Finamore v. Miglionico

• Decision Date: 28 September 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20-1800,20-1800
• Citation: 15 F.4th 52
• Parties: Michael FINAMORE, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Lt. Nick L. MIGLIONICO, in his individual and official capacity, et al., Defendants, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

15 F.4th 52

Michael FINAMORE, Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.Lt. Nick L. MIGLIONICO, in his individual and official capacity, et al., Defendants, Appellees.

No. 20-1800

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

September 28, 2021

Bart W. Heemskerk and Heemskerk Business Litigation PLLC on brief for appellant.

Gerard T. Donnelly, Matthew G. Lindberg, and Hassett & Donnelly, P.C. on brief for appellees.

Before Howard, Chief Judge, Selya and Barron, Circuit Judges.

SELYA, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant Michael Finamore, convinced that the town of Douglas, Massachusetts (the Town), was infringing upon his property rights by allowing the public to traverse a public way that cut through his property, tried to enforce his perceived rights through self-help. A ruckus ensued, and police officers arrested the appellant for disturbing the peace and disorderly conduct. After the criminal charges were dismissed, the appellant sued a number of municipal actors (including the police officers). The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants, and the appellant assigns error. Concluding that the entry of summary judgment was appropriate, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

We briefly rehearse the relevant facts and travel of the case. The appellant owns real estate (the Property), located in the Town. Part of Cedar Street, which has been used as a public way for many years, cuts through the Property. After commissioning a survey, the appellant came to believe that the portion of Cedar Street that crossed the Property belonged to him. Consequently, he sought to rescind public access across it.

The Town was unpersuaded. It continued to maintain that the disputed portion of the street was a public way. Litigation followed, and the state superior court found in favor of the Town and declared all of Cedar Street to be a public way. On appeal, though, the judgment was vacated and a new trial ordered. See Hunter v. Town of Douglas, No. 14-1531, 2015 WL 4494670, at *2 (Mass. App. Ct. July 24, 2015). The appellant claims — albeit without elaboration — that he thought the appeals court decision meant that he could rescind public access through the disputed section of Cedar Street pending the new trial.

On October 13, 2015, three members of the Town's police force — Lt. Nick Miglionico, Officer Anthony Yannino, and Officer Mark Kaminski (collectively, the Officers) — responded to a report that the appellant had unilaterally closed off the street. By the time the Officers arrived on the scene, the appellant had stretched an orange plastic snowfence across the northernmost boundary of the disputed portion of Cedar Street and was about to erect a similar barrier across the southernmost boundary. Two other Town hierarchs, Town Administrator Mike Guzinski and Highway Superintendent John Furno (collectively, the Municipal Officials), also came to the scene. Lt. Miglionico told the appellant to remove the fence and warned him that he would be arrested if he did not do so. The appellant refused, stating that he would rather go to jail.

In the meantime, a crowd had gathered, people were yelling and screaming, and the appellant was bombarded with demands to open the street. After conferring with the Municipal Officials and confirming that the appellant did not have the authority to close Cedar Street, Lt. Miglionico again ordered the appellant to remove the fence. When the appellant still balked, Lt. Miglionico arrested him and directed Highway Superintendent Furno to take down the fence.

The Officers transported the appellant to the police station, booked him on charges of disturbing the peace and disorderly conduct, and forced him to surrender his personal items (including his prescription medication). Although the appellant was detained in a holding cell for nearly five hours, he claims to have no memory of anything past the first fifteen minutes. The appellant asserts that this memory loss was due to a cardiac event, which he says resulted in a loss of consciousness. There is no evidence in the record, though, of any contemporaneous medical treatment.

Officer Yannino filed a criminal complaint against the appellant for disturbing the peace and disorderly conduct. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 53(b). The state district court made a finding of probable cause, but the charges were ultimately dropped — one was dismissed and the other nolle prossed.

That was not the end of the matter. The appellant later repaired to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts and sued the Officers and the Municipal Officials. Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the district court's supplemental jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367, he brought a total of nine claims. The parties agreed to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) ; Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(b). Following pretrial discovery, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants on all counts. See Finamore v. Miglionico, No. 17-40122, 2020 WL 5100763, at *1 (D. Mass. June 24, 2020). This timely appeal ensued.

II. ANALYSIS

Before us, the appellant challenges the entry of summary judgment on six of the original nine claims. The six claims are a false arrest claim under section 1983 and the Fourth Amendment; a claim under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA), see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 11I, for false arrest; a combined common-law claim for false arrest and false imprisonment; a common-law claim for malicious prosecution; a common-law claim for civil conspiracy; and a common-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

We review de novo the district court's entry of summary judgment. See Shurtleff v. City of Boston, 986 F.3d 78, 85 (1st Cir. 2021). In conducting that review, we take the record in the light most flattering to the nonmovant (here, the appellant) and draw all reasonable inferences to his behoof. See Houlton Citizens' Coal. v. Town of Houlton, 175 F.3d 178, 184 (1st Cir. 1999). But this plaintiff-friendly approach has well-defined limits: one such limitation dictates that "motions for summary judgment must be decided on the record as it stands, not on litigants' visions of what the facts might some day reveal." Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir. 1994).

When all is said and done, "[s]ummary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Arabian Support & Servs. Co. v. Textron Sys. Corp., 943 F.3d 42, 47 (1st Cir. 2019). For this purpose, a genuine issue exists if "a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the nonmoving party." McCarthy v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313, 315 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop., 960 F.2d 200, 204 (1st Cir. 1992) ). By the same token, a fact is material only if "it possesses the capacity, if determined as the nonmovant wishes, to alter the outcome of the lawsuit under the applicable legal tenets." Roche v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 253 (1st Cir. 1996).

A. Section 1983 and MCRA Claims.

We begin with the appellant's counterpart claims under section 1983 and the MCRA. "The two essential elements of an action under [ section 1983 ] are ... (i) that the conduct complained of has been committed under color of state law, and (ii) that this conduct worked a denial of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Chongris v. Bd. of Appeals of Andover, 811 F.2d 36, 40 (1st Cir. 1987). As the appellant's section 1983 claim is premised upon an alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment — an allegation that the Officers wrongfully arrested him — the appellant must show that the Officers lacked probable cause to effect the arrest. See Roche, 81 F.3d at 254 ; see also Mann v. Cannon, 731 F.2d 54, 62 (1st Cir. 1984) ("To prove a section 1983 false arrest claim, ... [the appellant] must show at minimum that the arresting officers acted without probable cause.").

A similar set of requirements underpins the appellant's statutory state-law claim. Under the MCRA, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 11I, the appellant must show that "his exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of either the United States or of the Commonwealth" was either "interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with" through "threats, intimidation or coercion." Bally v. Northeastern Univ., 403 Mass. 713, 532 N.E.2d 49, 51-52 (1989) (quoting Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 11H ); see Meuser v. Federal Express Corp., 564 F.3d 507, 516 (1st Cir. 2009). Because the appellant premises his MCRA claim on an allegation of false arrest, he must establish that the Officers lacked probable cause to arrest him in order to prevail on that claim. See Santiago v. Fenton, 891 F.2d 373, 383 (1st Cir. 1989).

As the absence of probable cause represents the sine qua non of the appellant's claims under both section 1983 and the MCRA, we start — and end — with that element, turning directly to the issue of whether the Officers acted with probable cause when they arrested the appellant for disturbing the peace and disorderly conduct. In the context of warrantless arrests, the standard for probable cause is coextensive under federal and Massachusetts law. See id.; Coblyn v. Kennedy's, Inc., 359 Mass. 319, 268 N.E.2d 860, 863 (1971). The existence vel non of probable cause "depends ... upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, ... the facts and circumstances within [the Officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that the [appellant] had committed or was committing an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964) ; see United States v. Figueroa, 818 F.2d 1020, 1023 (1st Cir. 1987). "The preferred approach" to an inquiry into the existence of probable cause "is pragmatic; it focuses on the ‘factual and practical considerations...