Finch v. Holladay-Tyler Printing, Inc.
Decision Date | 01 September 1990 |
Docket Number | HOLLADAY-TYLER,No. 31,31 |
Citation | 322 Md. 197,586 A.2d 1275 |
Parties | , 124 Lab.Cas. P 57,219, 6 IER Cases 823 Lorenzer J.D. FINCH, Jr., et al., v.PRINTING, INC. , |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Paul Alan Levy (Alan Morrison, Washington, D.C., Ralph Edward Hall, Jr., Rockville), on brief, for petitioners.
Stephen D. Shawe (Patrick M. Pilachowski, Alisa H. Reff, Shawe & Rosenthal, Baltimore), on brief, for respondents.
Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE and CHASANOW, JJ.
Petitioner Lorenzer J.D. Finch, Jr., (Finch) was employed by Respondent Holladay-Tyler Printing, Inc. (Employer). In November 1986, Finch suffered a workplace injury for which he filed a claim under the Maryland Workmen's Compensation Act, Maryland Code (1957, 1985 Repl.Vol. & 1990 Cum.Supp.), Article 101. Finch had previously filed workers' compensation claims in 1977, 1981 and 1984. When Finch returned to work on March 30, 1987, after a four-month absence, his name was on a list of workers slated for layoff. Finch alleges that he was the most senior worker in the "general worker" classification and the third most senior of all plant employees on the list. His contention is that Employer went just high enough on the seniority list to ensure that Finch would be included in the layoff and that Employer used the layoff procedure as a pretext for discharging him in retaliation for his having filed workers' compensation claims. Finch also claims that, instead of being recalled from layoff, he received a telephone call offering him a temporary position but warning him that Employer did not want him back and otherwise discouraging him from returning to work. Employer claims, to the contrary, that Finch was recalled and "disclaimed interest in returning." In any event, Finch never returned to work. He later learned that less senior workers had escaped the layoff and/or been recalled and that the company had advertised for applicants in his job classification. Although Finch was covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) negotiated with Employer by his union, he did not initiate grievance procedures pursuant to that contract.
Employer moved for summary judgment based on its contention that Finch had not first exhausted his remedies under the CBA, which included a provision that the sole and exclusive method of resolving disputes was the grievance procedure outlined therein. The circuit court entered summary judgment against Finch based on his failure to exhaust remedies contained in the collective bargaining agreement. We granted certiorari on Finch's petition before the case was argued in the Court of Special Appeals.
Maryland Rule 2-501(e) provides, "The court shall enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if ... there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and ... the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." It is undisputed that Finch was covered under a CBA which provided for final and binding arbitration of disputes arising under the agreement. It is likewise undisputed that Finch did not seek adjustment of this matter under the terms of that agreement. The issue confronting this Court is purely a question of law: whether a union employee who charges an employer with retaliatory discharge for filing workers' compensation claims must first exhaust grievance procedures under a CBA before pursuing a state tort action in court.
The cause of action for retaliatory or abusive discharge was first recognized in Maryland in Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981), where, in response to a certified question, we declared, "Maryland does recognize a cause of action for abusive discharge by an employer of an at will employee when the motivation for the discharge contravenes some clear mandate of public policy...." Id. at 47, 432 A.2d at 473. Adler claimed that he was discharged to prevent him from reporting improprieties and illegal activities in his division to company headquarters. Id. at 34, 432 A.2d at 466. We found, however, that these allegations did not provide "a sufficient factual predicate for determining whether any declared mandate of public policy was violated." Id. at 46, 432 A.2d at 472.
Id. at 50, 537 A.2d at 1175. In addition, Ewing extended the cause of action for abusive discharge to cover "employees who serve under contract as well as those who serve at will." Id. at 49, 537 A.2d at 1175.
These cases clearly demonstrate that, under Maryland law, an employer may not discharge an employee solely in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim. Employer argues that Finch was not discharged "solely" for filing a workers' compensation claim because he was properly laid off. It maintains that Finch must follow the grievance procedures outlined in the CBA as a precondition to maintaining his tort action. Employer also implies that, regardless of whether the layoff was structured for the sole purpose of retaliating against Finch, it is vindicated if it was properly executed under the CBA. It ignores the possibility that, in the circumstances at bar, the outcome of any grievance process may not govern the issues in his abusive discharge claim.
Exhaustion of contractual remedies is a formal prerequisite of a section 301(a) action under the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988), which governs suits for violation of collective bargaining agreements. Childers v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 881 F.2d 1259, 1265 n. 3 (4th Cir.1989) (citing Clayton v. International Union, Etc., 451 U.S. 679, 681, 101 S.Ct. 2088, 2091, 68 L.Ed.2d 538, 543-44 (1981)). The question arises: Do the strictures of federal preemption require that we impose an exhaustion requirement in the context of a state tort action for abusive discharge?
This Court discussed the impact of federal preemption in an action for retaliatory discharge for filing workers' compensation claims in 1988 in Ewing, where the employee claimed that he was discharged solely for filing a workers' compensation claim. The terms of employment were fixed by a CBA which provided that employees shall not be discharged "without just cause." 312 Md. at 47 n. 1, 537 A.2d at 1174 n. 1. Ewing first sought arbitration pursuant to the CBA. The employer contended that Ewing was discharged with good cause, assigning several reasons including his poor attendance record and his physical inability to do the work. Id. The arbitrator found that Employer had just cause to terminate Ewing and denied the grievance. Id. at 48, 537 A.2d at 1174. Following that decision, Ewing filed an abusive discharge claim contending that his discharge was in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim. Id.
Id. at 57, 537 A.2d at 1179. Based on this reasoning, Ewing held that the finding by the arbitrator that Ewing's discharge was for "just cause" precluded a subsequent state court finding that the discharge was solely in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim. Id. at 56, 537 A.2d at 1178. In reaching this decision, we recognized that the federal circuits had reached "varying results" on the issue and noted that the United States Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Lingle...
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...we impose an exhaustion requirement in the context of a state tort action for abusive discharge?" See Finch v. Holladay-Tyler Printing, Inc., 322 Md. 197, 586 A.2d 1275, 1278 (1991). In Finch, the court interpreted Lingle, supra, to mean that an employee need not resort to arbitration "when......