Figueroa v. Garland
| Decision Date | 06 December 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:21-cv-7849-GHW |
| Parties | LUIS RAFAEL FIGUEROA, JR., Plaintiff, v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, in his official capacity as the Attorney General of the United States and Head of United States Department of Justice, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Luis Rafael Figueroa, Jr., worked for the United States Marshals Service as a Detention Enforcement Officer from February 2001 until his retirement in October 2017. After working as a first responder to the September 11 terrorist attack, Mr Figueroa developed asthma, sinus, and respiratory problems, for which he required ongoing accommodations in the form of regular leave to attend medical appointments. In the latter part of his tenure with the Marshals Service, from 2013 until his retirement in 2017, Mr. Figueroa was placed on two restrictions regarding his use of leave. Despite protesting these restrictions and using internal avenues to allege that the restrictions were both discriminatory and retaliatory, Mr. Figueroa was placed under increasing scrutiny from his supervisors at the Marshals Service. Mr. Figueroa contends that this scrutiny reached the level of discrimination from September 2016 until his retirement in October 2017. Finally, the Marshals Service denied Mr. Figueroa his retirement credentials in 2018, which prohibited Mr. Figueroa from obtaining a firearm and certain subsequent employment. In September 2021, Mr. Figueroa filed suit against both the Marshals Service and the Attorney General (together, “Defendants”) alleging both discrimination and retaliation under several federal statutes.
Because Mr. Figueroa has failed to plead sufficient facts to plausibly establish that he was subject to disparate treatment, that he endured a hostile work environment, that his employer failed to accommodate his disability, or he was retaliated against because of a protected activity, Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint is GRANTED.
Plaintiff began work as a Detention Enforcement Officer (“DEO”) with the United States Marshals Service (“USMS”) in February 2001. Dkt. No. 15 (First Amended Complaint, or the “FAC”) ¶¶ 6, 14. He worked for the United States District Court in the Southern District of New York. Id. Mr. Figueroa's role as a DEO “was to assist with transport and housing of federal prisoners in the SDNY.” Id. ¶ 13. The USMS is an agency within the Department of Justice. Id. ¶ 12.
Mr. Figueroa “was one of many USMS officer first responders who assisted at the site of . . . the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001,” and he continued working at the World Trade Center site “in the days and months following” the September 11 attacks. Id. ¶ 7. Because of the time he spent at the World Trade Center following September 11, Mr. Figueroa developed “disabling severe asthma and respiratory problems” as well as sinus problems. Id. ¶¶ 8, 17. Mr. Figueroa required accommodations from the USMS so he could take regular leave to attend medical appointments and receive treatment. Id. ¶¶ 8, 19.
In 2010, Mr. Figueroa gave a letter from his physician to his then-supervisors. Id. ¶ 21. The letter addressed Mr. Figueroa's asthma, sinus, and respiratory problems for which he required intermittent leave to receive treatment and to pursue a workers' compensation benefits claim. Id. Mr. Figueroa alleges that sometime after he provided this letter, he was told second-hand that a supervisor had questioned the severity of his disability. Id. ¶ 22. Additionally, sometime between 2010 and May 2013, Mr. Figueroa was involved with Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) activity relating to an “administrative discrimination complaint” and he participated “in class action litigation concerning employment discrimination against DEOs based on race.” Id. ¶ 25.
On September 20, 2013, Mr. Figueroa's supervisor issued him a “Letter of Leave Restriction” due to his use of leave for “workers' compensation related medical appointments and for care of his infant daughter.” Id. ¶ 23. In response, Mr. Figueroa filed an administrative complaint claiming that the letter was discriminatory because of his asthma, sinus, and respiratory disabilities and retaliatory because of his prior EEO activity and class-action participation. Id. ¶ 25. Sometime later-though Plaintiff does not identify when-the USMS lifted Mr. Figueroa's 2013 leave restrictions, which resolved the administrative discrimination complaint. Id. ¶ 26. Mr. Figueroa contends, however, that he “continued to experience escalated harassment and discrimination . . . related to his use of leave for ongoing medical treatment related to his 9/11 injuries.” Id. ¶ 27. That harassment led Mr. Figueroa to “not make a request or try to bundle appointments on one day to avoid the harassment he[ ] would inevitably experience if he made multiple requests for leave in any given time period.” Id.
On September 16, 2016, USMS management implemented a sign in sheet. Id. ¶ 115. Despite witnessing “numerous employees leave the office without signing out and/or inputting the end of their shift (4:00pm) leaving the office at 3:30 PM almost every day for months,” management said nothing to them. Id. ¶ 117. Mr. Figueroa “was the only one being watched by management when he signed in and signed out.” Id. ¶ 116.
On September 28, 2016, Mr. Figueroa applied for disability retirement from the USMS because he did not want to experience any more harassment for taking his leave. Id. ¶¶ 31, 34. “As soon as he submitted his application,” Mr. Figueroa's supervisor-Supervisory Deputy United States Marshal Stuart Smith-“began submitting complaints about minor infractions to Internal Affairs that would normally not trigger a complaint or any discipline, most of which were related to [Mr. Figueroa's] leave requests and attendance, which Smith falsely alleged that [Mr. Figueroa] was abusing.” Id. ¶ 143. Mr. Figueroa believed that Smith was attempting to get him fired before he could receive his disability retirement. Id. ¶ 145. Mr. Figueroa believed, alternatively, that Smith wanted to ensure he did not retire in good standing. Id.
Also on September 28, 2016, Smith issued Mr. Figueroa a second “Letter of Leave Restriction.” Id. ¶ 35. That letter addressed what the USMS referred to as Mr. Figueroa's “excessive absenteeism” and “a possible abuse of leave.” Dkt. No. 19-1 (the “2016 Letter”). The letter's stated purpose was to “correct [Mr. Figueroa's] excessive absenteeism”; it was to remain in effect until Mr. Figueroa could show that he was able to consistently abide by the leave requirements (which the letter then outlined). Id. at 3. The 2016 Letter served as evidence that the USMS had spoken with Mr. Figueroa about his “leave balances and leave requesting procedures,” but it noted that it was not to be placed in his official file and that it was not a disciplinary action. Id. at 4.
The 2016 Letter required Mr. Figueroa to request all sick leave for “prearranged medical appointments or care of a family member” in advance while reserving the right to deny the request if the USMS needed Mr. Figueroa's services. Id. at 1. If Mr. Figueroa did not receive approval of a request and failed to show up for his shift, his supervisor could report him as “absent without approved leave (AWOL).” Id. Requests would be denied if Mr. Figueroa did not have sufficient accrued leave to cover the requested absence. Id. at 1-2. The 2016 Letter reminded Mr. Figueroa that emergency requests should be rare and required him, when making such a request, to notify his supervisor “no later than 30 minutes prior to the start of [his] shift” and to provide “the exact nature of the emergency and how long [Mr. Figueroa] expect[ed] to be away from the office.” Id. at 2. It also required that Mr. Figueroa provide medical documentation for emergency leave before the end of the pay period when he took the leave. Id. If Mr. Figueroa failed to provide this documentation, his supervisors reserved the right to mark him as AWOL for his absence. Id.
Finally, the 2016 Letter required Mr. Figueroa to request annual leave at least twenty-four hours in advance and noted that the request would be denied if he had not accrued sufficient annual leave to cover the absence. Id. Mr. Figueroa was prohibited from using leave requests to cover any tardiness, except in the case of an emergency. Id. at 3. Similarly, the 2016 Letter disallowed the use of leave without pay (“LWOP”) except in cases of emergency or if Mr. Figueroa invoked the Family Medical Leave Act (the “FMLA”). Id. Mr. Figueroa also had to provide “supporting medical documentation for the request.” Id. When Mr. Figueroa planned to use FMLA leave, he had to notify his supervisor and provide “acceptable medical documentation.” Id.
On December 27, 2016, “the morning shift employees were allowed to go home for the day early at 1pm.” FAC ¶ 126. When Mr. Figueroa called Smith to ask if he could leave, Smith told Mr. Figueroa that he had to stay until 4:00 p.m. because he was doing Union duty that day and thus was on “Union time.” Id. ¶¶ 127-128. Around 2:25 p.m., after completing union business for the day, Mr. Figueroa received permission from Chief Saleh to leave for the day around 2:45 p.m.[2] Id. ¶ 130- 132. Mr. Figueroa signed out at home at 4:00 p.m. like his fellow shift-members. Id. ¶ 133. Two days later, on December 29, 2016, Smith told Mr. Figueroa that he would be charged as AWOL from 2:45-4:00 p.m. and that Smith had reported Mr. Figueroa to Internal Affairs. Id. ¶ 134.
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