Financial Institute Ins. Service v. Hoy

• Decision Date: 12 September 2000
• Docket Number: No. 1999-WC-01647-COA.,1999-WC-01647-COA.
• Citation: 770 So.2d 994
• Parties: FINANCIAL INSTITUTE INSURANCE SERVICE and PCA Property and Casualty Insurance Company, Appellants, v. Teresa HOY, Appellee.
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

770 So.2d 994

FINANCIAL INSTITUTE INSURANCE SERVICE and PCA Property and Casualty Insurance Company, Appellants, v. Teresa HOY, Appellee.

No. 1999-WC-01647-COA.

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

September 12, 2000.

Michael D. Young, Attorney for Appellants.

R. Jack Brantley Jr., Attorney for Appellee.

BEFORE KING, P.J., BRIDGES, AND MOORE, JJ.

BRIDGES, J., for the Court:

¶ 1. This is a workers' compensation case on appeal from an order by an administrative law judge on April 1, 1998. The administrative law judge found that Teresa Hoy had sustained an injury within the scope and course of her employment with Financial Institute Insurance Service (hereinafter called FIIS). FIIS filed a petition of review to the full Commission, which entered an order affirming the decision of the administrative law judge on October 12, 1998. FIIS then filed an appeal with the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Harrison County, Mississippi and that court entered an order affirming the full Commission's decision on August 30, 1999.

I. THE MISSISSIPPI WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN CONCLUDING THAT AN EMPLOYEE WHO FALLS IN HER HOTEL ROOM AFTER GETTING UP IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT TO GO TO THE BATHROOM HAS SUSTAINED AN INJURY WHICH ARISES OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE AND SCOPE OF THE CLAIMANT'S EMPLOYMENT.

II. THE CLAIMANT WAS AN OFFICER OF A CORPORATION WHO VOLUNTARILY EXEMPTED HERSELF FROM COVERAGE UNDER THE MISSISSIPPI WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT PURSUANT TO MISS.CODE ANN. § 71-3-79 (Rev. 1999).

¶ 2. Finding no error on the part of the Commission or lower court, we affirm.

FACTS

¶ 3. Hoy was hired by FIIS on or about June 1, 1995. Her duties there included selling forced placed insurance in the state of Mississippi which would often cause her to spend nights in a hotel away from home. When the incident at issue occurred, Hoy was visiting clients on the Mississippi Coast, delivering paperwork in accordance with her job. Upon completion of this work at around 5:45 p.m., on March 29, 1996, Hoy elected to stay the night in Gulfport, Mississippi to avoid a five to six hour drive home that night to Carthage, Mississippi.

¶ 4. Hoy had dinner at a restaurant that evening, stopped at an outlet mall and finally retired to her hotel room around 9:00 p.m. At about 2:00 or 2:30 a.m., Hoy got out of bed to use the bathroom when she slipped and fell on wet carpet, sustaining injuries. The administrative law judge and the lower court determined that, because she was staying the night in Gulfport following the duties of her job, Hoy had sustained these injuries within the course and scope of her employment with FIIS. FIIS, however, argues that this was strictly a personal activity, not within the scope of her employment.

¶ 5. Another very important set of facts in this case are that, subsequent to Hoy being hired by FIIS, she was elected as assistant executive secretary of the company, thereby making her an officer. Hoy asserts that she was never notified that she had received this position until FIIS forced her to sign a waiver or Certificate of Exemption of Coverage Under Workers' Compensation Law on October 5, 1995. Hoy maintains that she was told to sign this waiver or she would lose her job. FIIS argues, however, that Hoy voluntarily signed the waiver without coercion. FIIS asserts that because of Hoy's signature on this waiver, she is not entitled to workers' compensation benefits at the outset, notwithstanding the fact that her injury took place outside the scope of her employment.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 6. The full Commission acts as the "ultimate finder of fact," and as such "its findings are subject to normal, deferential standards upon review." Natchez Equip. Co., Inc. v. Gibbs, 623 So.2d 270, 273 (Miss.1993). We are to presume that the Commission made proper determinations as to which evidence was credible, had weight, and which was not. Metal Trims Indus., Inc. v. Stovall, 562 So.2d 1293, 1297 (Miss.1990). Findings of fact made by the full Commission are binding on this Court provided they are "supported by substantial evidence." Vance v. Twin River Homes, Inc., 641 So.2d 1176, 1180 (Miss.1994). We will only reverse the Commission's decision when the decision is erroneous and contrary to the weight of the evidence. Id. Under the substantial evidence rule, we are further bound from rendering a different decision than that reached by the full Commission even though the evidence presented may lead us to conclude otherwise had we been sitting as the ultimate finder of fact. Barnes v. Jones Lumber Co., 637 So.2d 867, 869 (Miss.1994). "Substantial evidence, though not easily defined, means something more than just a `mere scintilla' of evidence, [yet] it does not rise to the level of a `preponderance of the evidence.'" Delta CMI v. Speck, 586 So.2d 768, 773 (Miss.1991) (citations omitted). Substantial evidence can further be said to be evidence "affording a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred." Id. We apply the de novo standard of review to matters of law. Spann v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 700 So.2d 308 (¶ 12) (Miss.1997). This Court is reminded that workers' compensation law is to be liberally and broadly construed, resolving doubtful cases in favor of compensation so that the beneficial purposes of the act may be accomplished. Marshall Durbin Cos. v. Warren, 633 So.2d 1006, 1010 (Miss.1994). See also Miller Transporters, Inc. v. Guthrie, 554 So.2d 917, 919 (Miss.1989).

LEGAL ANALYSIS

I. THE MISSISSIPPI WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION

ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN CONCLUDING THAT AN EMPLOYEE WHO FALLS IN HER HOTEL ROOM AFTER GETTING UP IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT TO GO TO THE BATHROOM HAS SUSTAINED AN INJURY WHICH ARISES OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE AND SCOPE OF THE CLAIMANT'S EMPLOYMENT.

¶ 7. The parties here battle over the issue of whether Hoy's injury took place during a purely personal activity or whether it happened within the scope and course of her employment with FIIS. Both parties have backed their position with case law, some of which we find to be misplaced and some of which is, in our opinion, relevant to the case at bar. We begin our discussion by analyzing both parties' positions as to the law, keeping in mind that our ultimate task is to comply with the appropriate standard of review, which includes determining whether the Commission's decision in this case was supported by substantial evidence.

¶ 8. FIIS argues that the act of using the bathroom is a purely personal activity and cites error on the part of the Commission and the lower court in finding that Hoy's injuries were within the scope of her employment. FIIS cites Breland and Whitten v. Breland, 243 Miss. 620, 139 So.2d 365 (1962). In this case, it is noted that "if the activity is purely personal and is disconnected from employment, the deviation suspends the employment relationship." Id. at 367. While we do not doubt that Hoy was performing a personal activity, we cannot say that this personal activity was not connected to her employment with FIIS. Application of the Breland case is misplaced here.

¶ 9. First we look to the law that speaks to traveling employees, such as we have here. Smith and Johnson, Inc. v. Eubanks, 374 So.2d 235 (Miss.1979), tells us that when the business or work of an employee necessitates travel, then the employee will be covered from the time that he leaves home until such time as he returns home. Id. at 237 (citing Bryan Bros. Packing Co. v. Dependents of Murrah, 234 Miss. 494, 106 So.2d 675 (1958)). As pointed out by Hoy, sleeping and eating meals while traveling are included in this coverage. Smith and Johnson, 374 So.2d at 238. Smith and Johnson further tells us that as long as the injury "results from a risk which is inherent in the nature of the employment, or which is reasonably incidental thereto ...," the employee will be covered. Id. at 238.

¶ 10. Further, we look to Dependents of Durr v. Schlumberger Oil Well Surveying Corp., 227 Miss. 606, 86 So.2d 507 (1956). That case clears up any doubt as to the law regarding traveling for employment business as opposed to personal business. Id. at 509. Specifically, the court stated:

We do not say that service to the employer must be the sole cause of the journey, but at least it must be a concurrent cause. To establish liability, the inference must be permissible that the trip would have been made though the private errand had been [canceled].

* * *

The test in brief is this: If the work of the employee creates a necessity for travel, he is in the course of his employment, though he is serving at the same time some purpose of his own.

* * *

If however, the work has had no part in creating the necessity for travel, if the journey would have gone forward though the business errand had been dropped, and would have been canceled upon failure of the private purpose, though the business errand was undone, the travel is then personal, and personal the risk.

Id. at 509 (citing LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, Sec. 18.12.).

Smith and Johnson goes further to inform us that:

[W]hen a traveling man slips in the street or is struck by an automobile between his hotel and a restaurant, the injury has been held compensable, even though the accident occurred on a Sunday evening, or involved an extended trip occasioned by employee's wish to eat at a particular restaurant.

Smith and Johnson, 374 So.2d at 238.

¶ 11. When applying this law to the case at bar, we find that Hoy's work necessitated her travel in this instance. As stipulated by FIIS, Hoy's work regularly required her to travel. We note that had her business not required her to be on the Mississippi Coast that day and had it not required her to be very late getting back to her home which was five to six hours away, then we would be dealing with a very different case than we have before us today. However, Hoy had no other reason to be on...