dismiss. The circuit judge promptly denied the motion and stated in explanation that "the plaintiff has sufficiently complied with the requirements."
The jury returned a verdict of $2,021 and allocated 90 percent of the causal negligence to the city and 10 percent to the plaintiff. Judgment in favor of Figgs was entered on January 14, 1983, in the sum of $1,818.90 damages and $321.20 costs.
On appeal the judgment was reversed because, it was concluded, the claim filed, while asserting a demand in the amount of $4,500, contained no itemization of the plaintiff's demand.
To state the position of the court of appeals in the words used in its opinion reveals the flaw of its decision. It stated:
Thus, the court of appeals equated the statutory requirement of sec. 893.80(1)(b), Stats., of "an itemized statement of the relief sought" with a requirement for an itemized statement of any damages sought or demanded. This equivalency is not justified by the words used in the statute. Although damages is one form of relief available in a court and the statute requires that the "relief" sought must be set forth in the claim, the claim statute does not require that a claim stated for a single form of relief by a demand for a stated sum of damages be further broken down into its components.
Following this court's decision in Holytz v. Milwaukee, 17 Wis.2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962), cities and other governmental units can be held liable in damages for the negligence of their employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The procedure by which a claim is asserted is set forth in the statutes. 3 The legislature has also seen fit to limit the amount of liability. 4
Accordingly, the language of secs. 62.25 and 893.80, Stats., controls the procedural and notice aspects of this case. Under sec. 62.25(1):
"No action may be brought or maintained against a city upon a claim or cause of action unless the claimant complies with s. 893.80."
Sec. 893.80, Stats., requires (1) a "written notice of the circumstances of the claim" to be given within one hundred twenty days after the event giving rise to the claim, and (2) a claim containing "an itemized statement of the relief sought."
In the instant case the notice reciting the circumstances of the claim, as required by sec. 893.80(1)(a), Stats., was filed within a few weeks of the date of the alleged injury. That filing was timely, the explicitness of the statement of circumstances is not challenged, and the adequacy of the document in that respect is not at issue. The same document purported also to include the "itemized statement of the relief sought" under sec. 893.80(1)(b).
While the notice of circumstances must be filed within one hundred twenty days after the happening of the event, no time limit is imposed by sec. 893.80 for the filing of the itemized statement of relief sought. Clearly, the two documents may be filed separately, but it was appropriate for the plaintiff to do as she did here--file in a single document the two elements of information prerequisite to bringing or maintaining any action against a city. 5
The trial court concluded that the notice of claim filed by the claimant was adequate because it contained "an itemized statement of the relief sought." Hence, it concluded that the bar to commencement of an action for noncompliance with sec. 893.80 was inapplicable.
The court of appeals concluded that the claim was defective; accordingly, it stated there was no subject matter jurisdiction. If the court of appeals erred in respect to the sufficiency of the claim, as we conclude it did, we need not, for the purpose of deciding this case, explore whether an insufficient notice would deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction and render futile any assertions by a plaintiff of estoppel or laches. 6
The plain language of sec. 893.80(1)(b), Stats., specifies that what is to be itemized in the claim is the "relief" sought. As pointed out above, curiously the court of appeals and the defendant city focus upon the word, "itemized," not upon "relief" and then equate relief with damages and conclude that damages should be itemized as though a form similar to a special verdict for damages were being presented to the common council.
The fact that it is necessary to look to standard dictionaries to ascertain the usual meaning of words does not render the words used in a statute ambiguous. What then is the meaning of "relief."
"Relief" is defined in Webster's Third New International Dictionary as, "5a: legal remedy or redress." Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.) defines "relief" as:
In respect to "itemize," Webster's Third New International Dictionary provides this definition: Black's defines "itemize" as:
Under these definitions, of which we take judicial notice, it is apparent that sec. 893.80(1)(b), Stats., requires a list, item by item, of the kinds of relief sought. One kind of relief sought might be, as here, money damages. In another case, it might be a demand for relief by specific performance or by injunction. It should be noted that sec. 893.80 is not a statute only applicable to tort claims or claims for negligence. The opening sentence of sec. 893.80 recites its applicability to any cause of action. Sec. 893.80, when initially enacted by the legislature, applied only to tort claims, but, by ch. 285, Laws of 1977, the procedures were made generally applicable to any claims against the listed governments. Accordingly, the statute provides for a method of securing relief...
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