Filer v. Mcnair

• Citation: 158 Va. 88
• Parties: WILLIAM J. FILER, ET ALS. v. JACK MCNAIR, AN INFANT, ETC.
• Decision Date: 24 March 1932
• Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

Page 88

158 Va. 88

WILLIAM J. FILER, ET ALS. v. JACK MCNAIR, AN INFANT, ETC.

Supreme Court of Virginia, Richmond.

March 24, 1932.

Present, Campbell, C.J., and Holt, Epes, Gregory and Chinn, JJ.

1. NEGLIGENCE — Children — Child Injured by Placing his Hand Between Rollers of a Washing Machine — Negligence of Agent of Owner of Washing Machine in Going Out of the House and Leaving the Rollers Running. — The instant case was an action for damages by an infant for injuries suffered when he placed his hand between the rollers of a washing machine. The agent of defendant company took the washing machine to the home of plaintiff to demonstrate it to plaintiff's parents. There was evidence that the agent knew that plaintiff was in the home and he should have known that plaintiff would probably go into the room where the machine was at that hour. He knew that the wringers were running and were dangerous if plaintiff undertook to play with them. In substance the agent admitted that it would have been negligent for him to have left these rollers running had he known that plaintiff was about, but said that, as a matter of fact, they were not running when he left the house. The jury, however, found that they were running when he left.

Held: That it was negligence for the agent to go out of the house and leave the rollers running.

2. NEGLIGENCE — Definition — Negligence an Elastic Term. — Negligence lies in the omission of due care in the performance of some duty. Want of ordinary care or of reasonable prudence must appear. These are not arbitrary definitions but are highly elastic, and vary with the facts to which they are applied.

3. NEGLIGENCE — Questions of Law and Fact — Jury with No Other Guide than their Judgment as Reasonable Men. — Courts constantly have to refer to juries the question of what is reasonable conduct, or reasonable prudence, under all the circumstances of the case, with no other guide than their own judgment and conclusion as reasonable men.

4. NEGLIGENCE — Questions of Law and Fact — New Trial — Verdict not Supported by the Evidence. — Negligence is usually a question for the jury, and should be taken from it only when there is no real conflict of evidence on material matters, and when from facts established reasonable men should not differ as to conclusions to be drawn. A verdict must stand unless there is a plain deviation from the evidence or it is palpable the jury have not drawn a correct inference from the facts.

5. NEGLIGENCE — Children — Precautions in Regard to Children. — Children of tender years may be expected to act heedlessly. Adequate precautions, where adults are concerned, may as to them be gross negligence.

6. NEGLIGENCE — Children — Presumption as to Negligence of Child. — It is the settled doctrine in Virginia that a child under seven years of age cannot be guilty of negligence, and that as to children between seven and fourteen years of age, the presumption is they are incapable of exercising care and prudence, and this presumption prevails unless rebutted by sufficient proof to the contrary.

7. NEGLIGENCE — Children — Unguarded Machinery. — Almost without exception it may be said to be dangerous to leave unguarded machinery running where unattended children are in the habit of going.

Error to a judgment of the Corporation Court of the city of Hopewell, in an action of trespass on the case. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendants assign error.

The opinion states the case.

Sinnott, May & Leaman, for the plaintiffs in error.

K. L. Woody and A. L. Jones, for the defendant in error.

HOLT, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an action brought by Jack McNair, an infant who sues by his father and next friend, to recover damages for injuries suffered by him on April 9, 1929. He has obtained a verdict for $8,000.00 which was confirmed by the trial court. From that judgment defendants seek relief.

The Maytag Company manufactures washing machines, and sells its product, not direct to ultimate purchasers, but to dealers who have exclusive agencies for designated territories — in this case, to William J. Filer and Robert Filer, partners trading as Richmond Maytag Company.

This parent corporation does a national and extensive business, and has sold through the Richmond company alone over 1,500 machines. They are in common use. J. L. Gaitley is an employee of the Richmond company, working on a commission basis, and has been so employed for about two years. Beyond the case in judgment, none of the witnesses know of but two accidents of like character.

The machine itself consists of a tub, or washer, in which clothes are cleaned. Attached to its back as a part of it is the wringer, consisting of two rubber rollers, through which the wet clothes are passed. Both of them are driven by electric power, and by a switching device may be made to work separately or together.

Mr. Gaitley believed the McNairs to be possible purchasers, and finally secured permission to bring one of the machines to their home for demonstration, and did bring it around at seven o'clock on the morning of May 9, 1929. With the aid of two older McNair boys, he put it in the bathroom and made the necessary power connection through an electric socket over the bath-tub, five or six feet above the floor.

That demonstration might be made, he was given some soiled clothes to wash. When the laundering of one lot had been completed Mrs. McNair came in and took them out in the back yard to dry. Later Mr. McNair also came into the bath-room, stood there for a little while, and then followed his wife into the yard. In a short time Gaitley followed him. Both Mr. McNair and Mrs. McNair say that the wringer was working when they left. Clothes that had been washed had been also wrung, and so there was then no necessity for its continued operation. Gaitley, as we have seen, followed Mr. McNair from the bath-room. He said that the washer was then running and at work on another lot of clothes, but that the wringer was not, and that the switch which controlled it stood in neutral. He also said that when the wringer was in use the rollers were turning in a direction which made it impossible for one standing by or in front of the tub to catch his fingers in them. The switch, which he said was then standing in neutral, governed the direction in which they revolved.

Jack McNair, the plaintiff, was at that time eight years and five months old, was a child of fair intelligence, and had been assigned to the third grade in the public school. He had an impediment in his speech, and when testifying his mother sat by him and repeated his answers to the jury. In other words, he was an ordinary boy between eight and nine years old.

When Gaitley came to the home he was still in bed and probably asleep. In any event, he went into the bathroom a few minutes after Gaitley left it, and in a little while was hurt, and severely hurt. No complaint is made as to the amount of the verdict.

Jack said that when he went into the room the rollers were in motion. Either he or Gaitley must be mistaken. It is impossible to reconcile their testimony. The jury has accepted Jack's statement, as it had a right to do. We must take it as true that the wringer was then working. He placed his arm against the rollers. It was drawn in by them and held until his outcries brought relief. Gaitley ran back and cut off the power. This boy has also said that he touched no part of the machine before his arm was caught up. If he was correct in this he of course did not touch the switch.

There is evidence to show that Gaitley knew this child was in the home; that these wringers were running and were dangerous if it undertook to play with them. He further said that in such circumstances they should not have been left in motion. That is to say, the substance of his testimony is that it would have been negligent for him to have left these rollers running had he known that Jack was about. He did say that they were, as a matter of fact, not running. The jury here did not follow him.

Was it negligent for Gaitley to go out of the house and leave the rollers running?

Negligence lies in the omission of due care in the performance of some duty. Want of ordinary care or of reasonable prudence must appear. These are not arbitrary definitions but are highly elastic, and vary with the facts to which they are applied. Boggs Plybon, 157 Va. 30, 160 S.E. 77; Price Burton, 155 Va. 229, 154 S.E. 499; Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. Mace, 151 Va. 458, 145 S.E. 362; Grand Taunk Ry. Co. Ives, 144 U.S. 408, 417, 12 S.Ct. 679, 683, 36 L.Ed. 485.

In Morris Peyton, 148 Va. 812, 139 S.E. 500, 504, Crump, P., cited with approval this statement of Judge Burks, made in Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. Allen, 137 Va. 522, 120 S.E. 157, 158: "Courts constantly have to refer to juries the question of what is reasonable conduct, or reasonable prudence, under all the circumstances of the case, with no other guide than their own judgment and conclusion as reasonable men."

Negligence is usually a question for the jury, and should be taken from it only when there is no real conflict of evidence on material matters, and when from facts established reasonable men should not differ as to conclusions to be drawn. A verdict must stand "unless there is a plain deviation from the evidence or it is palpable the jury have not drawn a correct inference from these facts as certified." Richmond & Danville R.R. Co. Medley, 75 Va. 499, 40 Am.Rep. 734; Blair & Hoge Wilson, 28 Gratt. (69 Va.) 165; Carrington Ficklin's Ex'rs, 32 Gratt. (73 Va.) 670; Western Union Tel. Co. Virginia Paper Co., 87 Va. 418, 12 S.E. 755; Nelson C. & O. Ry. Co., 88 Va. 971, 14 S.E. 838, 15 L.R.A. 583; New York, P. & N. Ry. Co. Thomas, 92 Va. 606, 24 S.E. 264; ...