Figueroa v. Oberlander
| Docket Number | 1:22-CV-00143-SPB |
| Decision Date | 09 June 2023 |
| Parties | RENE FIGUEROA, Plaintiff v. DEREK F. OBERLANDER, SUPERINTENDENT; SECURITY CAPTAIN CARTER, C/O MORGAN, C/O JOHN DOE 1, SGT. JOHN DOE 3, JOHN DOE 2, SUED IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES, Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
It is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff Rene Figueroa's Amended Complaint (ECF No. 21) be GRANTED. It is also respectfully recommended that Plaintiffs claims against Defendants John Doe 2 and Sgt. John Doe 3 be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b).
Plaintiff Rene Figueroa, an inmate currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Forest (“SCI-Forest”), commenced this pro se civil rights action against SCI-Forest Superintendent Oberlander, Security Captain Carter, Corrections Officer (“C/O”) Morgan, and three unidentified Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) employees. The Court granted Figueroa's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) (ECF No. 5). Oberlander, Carter, and Morgan moved to dismiss Figueroa's original complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), see ECF No 12, prompting Figueroa to file his Amended Complaint against the same Defendants. ECF No. 19.
The Amended Complaint is the operative pleading before the Court and asserts violations of Figueroa's rights under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as a civil rights conspiracy claim, and state law claims of assault, conspiracy, negligence, medical malpractice, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. Figueroa asserts these claims against each Defendant in his or her individual and official capacities. He seeks compensatory and punitive damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief.
Oberlander, Carter, and Morgan have again moved to dismiss all claims against them pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). ECF No. 21, 22. Figueroa has filed a brief in opposition to their motion. ECF No. 24.
For purposes of the pending motion, the factual allegations of Figueroa's Amended Complaint are accepted as true. The events upon which Figueroa bases his claims began on August 23, 2021, when Figueroa was returning to his housing unit from his job at SCI-Forest's activities department. Figueroa's route back to his cell required him to pass through a metal security gate that a corrections officer controlled electronically from a “hub” located approximately seven feet behind the gate. Figueroa asserts that at about 3:30 p.m., he “was patiently waiting for the security gate to open” when “John Doe 1 proceeded to open the security gate to Echo Unit to allow [him] to enter,” and then, as “[he] began entering the now open medical security gate, Defendant, John Doe 1 abruptly closed the gate.” Id., ¶¶ 18, 19. Figueroa explains that the gate then “smashed into Plaintiffs right shoulder causing severe pain and injury to his right shoulder and right deltoid.” Id., ¶ 19. To avoid further injury, Figueroa “lunged forward in a desperate attempt not to be crushed by the closing metal security gate.” Id. Once safely inside the enclosed area, Figueroa “attempted to get medical assistance from the Correctional Officers in the Hub when Defendant Morgan immediately opened the Hub Door and stated that it ‘was not him' who closed the Gate.” Id., ¶ 20.
Upon his return to Echo Unit, Figueroa related the incident to his Unit Manager and then called his wife. He “ask[ed] her to call the prison and report the incident immediately to security staff' because “[he] was paranoid that this assault was intentional and in retaliation over [his] previous Grievance(s) filed on his housing unit based on sexual harassment and theft of his tablet.”[1] Id., ¶ 22. He told “his wife that he feared more retaliation would come.” Id. Shortly thereafter, his wife called SCI-Forest and was told “that a person from institutional security will [sic] be sent down to speak with [Figueroa] about the incident.” Id. ¶ 23. Figueroa avers that security has yet to speak with him. Id.
At about 4:10 p.m. on August 23, Figueroa was called to medical and “assessed by the facility physician, Defendant John Doe 2.” Id., ¶ 24. According to Figueroa, John Doe 2 told him that his heart rate was low and then accused him of faking his injury. He then asked Figueroa if he wanted pain medication, to which Figueroa responded that he did. Figueroa avers that John Doe 2 then reviewed his medical files and said, “you already have the good shit in your cell.” Id., ¶ 46. In response, Figueroa told John Doe 2 that he did not. John Doe 2 then allegedly told him “to take his old medication pack to A.M. medication line to have it re-filled” before sending him back to his cell without “even examin[ing] the area that was causing Plaintiff severe pain.” Id., ¶ 26.
On Figueroa's way back to his cell, Sgt. John Doe 3 approached him and asked him about the alleged gate incident. Figueroa asserts that Sgt. John Doe 3 “explained to [him] that there was a similar situation which occurred previously with himself and another inmate in a wheelchair,” that Figueroa “[wa]s lucky because he could actually receive a DC-141 Inmate Misconduct for ‘Disobeying a Written Order,”' and “that the inmate in a wheelchair attempted to file suit, but was unsuccessful.” Id., ¶ 27. Figueroa responded by informing John Doe 3 that he would be filing a grievance because someone had to be held responsible for the alleged assault. Figueroa added that “nobody will identify who Def. John Doe 1 is who closed the gate on [him] and no formal apology was given.” Id.
Later that day, at about 7:30 p.m., C/O Morgan allegedly visited Figueroa to reiterate that he did not “assult[] [sic] Plaintiff with the gate.” Id., ¶ 28. Figueroa, “intimidated and scared for his safety,” said to Morgan, “I don't believe that it was you because you were standing by the Hub door and immediately opened the door when it happened.” Id. Morgan then allegedly told Figueroa that he would not disclose the identity of the guard responsible, but that “he ‘chewed' him a new ‘a-hole.'” Id., ¶ 29.
Figueroa's shoulder pain persisted, leading him to submit an inmate sick call request on August 24, 2021. Nurse Practitioner Sutherland examined him three days later. Sutherland informed him “that there is severe visible damage to his right deltoid” and gave him three steroid shots. Id., 32. Figueroa asserts that he “still feels soreness and pain in his shoulder and right deltoid.” 7tZ.,¶33.
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002). The “court[] generally consider[s] only the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim” when considering the motion to dismiss. Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 222 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997)).
In making its determination under Rule 12(b)(6), the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662. Furthermore, a complaint should only be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if it fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 ().
While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as explained in the complaint. See California Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the court accept legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”).
Expounding on the Twombly!Iqbal line of cases, the Third Circuit has articulated the following three-step approach:
First, the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' Second, the court should identify allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.' Finally,...
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