Finch v. Matthews

• Decision Date: 18 July 1968
• Docket Number: No. 39276
• Citation: Finch v. Matthews, 74 Wn.2d 161, 443 P.2d 833 (Wash. 1968)
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: David R. FINCH and Dorothy H. Finch, his wife, Respondents, v. John G. MATTHEWS, Jr., Rita M. Matthews, Irene M. Matthews, Defendants, City of Seattle, Appellant.

Page 161

74 Wn.2d 161

443 P.2d 833

David R. FINCH and Dorothy H. Finch, his wife, Respondents, v. John G. MATTHEWS, Jr., Rita M. Matthews, Irene M. Matthews Defendants, City of Seattle, Appellant.

No. 39276.

Supreme Court of Washington, Department 2.

July 18, 1968.

A. L. Newbould, Corp. Counsel, Seattle, E. Neal King, Asst. Corp. Counsel, for appellant.

Malcolm S. McLeod, Seattle, for respondents.

WARD, Judge. ^*

This is an appeal by the defendant, city of Seattle, from a decree quieting the plaintiffs' (respondents') title to a tract of real estate presently lying within the boundaries of the city. This tract of land was placed on the tax rolls by King County in 1935. The taxes were not paid and the county foreclosed its tax lien, purchased the property at the foreclosure sale in satisfaction of its lien and received a deed from the county treasurer, conveying the property to it in October 1951. On November 6, 1952, the county entered into a realestate contract, pursuant to RCW 84.64.270, by which it agreed to sell the property to the plaintiffs for a purchase price of $1,005. The purchase price was paid by the plaintiffs, and on November 1, 1962, they received the county treasurer's deed conveying the property to them.

The area where this land lies was annexed by the city of Seattle on March 1, 1953. It is the contention of the city that all of the above-recited acts, done by King County, were ultra vires and void, and hence, the plaintiffs are without title to the land purchased from the county. The city bases its claim to the property upon the contention that the plaintiffs' property was dedicated 'to the use of the public forever,' as a part of a street on May 6, 1906, when the plat of Lake Shore View Addition to the city of Seattle was recorded in vol. 13 of plats, p. 15, records of King County, by Seaboard Security Company, and that it has at all times since remained, and is now, a street. The city of Seattle claims it acquired this street on extension of the corporate boundaries on March 1, 1953. The trial court held otherwise, and this appeal followed.

The evidence reveals an unusual factual pattern with respect to the title to this tract of land. At the time Seaboard Security Company recorded its plat, it owned Government Lot 2, lying north of the east and west center line of Section 34, Township 26, North Range 4 East, W.M. in King County. John G. Matthews and wife owned Government Lot 3, adjoining, lying south of this east-west center line. Seaboard Security Company, in platting its property, intended to leave a highway or street (which appeared from the plat to be about 30 feet wide, although its width was not stated on the plat), running east and west between the southernmost platted lots and the center line of the section. This 30-foot strip of land is designated as Indianapolis Street on the recorded plat. A resurvey in 1914 disclosed that the east-west center line of section 34, was approximately 60 feet south of where Seaboard Security Company thought it was when it platted Lake Shore View Addition, making it 60 feet south of its location as shown on the recorded plat. As a result of this error, there was left a tract of land running east and west between the platted lots of the addition and the center line of the section, 90 feet in width, instead of 30 feet in width, as intended by the platters.

Subsequently, an action was brought by John G. Matthews, who sought removal of fences and obstructions from Indianapolis Street. I. Curtiss Parker intervened in the action and claimed title to the 60-foot strip of land lying between Indianapolis Street, as platted, and the east-west center line of section 34. On appeal to this court, in Matthews v. Parker, 163 Wash. 10, 16, 299 P. 354, 356 (1931), we held 'that Indianapolis street necessarily occupies the full width of the land between the south line of the south row of lots and blocks and the east and west center line of the section which is established by the center of the section as a monument.' The effect of this decision was to make Indianapolis Street 90 feet wide, instead of 30 feet wide as it appeared on the plat.

In 1928 King County made plans to open a street or highway between the property owned by Mr. Matthews and the platted area, but the county engineer, in preparing his plans for the highway, which is now designated as N.E. 95th Street, found that a deep ravine and creek traversed the northerly part of the 90-foot strip of land lying north of the relocated center line of section 34, and that it was not feasible to construct the highway on this property. The county, therefore, sought to acquire a road right-of-way, which would be 60 feet in width, with the east-west center line of section 34, as the center line of the relocated highway. At that time, Mr. Matthews owned the south 30 feet of the proposed right-of-way as a part of Government Lot 3 and claimed to own the 60-foot strip of land north of the center line of the proposed highway. The county was able to acquire the desired road right-of-way from Mr. Matthews by means of an exchange agreement, which is set out in Resolution No. 2791, adopted by the King County Commissioners on March 12, 1928. ¹

The deed from Matthews to King County was not introduced in evidence, but it may be assumed that such deed was delivered because King County constructed the highway now designated N.E. 95th Street, with the center line of the highway along the relocated east-west center line of section 34. The present street is 60 feet wide with 30 feet on each side of the center line of the section.

Resolution 2791 must be construed in accordance with Mr. Matthews' claim of ownership at the time the exchange agreement was consummated. It was the intention of King County by the terms of Resolution No. 2791 to grant the original 30-foot strip of land, platted as Indianapolis Street, to Mr. Matthews, and it was Mr. Matthews' intention to convey to the county a 60-foot strip of land for road purposes being 30 feet on either side of the relocated center line of section 34.

This intention of the parties is evidenced by the construction of the highway at the present location of N.E.95th Street, and by the fact that the county placed on its tax rolls and later foreclosed its tax lien against the property now claimed by the plaintiffs. The tract was described in the foreclosure proceedings and on the resale to plaintiffs as: 'Indianapolis St. and unplatted Strip adjoining running to center 46th Avenue N.E., less County Road, Block 5, Lake Shore View Addition to city of Seattle.' This property is more particularly described in the trial court's decree quieting title. ² This describes a strip of land, approximately 60 feet wide, lying between the north marginal line of present N.E.95th Street, and the southernmost lots of a part of Lake Shore View Addition.

Jurisdiction to grant relief by a decree quieting a claimant's title to land is inherent in a court which exercises equity powers. 44 Am.Jur. Quieting Title § 3 (1942). This state is aligned with those jurisdictions which permit one who has only an equitable title to land to maintain an action to quiet title, even though out of possession. Brodsky v. Nelson, 57 Wash. 671, 107 P. 840 (1910); Carlson v. Curren, 48 Wash. 249, 93 P. 315 (1908); Brown v. Baldwin, 46 Wash. 106, 89 P. 483 (1907); RCW 7.28.010. The superior title whether legal or equitable must prevail. Rue v. Oregon & Washington R.R. Co., 109 Wash. 436, 186 P. 1074 (1920); RCW 7.28.120. The plaintiffs' claim, therefore, should not be dismissed as the city claims because King County purported to convey the property to Matthews by means of a resolution rather than a deed, nor should it be dismissed because of any indefiniteness in the description of the land in the tax foreclosure proceedings or in the conveyance by King County to the plaintiffs.

If the plaintiffs had title prior to the decree entered by the trial court, their title was equitable not legal. We examine therefore the equities upon which the plaintiffs rely, and we find that the record discloses the following matters which appeal to the conscience of the court.

The plaintiffs purchased subject to a local improvement assessment in the sum of $102.02, which they have paid. They have paid real-estate taxes on the property since they purchased it in 1952, including that portion of the taxes assessed by the city of Seattle. Plaintiffs were engaged in filling the city of Seattle and claim to have expended approximately $6,800 in the project. This claim was not controverted nor questioned by the city. They paid to King County the purchase price of $1,005 and the accruing interest over a period of ten years. The city has never tendered to the plaintiffs any sum whatsoever as reimbursement for any of the sums so expended by them.

Neither can we ignore the further equitable considerations. The platters of Lake Shore View Addition dedicated to the public for a street, a tract of land which was traversed by a ravine, and was therefore, as the county commissioners declared, not 'feasible for highway purposes.' The county wisely decided to forever abandon the land for street purposes, and was able to exchange such property under its agreement with Mr. Matthews, for a tract of land which served the public purposes. Now, after the successors in title to Mr. Matthews have expended several thousand dollars converting this tract into a valuable piece of property, the city of Seattle, as successor to King County's rights by reason of the extension of the boundaries of the city, seeks to take the property from the present owners. The city took no steps to assert its claimed interest until the filling operations were substantially completed, and the plaintiffs had expended several thousand dollars in the improvement. On oral argument, the city was unable to state that it had any present use for the property.

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