Fila v. Spruce Mountain Inn

• Decision Date: 05 August 2005
• Docket Number: No. 03-530.,03-530.
• Citation: 885 A.2d 723
• Parties: Virginia FILA v. SPRUCE MOUNTAIN INN and Candace Beardsley.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

885 A.2d 723

Virginia FILA v. SPRUCE MOUNTAIN INN and Candace Beardsley.

No. 03-530.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

August 5, 2005.

Allison A. Ericson of Law Offices of Daniel M. Sedon, P.C., Chelsea, for Plaintiff-Appellant Cross-Appellee. John Davis Buckley and Laura Q. Pelosi of Theriault & Joslin, P.C., Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellee Cross-Appellant.

Present: DOOLEY, JOHNSON, SKOGLUND and REIBER, JJ., and ALLEN, C.J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned.

¶ 1. SKOGLUND, J.

Plaintiff Virginia Fila appeals from a superior court judgment in favor of defendants Spruce Mountain Inn (SMI) and Candace Beardsley. Plaintiff contends that, in granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of defendants, the trial court: (1) applied an incorrect standard in determining whether plaintiff was incapacitated for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations; (2) erroneously ruled that the question of plaintiff's incapacity was an issue for the court rather than the jury to decide; and (3) mistakenly concluded that plaintiff failed to satisfy the standard for tolling the statute of limitations. We agree with the first two contentions, and therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 2. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, as we are required to do, Gero v. J.W.J. Realty, 171 Vt. 57, 59, 757 A.2d 475, 476 (2000), the essential facts may be summarized as follows. SMI is a residential facility for individuals with psychiatric problems who, in the words of its assistant director, "have had trouble living independently in the community." Plaintiff entered the facility in December 1995. She was twenty-three years old at the time, but already had a long history of psychiatric problems, including nine prior hospitalizations for mental illness. SMI staff acknowledged that during her stay plaintiff was continually troubled by flashbacks, anxiety, and depression, and had at least one dissociative episode.

¶ 3. Plaintiff testified that, in late December 1995, while in residence at SMI, she took an overdose of a prescribed sedative, and later awoke to find a male patient in her bed having sex with her. Although the sexual relationship continued briefly thereafter, plaintiff testified that it was nonconsensual and that she did not remember the incidents clearly, suggesting that she was in a dissociative state most of the time. Plaintiff reported the incidents to SMI staff, and the male resident was asked to leave, but plaintiff believed for many years thereafter that she was at fault for the alleged sexual assaults.

¶ 4. Plaintiff discovered that she was pregnant in February 1996, and shortly thereafter was compelled to leave the residential program because of insurance problems. She remained under SMI care, however, and SMI staff assisted plaintiff in finding an apartment in the community, arranging medical appointments, and managing her affairs. Despite their assistance, plaintiff became depressed and suicidal and was hospitalized for a week to ten days in April 1996. The following month, plaintiff left the SMI program. Her departure was against medical advice, her case manager taking the view that outpatient therapy was insufficient to meet plaintiff's needs.

¶ 5. In September 1996, plaintiff moved with her mother and other family members to North Carolina, where she received substantial assistance from both her family and the state social services agency in obtaining obstetric care and parenting services for herself and her child. Several months after the move, however, plaintiff again required involuntary hospitalization. Indeed, over the next several years, plaintiff was periodically hospitalized on almost fifty separate occasions, an average of about once a month, during which times plaintiff's family assumed full responsibility for her child.

¶ 6. In October 2000, plaintiff moved with her mother and sister to New York. Plaintiff testified that while in therapy there she came to understand that she had been sexually assaulted at SMI. She contacted a lawyer and learned that she might have a claim against SMI. In March 2001, she filed this action against SMI and its director, Candace Beardsley, alleging negligent supervision, among other claims. Defendants thereafter moved for summary judgment, asserting that plaintiff's claim was barred by the three-year statute of limitations. Although plaintiff agreed that the cause of action had accrued in late January 1996, and that the statute of limitations would normally have expired in January 1999, she asserted in opposition to the motion that the statute had been tolled from the date of accrual to the end of October 2000 under 12 V.S.A. § 551(b), which provides that "the time during which [a] person is insane shall not be taken as part of the time limited for the commencement of [an] action."¹

¶ 7. The trial court (Judge Cheever) denied defendants' motion for summary judgment, as well as a subsequent motion to reconsider, on the ground that genuine issues of material fact remained in dispute. At the close of plaintiff's case, however, the trial court (Judge Cook) granted defendants' motion for judgment as a matter law, ruling that the question of whether plaintiff was insane within the meaning of the statute was for the court rather than the jury to decide; that there was "no evidence in this case that she has ever, for example, been psychotic or delusional or suffered from any of the major mental illnesses"; and that despite plaintiff's frequent hospitalizations, her actions and decisions were not those of a person "who is floridly mentally ill," and did not support her assertion of the tolling provision. The court therefore dismissed plaintiff's negligence claim as time-barred, and allowed the trial to proceed on plaintiff's remaining fraud claims. The jury reached a deadlock on those claims, however, and the court declared a mistrial. Plaintiff has appealed on the statute of limitations issue. Defendants have cross-appealed two of the court's evidentiary rulings. We address the claims in turn.

¶ 8. Plaintiff first contends the trial court applied an erroneous standard of "insanity" under § 551. We agree. This Court has held that the definition of "insanity" under § 551 is whether a person's "mental disability makes him unable to manage his business affairs or estate, or to comprehend his legal rights and liabilities." Goode v. State, 147 Vt. 646, 646, 514 A.2d 322, 322 (1986) (mem.). Numerous other states apply an equivalent standard. See, e.g., Storm v. Legion Ins. Co., 265 Wis.2d 169, 665 N.W.2d 353, 370-71 (2003) (noting "consensus definitions in other states" for determining whether statute of limitations should be tolled typically include "the inability to manage one's own personal affairs" or an inability to "protect one's legal rights"). Although the trial court here made passing reference to plaintiff's ability "to make decisions about her life," the record discloses that it focused principally on the absence of evidence of a "major mental illness" or "psychosis" or other evidence normally associated with the higher standard for criminal insanity. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court applied an erroneous legal standard in determining that plaintiff was not "insane" for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations under § 551.

¶ 9. Plaintiff next contends the trial court erred in ruling that the question of plaintiff's insanity under 12 V.S.A. § 551 was an issue for the court rather than a jury to decide. We agree that the court erred. It is well settled in Vermont that factual questions relating to the tolling of a statute of limitations are for the jury to decide. See Galfetti v. Berg, Carmolli & Kent Real Estate Corp., 171 Vt. 523, 526, 756 A.2d 1229, 1232 (2000) (mem.) (determination of when plaintiff actually discovered or should have discovered injury is generally a factual determination for jury); Lillicrap v. Martin, 156 Vt. 165, 172, 591 A.2d 41, 44 (1989) (question of when injury was or reasonably should have been discovered is generally one of fact for jury to determine); Monti v. Granite Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 133 Vt. 204, 209, 333 A.2d 106, 109 (1975) ("Whether or not the defendant's claim of a bar of the action by the statute of limitations had merit, as well as whether or not there was actual or constructive fraud, were both questions of fact which would have to be decided by the jury."); In re Estate of Delligan, 111 Vt. 227, 239, 13 A.2d 282, 289 (1940) (holding that court erred in failing to properly instruct jury on statute of limitations).

¶ 10. Indeed, this common law principle may be gleaned from some of the earliest reported cases in Vermont. See, e.g., Smith v. Hubbard, 1 Tyl. 142, 144 (1801); Hayes v. Morse, 8 Vt. 316, 318 (1836); Hackett v. Kendall, 23 Vt. 275, 277 (1851); Stearns v. Adm'r of Stearns, 32 Vt. 678, 680 (1860); Sprague v. Ainsworth, 40 Vt. 47, 50 (1867); Smith v. Town of Franklin, 61 Vt. 385, 387, 17 A. 838 (1889). The rule, currently codified in 12 V.S.A. § 551, that a statute of limitations is tolled during the period when a person is legally incompetent or insane is also of longstanding vintage under the common law. Lincoln v. Norton, 36 Vt. 679, 680 (1864); Chamberlin v. Estey, 55 Vt. 378, 382 (1883); Kumar v. Hall, 262 Ga. 639, 423 S.E.2d 653, 658 (1992) (citing R. Pound, The History of the Common Law 444 (1913)); 2 H. Wood, A Treatise on the Limitation of Actions at Law and in Equity § 239, at 578 (2d ed. 1893).

¶ 11. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that whether a person is legally incompetent or insane for purposes of tolling the statute has also long been considered a question of fact to be determined by the jury. See, e.g., Tracy v. Atherton, 36 Vt. 503, 506-07 (1864) (recognizing principle that party's infancy, if found by the jury to exist at time defendant's use of property began, would toll time for adverse possession akin to tolling of statute of limitations); ...