Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel

• Citation: 188 F.3d 172
• Decision Date: 12 August 1999
• Docket Number: 98-7592,No. 98-7236,98-7236
• Parties: (3rd Cir. 1999) CATHERINE FIGUEROA, Appellant, v. BUCCANEER HOTEL INC; COMPANION ASSURANCE COMPANY; MERIDIAN ENGINEERING INC (98-7236); CATHERINE FIGUEROA, Appellant, v. BUCCANEER HOTEL INC; COMPANION ASSURANCE; MERIDIAN ENGINEERING, INC. (98-7592)
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)

Page 172

188 F.3d 172 (3rd Cir. 1999)

CATHERINE FIGUEROA, Appellant, v. BUCCANEER HOTEL INC; COMPANION ASSURANCE COMPANY; MERIDIAN ENGINEERING INC (98-7236);

CATHERINE FIGUEROA, Appellant, v. BUCCANEER HOTEL INC; COMPANION ASSURANCE; MERIDIAN ENGINEERING, INC. (98-7592)

No. 98-7236, 98-7592

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Argued April 13, 1999

Filed August 12, 1999

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Lee Rohn, Esq., Maurice J. Cusick, Esq., K. Glenda Cameron, Esq. (ARGUED), Rohn & Cusick, Christiansted, St. Croix, U. S. Virgin Islands, Attorneys for Appellant.

George H. Logan, Esq. (ARGUED), Nichols Newman Silverlight Logan & D'Eramo, P.C., Christiansted, St. Croix, U. S. Virgin Islands, Attorney for Appellees, No. 98-7236. Wilfredo A. Geigel, Esq. (ARGUED), Law Offices of Wilfredo A. Geigel, Christiansted, St. Croix, U. S. Virgin Islands, Attorney for Appellees.

Before: NYGAARD, McKEE, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

RENDELL, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Catherine Figueroa brought this action against appellees, The Buccaneer Hotel, Inc., Companion Assurance Company, and Meridian Engineering, Inc., contending that appellees fired her because of her religion. She argues on appeal that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of appellees on her Title VII and Virgin Islands Civil Rights Act claims, and in dismissing her remaining claims with prejudice for failure to state a federal cause of action. Figueroa also urges us to reverse the District Court's October 16, 1998 award of$ 20,000 in costs to appellees. For the reasons stated below, we will affirm in part and reverse in part.

I. Facts

Figueroa was employed by appellees as a property manager, bookkeeper, and accountant at the Buccaneer Hotel in St. Croix, United States Virgin Islands. She worked for appellees from 1989 until 1994, at which point, she claims, she was suspended from her position for "spreading her religious beliefs." Figueroa claims that thereafter she was told that she would be demoted upon her return to work, that she protested the demotion, and that she was then "constructively terminated."

On February 8, 1995, Figueroa filed a religious discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC"). Thereafter, on or around August 9, 1995, Figueroa received a "Notice of Right To Sue" letter, notifying her that she had ninety days to bring suit or be barred. Figueroa commenced this action against appellees in the United States District Court for the Virgin Islands 169 days after receiving her right to sue letter. Figueroa listed the following causes of action in her Complaint: religious discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. (Count I); violation of the Virgin Islands Wrongful Discharge Act, 24 V.I.C. 76 et seq. (Count II); religious discrimination in violation of the Virgin Islands Civil Rights Act (the "Act") (Count III);¹ breach of contract (Count IV); intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count V); and entitlement to punitive damages (Count VI). Figueroa did not file a complaint with the Virgin Islands Civil Rights Commission (the "Commission") or the Virgin Islands Department of Labor.

Appellees filed two motions for partial summary judgment, one asserting that the Title VII claim was time-barred as it was not brought within the ninety day window specified in 2000e-5(f)(1) of the statute, and the other arguing that Count III should be dismissed because the Virgin Island Civil Rights Act does not afford a private cause of action. The District Court granted both of appellees' motions in a decision and order dismissing Counts I and III. The court also dismissed Figueroa's remaining counts for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, granted appellees' costs as the prevailing party pursuant to 5 V.I.C. 541, and "invited defendants to move for sanctions under 28 U.S.C. 1927." Appellees did not move for sanctions but submitted a "Bill of Costs." The court ordered that appellees "are awarded attorneys fees in the amount of $ 20,000 payable jointly and severally by plaintiff and her counsel." Figueroa appeals from the court's orders granting summary judgment and granting appellees' fees. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291.

II. Discussion

Our review of a grant of summary judgment is plenary. We apply "the same test the district court should have utilized initially," viewing those inferences that may be drawn from the underlying facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir. 1976). We review the District Court's refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction for abuse of discretion. Sparks v. Hershey, 661 F.2d 30, 33 (3d Cir. 1981). We normally review the District Court's award of costs and sanctions for abuse of discretion, but if the procedure the court employs in imposing sanctions raises due process concerns, our review is plenary. See Martin v. Brown, 63 F.3d 1252, 1262 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that the district court's imposition of sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion unless its procedure raises due process concerns, in which case our review is plenary); Hamdallah v. Warlick, 35 V.I. 124, 935 F. Supp. 628, 631-32 (D.V.I. 1996) (review award of costs under 541 for abuse of discretion). We will address each of appellant's arguments in turn.

A. Title VII

The District Court dismissed Figueroa's Title VII claim for failure to bring the claim within the ninety day period mandated by 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1).² Figueroa does not dispute that she did not bring this claim within the ninety day window specified by the statute, but argues that appellees waived this defense by not raising it in a meaningful way before filing their motion for partial summary judgment, seventeen months after the institution of this suit. We will affirm the District Court on this issue, concluding that appellees did not waive this defense and that it is a complete bar to Figueroa's Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires that claims brought under Title VII be filed within ninety days of the claimant's receipt of the EEOC right to sue letter. This requirement has been treated by the courts as a statute of limitations rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 394, 71 L. Ed. 2d 234, 102 S. Ct. 1127 (1982). Thus, it is subject to waiver. Id. at 393. We have held that a claim filed even one day beyond this ninety day window is untimely and may be dismissed absent an equitable reason for disregarding this statutory requirement. See Mosel v. Hills Dep't Store, Inc., 789 F.2d 251, 253 (3d Cir. 1986). Figueroa argues that the "shot gunned" nature of appellees' assertion of the statute of limitations defense in their Answers somehow supplies an equitable justification for finding waiver. This argument is unsupported and totally lacking in merit. All three appellees timely asserted the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense in their Answers to Figueroa's Complaint, clearly preserving this issue. Further, appellees' first Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, which was timely filed in accordance with the court-approved Stipulated Scheduling Order, argued that the statute of limitations barred Figueroa's Title VII claim. These assertions were clearly sufficient. Accordingly, Figueroa's failure to file suit within the 90-day time period completely bars her Title VII claim. We will affirm the District Court on this issue.

B. Virgin Islands Civil Rights Act

The District Court dismissed Figueroa's claim under Title 10 of the Virgin Islands Civil Rights Act based on its belief that Title 10 affords no private cause of action. The court did not distinguish between a claim brought under chapter 1 of Title 10 and one brought under chapter 5 of Title 10, ruling that, in either case, "only the Commission can sue to recover damages [under the Act], not the individual claiming to be aggrieved." Dist. Ct. Op. at 4 (Feb. 19, 1998). Although the District Court relied upon Anderson v. Government, Civ. No. 96-118(N) (D.V.I. Nov. 21, 1997), for the proposition that there is no private cause of action under Title 10 of the Act, the parties at oral argument conceded that, as we discuss more fully below, the Anderson case is not on point, and the issue before the District Court has not previously been addressed by either the Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands or the district court sitting in the Virgin Islands.

We will first provide the context for this issue by explicating the pertinent provisions of the Act. The Virgin Islands legislature enacted the Civil Rights Act in 1950 with the intent to "prevent and prohibit discrimination in any form." The Act contains six chapters, only two of which -- chapter 1 and chapter 5 -- are relevant to this case. Chapter 1 of the Act, 10 V.I.C. 1-11, substantially amended and effective in 1961, contains a statement declaring the public policy of prohibiting and punishing discrimination based on race, creed, color, or national origin. 1. It recognizes the right to equal treatment with respect to employment and working conditions, and specifies those discriminatory acts prohibited under the chapter. 3. In section 7, the legislature provided civil and criminal penalties for violations of the chapter, including a specific provision for punitive damages. 7.³ As an aid to its interpretation, it also includes a provision requiring courts to "construe [it] liberally in furtherance of its intent as stated in section 1." 10.

In 1974, the Virgin Islands legislature enacted chapter 5 of Title 10, 61-75, and created the Virgin Islands Civil Rights Commission, granting it "general jurisdiction and power" to combat discrimination. 61. The Commission was empowered to investigate allegations of discrimination, collect information about the...