Finch Aerospace Corp. v. City of San Diego, D070000

• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: MCCONNELL, P.J.
• Citation: 214 Cal.Rptr.3d 628,8 Cal.App.5th 1248
• Parties: FINCH AEROSPACE CORPORATION, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF SAN DIEGO, Defendant and Respondent.
• Decision Date: 24 February 2017
• Docket Number: D070000

8 Cal.App.5th 1248
214 Cal.Rptr.3d 628

FINCH AEROSPACE CORPORATION, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
CITY OF SAN DIEGO, Defendant and Respondent.

D070000

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Filed February 24, 2017

LiMandri & Jonna, Charles S. LiMandri, Paul M. Jonna and Jeffrey M. Trissell, Rancho Santa Fe, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Jan I. Goldsmith and Mara W. Elliott, City Attorneys, Daniel F. Bamberg, Assistant City Attorney and M. Travis Phelps, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendant and Respondent.

MCCONNELL, P.J.

8 Cal.App.5th 1250

I

INTRODUCTION

This case requires us to determine whether the immunities in Government Code ¹ sections 818.8 and 822.2 apply to a slander of title cause of action and, if not, whether Finch Aerospace Corporation (Finch) otherwise adequately alleged a slander of title cause of action against the City of San Diego (City). We conclude the immunities in sections 818.8 and 822.2 do not apply to a slander of title cause of action. We further conclude Finch did not otherwise adequately allege a slander of title cause of action nor did Finch demonstrate it could cure the

214 Cal.Rptr.3d 630

pleading deficiencies by amendment. Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not err in sustaining the City's demurrer to Finch's complaint without leave to amend, and we affirm the judgment.

II

BACKGROUND

A

According to the allegations in the complaint, in 1996 Brown Field Aviation Ventures leased space at Brown Field Airport from the City under a long-term, master lease agreement. Brown Field Aviation Ventures subleased the space to Bearden Aviation, Inc. (Bearden), and Bearden subleased it to Finch. Finch occupied the space with three airplane hangars. Lancair Corporation (Lancair) later purchased Bearden's leasehold.

In 2005 the City amended and restated the master lease. Section 6.9, subdivision (a) (Section 6.9(a)) of the lease provided: "Any and all improvements, trade fixtures, structures, and installations or additions to the premises now existing or constructed on the premises by LESSEE shall at lease expiration or termination be deemed to be part of the premises and shall become, at the CITY'S option, CITY'S property, free of all liens and claims except otherwise provided in this lease."

In 2010 in the context of an unrelated dispute between a third-party lessee and a third-party sublessee over the ownership of a hangar on the third-party

8 Cal.App.5th 1251

lessee's leasehold, the City's airport development coordinator stated in a letter that "the improvements on the leasehold are the property of the [third-party lessee] until the expiration or termination of the lease, at which point they become the property of the City." Three years later, Finch attempted to enter a new lease directly with the City and remove its hangars from Lancair's leasehold; however, Lancair claimed to own and control the hangars. Lancair based its position on the airport development director's letter.

Finch subsequently filed a complaint against Lancair alleging causes of action for quiet title, declaratory relief, intentional interference with economic advantage, conversion, and retaliatory eviction. Lancair responded by filing an unlawful detainer complaint. The court consolidated the two actions, and following a bench trial, issued a judgment in favor of Finch on Finch's quiet title and declaratory relief causes of action, against Finch on Finch's other causes of action, and in favor of Lancair on Lancair's unlawful detainer cause of action. Of relevance here, the court found, notwithstanding Section 6.9(a), Finch's hangers were removable trade fixtures and belonged to Finch.

Although both parties filed a motion for attorney fees, the court denied the motions, finding neither party prevailed sufficiently to warrant an attorney fee award. Under the doctrine of tort of another, Finch filed this action for slander of title to recoup the attorney fees and other expenditures it incurred as a result of the litigation with Lancair.

B

The City demurred to the complaint on the ground it failed to state a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) Among other arguments, the City asserted it is absolutely immune from liability under section 818.8. The City also asserted the allegations in the complaint did not support a cause of action for slander of title.² The court found the City was immune

214 Cal.Rptr.3d 631

from liability under section 818.8 and related section 822.2, and it sustained the City's demurrer without leave to amend.

III

DISCUSSION

The standards for reviewing a judgment of dismissal following the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend are well settled. " ‘ "We treat the

8 Cal.App.5th 1252

demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed." [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. [Citation.] When a demurrer is sustained, we determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. [Citation.] And when it is sustained without leave to amend, we decide whether there is a reasonable possibility...