Finch v. City of Indianapolis

• Decision Date: 10 August 2012
• Docket Number: No. 1:08–cv–00432–DML–RLY.,1:08–cv–00432–DML–RLY.
• Parties: Joseph W. FINCH, David E. Hensley, and Peter W. Mungovan, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, Barton R. Peterson Individually and in his official capacities, Monroe Gray, Jr. Individually and in his official capacities, Frank J. Anderson Individually and in his official capacities, Chief of Police Michael T. Spears, Individually and in his official capacities, Merit Board for the Metropolitan Law Enforcement Agency, Cordelia L. Burks, Mary Maxwell, and Joseph L. Smith, Jr. Individually and in their official capacities, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

886 F.Supp.2d 945

Joseph W. FINCH, David E. Hensley, and Peter W. Mungovan, Plaintiffs,

v.CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, Barton R. Peterson Individually and in his official capacities, Monroe Gray, Jr. Individually and in his official capacities, Frank J. Anderson Individually and in his official capacities, Chief of Police Michael T. Spears, Individually and in his official capacities, Merit Board for the Metropolitan Law Enforcement Agency, Cordelia L. Burks, Mary Maxwell, and Joseph L. Smith, Jr. Individually and in their official capacities, Defendants.

No. 1:08–cv–00432–DML–RLY.

United States District Court,

S.D. Indiana,

Indianapolis Division.

Aug. 10, 2012.

Donald G. Orzeske, Gary P. Goodin, John D. Meyer, Goodin Orzeske & Blackwell, P.C., Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiffs.

Alexander Phillip Will, Office of Corporation Counsel, Anthony W. Overholt, Frost Brown Todd LLC, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendants.

Order on Cross–Motions for Summary Judgment

DEBRA McVICKER LYNCH, United States Magistrate Judge.

Introduction

Plaintiffs Joseph W. Finch, David E. Hensley, and Peter W. Mungovan are police officers employed by the Indianapolis Police Department (“IPD”) and later, its successor, the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (“IMPD”). IMPD was created to consolidate the operations of IPD and the Marion County Sheriff's Department. In 2006, and just prior to the actual merging of substantially all the operations of IPD and the Sheriff's Department, IMPD promoted eleven police officers from lieutenant to the merit rank of captain. The plaintiffs contend that but for their Caucasian race, they would have been promoted. Their suit asserts claims for race discrimination under (1) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a), (2)42 U.S.C. § 1981, and (3) the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, enforced via 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They also complain that the City of Indianapolis unlawfully retaliated against them in violation of Title VII for their filing of charges of race discrimination with the EEOC and their pursuit of rights under Title VII. See42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a).

The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The defendants seek summary judgment on all claims, on various grounds. The plaintiffs seek summary judgment against the City of Indianapolis on their claims under Title VII and section 1983, and against all defendants sued in their individual capacities under section 1983.

Although the parties' briefing tends to commingle the legal theories on which the plaintiffs' claims are based, the court must untangle them for proper analysis and resolution. The plaintiffs have not responded to the defendants' arguments challenging the viability of certain claims against certain defendants, and the court can dispose of those as a preliminary matter. For the analysis and resolution of some claims, a truncated recitation of undisputed material facts suffices, while for others—especially the claims against which a qualified immunity defense has been raised by individual defendants sued in their personal capacities—more detailed explication is necessary and the court will add those facts where necessary.

Preliminary Matters

As noted above, some claims will be addressed only briefly—and without recitation of facts—because the plaintiffs have failed to advance evidentiary or legal support for them.

I. All defendants except the City are entitled to summary judgment on the Title VII claims.

The plaintiffs' complaint asserts Title VII claims—for race discrimination and for retaliation for complaining of race discrimination—against defendant City of Indianapolis. See Complaint, Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 33 and 34 (“Defendant City has discriminated against [plaintiffs] ... based upon their race ... in violation of ... Title VII ....”) and ¶¶ 36 and 37 (“Defendant City has discriminated against [plaintiffs] ... by retaliating against Plaintiffs because they filed charges of discrimination against the City with the EEOC and pursued their rights under Title VII ....”).

Only “employers” are liable under Title VII. Fairley v. Fermaint, 482 F.3d 897, 903 (7th Cir.2007). The City of Indianapolis does not dispute that because IPD and its successor IMPD are City instrumentalities,the City of Indianapolis is properly regarded as the plaintiffs' employer for Title VII purposes. But the plaintiffs' brief suggests that the City and the Merit Board for the Metropolitan Law Enforcement Agency (“Merit Board”) are responsible for the claimed violations of Title VII (Dkt. 160 at p. 18). Their brief offers no argument or authority that the Merit Board and its members can be held separately liable to the plaintiffs under Title VII. Because the plaintiffs made no showing that the Merit Board or its members acted as the plaintiffs' employer, the Merit Board and the Merit Board members in their official and individual capacities are entitled to judgment on any Title VII claims against them. See Thanongsinh v. Board of Education, 462 F.3d 762, 771 n. 7 (7th Cir.2006) (Title VII imposes liability against the “employer”; a claim against a person's office is no different from a claim against the entity and is properly dismissed as duplicative).¹

Accordingly, the court GRANTS summary judgment to all defendants except the City of Indianapolis on the plaintiffs' Title VII race discrimination and retaliation claims.

II. All defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiffs' section 1981 claims.

Race discrimination in the terms of one's employment is prohibited under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See, e.g., Humphries v. CBOCS West, Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 391 (7th Cir.2007). With respect to section 1981, the plaintiffs' complaint makes specific allegations regarding each individual defendant and charges all “defendants” with race discrimination in violation of section 1981. (Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 38–45). However, the plaintiffs have completely ignored the defendants' summary judgment arguments addressed to the section 1981 claims. Though the plaintiffs identified as an issue for the court “Are Defendants entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' cause of action asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1981?” (Dkt. 160, at p. viii), their briefs never address this claim. If there are bases upon which the plaintiffs' section 1981 claim could survive summary judgment notwithstanding the defendants' arguments, it was the plaintiffs' responsibility to assert them. See Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386, 124 S.Ct. 786, 157 L.Ed.2d 778 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Our adversary system is designed around the premise that the parties know what is best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and arguments entitling them to relief.”). The plaintiffs' failure to oppose the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the section 1981 claim results in judgment for the defendants on this claim. See Mink v. Barth Electric Co., 685 F.Supp.2d 914, 935 (S.D.Ind.2010) (party waived argument that opposing party not entitled to summary judgment on claim when party failed to respond to the opposing party's contentions and otherwise failed to address the merits of her own claim).

Accordingly, the court GRANTS summary judgment to all defendants on the plaintiffs' section 1981 claims.

III. All defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claim that they are liable under section 1983 for violation of Title VII.

The plaintiffs also claim that all the defendants, acting under color of law, deprivedthem of their rights under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They seek redress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a statute that does not itself create substantive rights but provides “a means for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere,” Padula v. Leimbach, 656 F.3d 595, 600 (7th Cir.2011) (internal quotation omitted), such as the constitutional right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Those claims will be addressed in the Analysis section of this Order.

The complaint also asserts, however, that plaintiffs' Title VII rights are redressable under section 1983 (Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 49, 51), but their briefing does not address how or why the Title VII claims should be evaluated in the context of section 1983. The court is not aware of any basis for changing or expanding Title VII duties, rights, or remedies by recognition of a claim under section 1983. The court will evaluate the plaintiffs' Title VII claims only under Title VII—and only against the City of Indianapolis as the employer—and not with reference to section 1983. See Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle County, 243 F.3d 379, 381 (7th Cir.2001) (Title VII claim “must proceed against the employer as an entity rather than against a natural person”); Alexander v. Chicago Park District, 773 F.2d 850, 855 (7th Cir.1985) (Title VII claim cannot be brought under section 1983); Huebschen v. Department of Health and Social Servs., 716 F.2d 1167, 1170 (7th Cir.1983) (plaintiff cannot bring suit under section 1983 based on Title VII against a defendant who cannot be sued directly under Title VII).

Accordingly, the court GRANTS summary judgment to all defendants on the plaintiffs' claim that the defendants are liable under section 1983 for violations of Title VII.

IV. The Merit Board and individuals sued in their official capacities are entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiffs' equal protection claims.

To the extent the plaintiffs' section 1983 equal protection claims are brought against the individual defendants in their official capacities or against the Merit Board, those claims are duplicative or redundant of the claim against the City and are dismissed on that basis. See Campbell v. Town of Austin, 2004 WL 256343 at *4 (S.D.Ind. Feb. 10, 2004) (citing Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (official capacity claim is simply another way to plead an action against the entity for which the officer is...