Filius v. Mo. Dep't of Corrs.
| Decision Date | 25 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 4:21CV01483 |
| Parties | MICHAEL FILIUS, Plaintiff, v. MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Missouri Department of Corrections' motion ECF No. 5) to dismiss Plaintiff Michael Filius's complaint. Plaintiff asserts claims of retaliation in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., and intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
Taken as true for the purpose of this motion, Plaintiff alleges the following facts. Plaintiff was hired by Defendant to work as a Corrections & Probation Officer beginning in January of 2018. ECF No. 4, Compl. ¶ 9. At the outset of his employment, Plaintiff notified Defendant that he would require accommodations because he suffers from an autoimmune disorder which causes him to fatigue quickly. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. To accommodate this health condition Plaintiff requested that his shifts not exceed twelve hours per day, and that he not work more than four hours of overtime. Id. ¶¶ 13-14.
Plaintiff believed that this accommodation was granted, but he was frequently required to work shifts that exceeded the time limitations set by his accommodation. Id. ¶¶ 14-15.
Plaintiff used FMLA time early in his employment due to his own health care condition and also to care for his daughter, who “has a serious health condition.” Id. ¶¶ 16-17. Plaintiff continued to take FMLA leave “intermittently” through November of 2018 Id. ¶ 19. In November of 2018, Plaintiff's supervisor, Cynthia Hygrade, told Plaintiff that “I don't want people taking FMLA, I don't want people with accommodations, and if you can't work over sixteen hours, I don't want you here.” Id. ¶ 18. Hygrade made other disparaging comments about Plaintiff's need for FMLA accommodations, and on one occasion, she told Plaintiff that he would not have been hired if she knew about his need for accommodations. Id. ¶¶ 20, 22. Another employee of Defendant, Captain Kosanke, told Plaintiff that he was “taking advantage of” his FMLA leave. Id. ¶ 27.
After being subjected to harassment by his supervisors over the use of FMLA leave, Plaintiff made a formal complaint of discrimination on December 3, 2018. Id. ¶ 31. After making this complaint, Plaintiff was isolated from his co-workers and excluded from using the employee restroom. Id. ¶ 33. Instead, Plaintiff was required to use the inmate restroom, which was “in an unsanitary state” and “feces-stained.” Id. ¶¶ 33, 35.
Plaintiff then filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on December 19, 2018. Id. ¶ 40. Once this occurred, Plaintiff experienced additional pressure to leave his position with Defendant. Id. ¶¶ 41-43. An employee of Defendant told Plaintiff that “he could not keep working for Defendant” because he filed a charge with the EEOC. Id. ¶ 41. Plaintiff was also falsely accused of misconduct with respect to the use of force on an inmate, and he was pressured to transfer to a different location. Id. ¶¶ 42, 44. One of Plaintiffs supervisors remarked to Plaintiff, “You're making a lot of complaints.” Id. ¶ 47.
Plaintiff continued to take FMLA leave in 2019 for both himself and for his daughter. Id. ¶ 50. In late spring of 2019 Plaintiff obtained FMLA paperwork so that he could “expand his FMLA approval that he already had.” Id. ¶ 49. Plaintiff intended to take FMLA leave “related to his serious health conditions.” Id. ¶ 51. Plaintiff completed this paperwork and returned it to his Facility Supervisor, Don Aries, but Aries claimed that he never received the paperwork. Id. ¶¶ 52-53. At about the same time, Plaintiffs supervisor, Hygrade, undertook efforts to uncover negative information about Plaintiff which could be used to justify his termination. Id. ¶¶ 54-55. Plaintiff also alleges that, around this time, he attempted to “open[] a door to aid his breathing, ” due to his asthma, and he was told by an unidentified person: “If you open that door, just leave.” Id. ¶ 58.
Plaintiff was terminated on June 17, 2019. Defendant stated that Plaintiffs termination was due to his violation of Defendant's “policies and procedures.” Id. ¶ 59. He filed suit on December 17, 2021. He asserts claims for retaliation in violation of the FMLA (Count I), and for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) (Count II). Under Count I, Plaintiff seeks a remedy in the form of monetary damages, as well as for “appropriate equitable, declaratory, and injunctive relief . . . .” Id. ¶ 69.[1] Under Count II, Plaintiff requests only monetary damages.
Defendant seeks dismissal of all counts for failure to state a claim. Defendant submits that Plaintiff cannot recover because both of his claims are barred by sovereign immunity. With respect to the FMLA claim, Defendant argues that Plaintiff relies on the “self-care” provision of the statute, which does not create a valid waiver of sovereign immunity. On the IIED claim, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claim is barred by sovereign immunity because it does not come within the statutory exceptions.
Plaintiff opposes the motion to dismiss and argues that his claims are not barred by sovereign immunity. On the FMLA claim, Plaintiff argues that his claim also concerns leave which he took to care for his daughter. Plaintiff contends that this transforms his FMLA claim into one concerning the “family care” provision, which does yield a valid waiver of state sovereign immunity. On the IIED claim, Plaintiff argues that his claim comes within the statutory exception to sovereign immunity for an unsafe condition on public property, or that sovereign immunity has been waived by the purchase of liability insurance.
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Magee v. Trustees of Hamline Univ., Minn., 747 F.3d 532, 535 (8th Cir.2014). The court “construe[s] [a] complaint liberally.” Id. (alterations in original). “[T]he complaint should be read as a whole, not parsed piece by piece to determine whether each allegation, in isolation, is plausible.” Wilson v. Arkansas Dep't of Hum Servs., 850 F.3d 368, 371 (8th Cir. 2017). Where the complaint contains “well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Because a valid invocation of sovereign immunity would be dispositive as to all of Plaintiff's claims, the Court will address the sovereign immunity issue before considering Plaintiff's claims on the merits. “Sovereign immunity is the privilege of the sovereign not to be sued without its consent.” Virginia Office for Prot & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253 (2011). “Under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.600, public entities enjoy sovereign immunity . . . unless immunity is waived, abrogated, or modified by statute.” Richardson v. City of St. Louis, 293 S.W.3d 133, 136 (Mo.Ct.App. 2009). Here, the parties agree that Defendant is a public entity that is presumptively covered by the state's sovereign immunity. See Compl. ¶ 2; ECF. No. 6, Def.'s Mem. in Supp. at 2.
Determining whether sovereign immunity has been abrogated in this case requires an examination of the FMLA provisions at issue. “The FMLA entitles an employee to twelve weeks of leave from work during any twelve-month period if the employee meets certain statutory requirements.” Pulczinski v. Trinity Structural Towers, Inc., 691 F.3d 996, 1005 (8th Cir. 2012). The statutory requirements at issue here are the “family-care” and “self-care” provisions. Under the “family-care” provisions of FMLA, qualified employees are entitled to leave “to care for the spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent, of the employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or parent has a serious health condition, ” among other reasons. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C); see also Id. § 2612(a)(1)(A)-(B). The “self-care” provision entitles a qualified employee to leave “because of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D).
The FMLA entitles employees to the same period of leave regardless of which statutory requirement they satisfy, so the reason for which the leave is taken is generally not relevant to an employee's claim under the FMLA. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 2612(a)(1). However, the purpose of the leave is relevant to whether state sovereign immunity may be validly abrogated by the FMLA. In Nevada Dep't of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), the United States Supreme Court held that Congress could validly abrogate state sovereign immunity with respect to claims against states under the family care provision of the FMLA, § 2612(a)(1)(C). See Hibbs, 538 U.S at 740. The plaintiff in Hibbs was fired while on approved FMLA leave to care for his injured wife, and he sued his employer for “retaliating against him when he opposed [their unlawful practices under the FMLA].” Brief for Resp't at 9, Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (No. 01-1368), 2002 WL 31655020. The Court in Hibbs noted that the administration of family-care leave at the...
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