Filippo v. Northern Indiana Public Service Corp., Inc.
| Decision Date | 10 April 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-1541,97-1541 |
| Citation | 141 F.3d 744 |
| Parties | 157 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2971 Lita M. FILIPPO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NORTHERN INDIANA PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION, INC., and United Steelworkers of America, Local 13796, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Michael J. Foley (argued), Foley & Foley, Chicago, IL, for Lita M. Filippo.
Lisa A. Weiland, Robert D. Campbell (argued), Schiff, Hardin & Waite, Chicago, IL, for Northern Indiana Public Service Co.
Daniel M. Kovalik, David I. Goldman (argued), United Steelworkers of America, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Pittsburgh, PA, for Local 31-13796 United Steelworkers of America.
Before POSNER, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and KANNE, Circuit Judges.
Lita Filippo brought this action against her employer, Northern Indiana Public Service Corporation ("NIPSCO"), and her union, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, Local Union 13796 ("Union"). Her complaint included a claim under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185, and a claim that NIPSCO's actions constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress under Indiana law. Both parties consented to trial before a magistrate. To prevail on her LMRA claim, Filippo must show that the Union breached its duty of fair representation. The magistrate determined that Filippo could not make this showing and granted summary judgment on this count to NIPSCO and the Union. The Magistrate also granted summary judgment to NIPSCO and the Union on the state-law claim, finding that the LMRA displaced the state law in this area because the tort would require interpretation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") in force between NIPSCO and the Union. This appeal followed.
Because we find that Filippo cannot establish that the Union breached its duty of fair representation and we believe the LMRA displaces Indiana law on intentional infliction of emotional distress under the circumstances of this case, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment.
NIPSCO employs Filippo as a customer service representative. For over thirty years, the Union has served as the bargaining agent for NIPSCO employees, including customer service representatives. Filippo is a member of the Union.
From December 1993 until April 1994, Filippo served as a Union Steward under Local Union President Debbie Birkholtz. In April 1994, Filippo ran against Birkholtz for President of the Local Union but lost the election. After Birkholtz's reelection, she removed Filippo from her position as a Union Steward.
The CBA in effect for all times relevant to this lawsuit covered the period from June 1, 1993 to May 31, 1997. As a member of the Union Filippo is covered by this CBA, which governs the procedures for resolution of employee grievances. The grievance process proceeds as follows: First, the employee discusses the matter with her supervisor in a "pre-grievance" step. If the matter is not resolved to the employee's satisfaction, she can pursue the matter to "Step 1." In Step 1, the employee completes a Grievance Form and presents it to her supervisor. The supervisor signs the Grievance Form, acknowledging the request for a grievance hearing. The supervisor then arranges for a grievance hearing as soon as practicable. In attendance at the grievance hearing are the employee, her Steward, and a Grievance Committee person. If the grievance is not resolved in Step 1, the employee can request to proceed to Step 2 by submitting a particularized account of her grievance on the Union's Grievance Report Form to the Local Union Grievance Committee. The Union then evaluates the grievance, and if the Union intends to pursue the complaint, it must notify NIPSCO's Manager of Labor Relations in writing. Upon such notification, NIPSCO arranges for a Step 2 Grievance Hearing. At the Step 2 hearing, NIPSCO is represented by the Manager of Labor Relations, while the Union is represented by the International Staff Representative, the Local Union President, and the Local Union Grievance Committee Chairperson. If the grievance is not resolved at Step 2, the grievance may be submitted to arbitration by the International Staff Representative. Only the International Staff Representative has the authority to appeal a grievance to arbitration.
Filippo filed eight grievances between February and November of 1994. These eight grievances are the subject of Filippo's complaint that NIPSCO violated the CBA and that the Union violated its duty of fair representation.
Filippo's first grievance alleged that supervisors William Vagenas and Carol Kane were oversupervising her because of her status as a Union Steward and because she was a candidate for Local Union President. Filippo complained specifically of a meeting with Kane in which Kane reprimanded Filippo for being away from her desk too often. This grievance was pursued through Step 2. In its investigation, the Union spoke with Filippo, Vagenas, and Kane. The Union resolved the grievance in Step 2 based on NIPSCO's representation that Filippo's file contained no record of reprimand. Because the supervisors did not record a formal reprimand, the Union concluded that Filippo suffered no injury. Filippo admits that she was not disciplined in any way as a result of her meeting with Kane, but claims the Union should have interviewed Maria Callas, an employee Filippo identified as a witness. Filippo also complains to us that the Union did not communicate the resolution of this grievance to her until three months after the Step 2 hearing.
The second grievance listed several complaints, including retaliatory discipline and harassment. After the Step 1 hearing, Filippo did not complete the necessary paperwork to take her grievance to Step 2. Union Steward Velma Hawkins advised Filippo that her paperwork was not complete, yet Filippo chose not to supplement her filing. The Union therefore did not pursue this grievance further.
Filippo's third and eighth grievances complained about NIPSCO establishing a standard that required customer service representatives to be available to take telephone calls from customers for at least 55% of their work time. These grievances were not resolved in Step 1 or Step 2. Several other employees submitted grievances on this issue, and the International Union elected to combine the complaints and take them to arbitration. The Union settled all the grievances dealing with the 55% standard by reserving the right to challenge the standard if and when any of the employees were disciplined for failing to meet it.
The fourth and sixth grievances concerned written warnings Filippo received regarding her absences. NIPSCO has an attendance policy which includes a procedure for employees to request a "special review" of absences. If an employee seeks such a review and extenuating circumstances exist, the absence is not counted against the employee. The Union encourages employees to use the special review process because it often eliminates the need for pursuing a grievance. At Filippo's Step 2 hearing, the Union requested that she use the special review process. Filippo refused. The Union settled the grievances by receiving assurances from NIPSCO that NIPSCO and the Union would review the absences should Filippo later receive discipline for attendance problems. Filippo had not yet been disciplined for absenteeism; accordingly her grievances were suspended unless and until she is actually injured.
Filippo's fifth grievance alleged that she had been harassed by her supervisor. The grievance was not resolved in Step 1. While Filippo claims she "appealed the denial," the Union asserts that Filippo did not complete the necessary paperwork to take the grievance to Step 2. The Union did not pursue this grievance further.
In her seventh grievance Filippo complained that she should have been allowed Union representation when an outside consultant critiqued her customer service calls. The Union took the grievance to Step 2 and resolved it on the grounds that no documentation from the evaluation was placed in Filippo's files and that the evaluation was solely for training purposes.
On the basis of the handling of these grievances, Filippo filed suit in the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana alleging violations of the LMRA and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The parties consented to trial before a magistrate. The magistrate granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on all counts.
We review a district court's grant of summary judgement de novo, drawing our own conclusions of law and fact from the record before us. See Thiele v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 68 F.3d 179, 181 (7th Cir.1995). Summary judgment is proper where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, courts must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable and justifiable inferences in favor of that party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513-14, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). However, neither "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties," Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247, 106 S.Ct. at 2509-10, nor the existence of "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), is sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Csx Transp. Inc. v. Transp.-Communs. Intern. Union
... ... employees at numerous "Transportation Service Centers" to a centralized Customer Service Center ... disputes, CSXT and TCU established Public Law Board No. 5782. Public Law Boards are a ... Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299, ... See e.g., Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S ... ...
-
Payne v. Pauley
...15) (citing Weeks, 126 F.3d at 939; Cowan v. Glenbrook Sec. Servs., Inc., 123 F.3d 438, 446 (7th Cir.1997); Filippo v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Corp., 141 F.3d 744, 749 (7th Cir.1998); Edward E. Gillen Co. v. City of Lake Forest, 3 F.3d 192, 196 (7th Cir.1993)). It is not the self-serving nature ......
-
Nelson v. Stewart
..."hybrid" section 301/fair representation action against employer and union under federal law); Filippo v. Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Corp., Inc., 141 F.3d 744 (7th Cir.1998) (same); see also 2 The Developing Labor Law: The Board, the Courts, and the National Labor Relations Act 2263-67 (Pa......
-
Leber v. Universal Music and Video Distribution
...agreement. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967) (grievance); Filippo v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Corp., 141 F.3d 744 (7th Cir.1998) (grievance); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 73 S.Ct. 681, 97 L.Ed. 1048 (1953) (contract negotiations); Wegsch......