Filer v. Smith
| Decision Date | 25 July 1893 |
| Citation | 96 Mich. 347,55 N.W. 999 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | FILER v. SMITH. |
Error to circuit court, Muskegon county; Albert Dickerman, Judge.
Action by Alvah C. Filer against William H. Smith to recover damages for false imprisonment. From a judgment, entered on the verdict of a jury in favor of defendant, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.
L. K. Soper, for appellant.
Chamberlain & Cross, for appellee.
Plaintiff had been for some five days at Muskegon, engaged in soliciting orders for trees and shrubbery, and had taken several orders. He boarded at a private house, at which several other persons were at the time boarding. Defendant who is the sheriff of Muskegon county, on the 14th of December, 1891, received from one Cane, the sheriff of Isabella county, by letter, information, that in August 1891, one Reynolds had eloped from Mt. Pleasant with a Mrs. Nichols, the pair taking with them the five children of the latter. The letter contained the description of Reynolds and Mrs. Nichols, and a photograph of the former. On receipt of this information, defendant telegraphed to Cane that he thought his man was at Muskegon. Cane replied, stating that he had a warrant for Reynolds' arrest, and requested that he be arrested and held. He was arrested accordingly. Cane arrived the next day, and declared that plaintiff was not the man, and plaintiff was discharged, and he now brings suit for false imprisonment. The defense was that defendant acted in good faith; that there was a striking resemblance between the photograph and plaintiff, and that on the 11th of December a woman who had been boarding at the same place had been arrested for larceny; that this woman had at first given her name as Campbell, and again as Nichols. The court instructed the jury that
This instruction could not fail to mislead the jury, under the circumstances of this case. A prosecution for adultery can only be instituted in this state by the husband or wife of one of the parties to the crime. Whatever suspicions an officer may have, he has no right to make an arrest for adultery, of his own motion. There was no charge of adultery against Filer, though there was against the man for whom he was mistaken, and no ground for suspecting him guilty of that offense.
If a warrant was in fact issued, defendant would have had an undoubted right to arrest Reynolds. Drennan v. People, 10 Mich. 169. The question here is, was defendant justified in arresting plaintiff, under the circumstances detailed by him? He claims to have relied-First, on the resemblance indicated by the photograph; and, second, upon the fact that the woman arrested December 11th gave her name, on one occasion, as "Nichols." Reynolds was described in the letter as 50 years of age. Plaintiff was 36. This woman had two children. The fugitive had five. There was nothing suspicious about plaintiff's conduct. Defendant had seen him several times before the arrest under circumstances which indicated that plaintiff knew that he was the sheriff. Plaintiff was present at the house when the sheriff was there with Mrs. Campbell in his custody. Plaintiff knew of her arrest, and the sheriff knew that he was aware of the fact of her arrest. Plaintiff evinced no uneasiness because of her arrest, nor had he manifested any concern regarding it, more than might have been manifested by any one of the boarders at the house. He continued to remain there for several days after her arrest. Mt. Pleasant was but about 100 miles away. It appears that, at the boarding house, plaintiff was known as Mr. Filer, and the woman, as Mrs. Campbell. There was no testimony that defendant had at any time before the arrest made any inquiry, at the boarding house or elsewhere, as to the nature of plaintiff's business; his name; the length of his stay at Muskegon; what his relations were with Mrs. Campbell or Mrs. Nichols; or as to how long Mrs. Campbell had been in the city. Nor was there any evidence of any improper relations between plaintiff and Mrs. Campbell, or that there had been any intimacy between the two, or that there was anything more than a boarding house acquaintance between them. When plaintiff was arrested, he protested against his arrest; insisted that his name was not Reynolds, but that it was Filer; exhibited his memorandum book, with the name "A. C. Filer" printed in gilt letters upon the back; took from his pocket certain letters that he had received at Muskegon, addressed to A. C. Filer, and showed the postmark thereon; exhibited a tax receipt for taxes paid at Kalamazoo; and later gave the name of a cashier of one of the banks at Kalamazoo, and desired that he be telegraphed to. But, notwithstanding, he was locked up at 1 o'clock in the daytime, and kept in jail, in the ward with other prisoners, for 30 hours.
It is undoubtedly true that an officer is justified in making the arrest of a person formally charged with an offense, though it turns out that the person so charged be innocent. So, if he makes an arrest for a felony without a warrant, although he has no personal knowledge, but acts upon information received from one whom he has reason to rely upon, although it may be that the person so charged is not guilty, or no felony in fact be committed. Samuel v. Payne, 1 Doug. 359; Hobbs v. Branscomb, 3 Camp. 420; Holley v. Mix, 3 Wend. 350; Burns v. Erben, 40 N.Y. 463; Cahill v. People, 106 Ill. 621; Crock. Sher. � 49; 1 Chit. Crim. Law, 22. In Williams v. Dawson referred to in Hobbs v. Branscomb, supra, Buller, J., laid down the rule "that if a peace officer, of his own head, takes a person into custody on suspicion, he must prove that there was such a crime committed." The rule is laid down by Mr. Bigelow, in his work on Torts, (4th Ed., p. 140,) that the officer, in executing his process, must arrest the person named in it. If he do not, though the arrest of the wrong person was made through a mere mistake, it may be a case of false imprisonment; citing Coote v. Lighworth, Moore, 457; Dunston v. Paterson, 2 C. B. (N. S.) 495. A number of authorities may be cited in support of this rule: Add. Torts, � 805; Davies v. Jenkins, 11 Mees. & W. 754; Gwynne, Sher. 99; Griswold v. Sedgwick, 6 Cow. 460; Lavina v. State, 63 Ga. 513; Hays v. Creary, 60 Tex. 445; Comer v. Knowles, 17 Kan. 436. I do not think, however, that an officer who, through an honest mistake, and after such investigation into the facts and circumstances as the particular case enables him to make, upon a charge of felony, arrests a party, having reasonable grounds to suppose him to be the guilty party, and the one named in his warrant, is liable to the arrested party, who turns out to be innocent, for whatever damages he may suffer in consequence of the arrest. Such a rule would materially interfere with the apprehension of fugitives from justice. Probable cause is a justification for criminal proceedings. Criminals who seek safety in flight are usually apprehended through officers in other localities, and by means of photographs and descriptions of the person. As is said in Brockway v. Crawford, 3 Jones, (N. C.) 433, the law encourages every one-as well private citizens as officers-to keep a sharp lookout for the apprehension of felons, by holding them exempt from responsibility for an arrest or prosecution, although the party charged turns out not to be guilty, unless the arrest is made, or the prosecution is instituted, without probable cause, and from malice. In Eanes v. State, 6 Humph. 53, a murder had been committed in Franklin county by one Payne, who made his escape, and the governor issued a proclamation offering a reward for the apprehension of the criminal. One Martin was arrested in Sullivan county. The particulars of personal description annexed to the governor's proclamation applied in some respects to Martin, and in others did not. The court say: ...
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