Finch v. Payne

• Decision Date: 18 December 2020
• Docket Number: No. 19-2369,19-2369
• Citation: 983 F.3d 973
• Parties: Elliott FINCH, Jr., Plaintiff - Appellee v. Dexter PAYNE, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, Defendant - Appellant
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

983 F.3d 973

Elliott FINCH, Jr., Plaintiff - Appellee

v.Dexter PAYNE, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, Defendant - Appellant

No. 19-2369

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: September 22, 2020

Filed: December 18, 2020

Elliott Finch, Jr., Pro Se.

David L. Eanes, Jr., ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, Little Rock, AR, for Defendant - Appellant.

Before LOKEN, SHEPHERD, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

A Pulaski County, Arkansas, jury convicted Elliot Harold Finch, Jr. of aggravated residential burglary, aggravated assault on a family or household member, and first-degree terroristic threatening. Finch was subject to a firearm enhancement and sentenced as a habitual offender, resulting in a sentence of life imprisonment plus 15 years in the Arkansas Department of Corrections and a $10,000 fine. Finch appealed his conviction to the Arkansas Supreme Court, alleging that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation and that he was prejudiced by juror misconduct. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. Finch challenged his conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, raising the same arguments as in state court. The district court¹ granted Finch's petition based on his Sixth Amendment claim. The State of Arkansas (the State) now appeals, arguing that the district court failed to give proper deference to the Arkansas Supreme Court's factual determinations. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

I.

On August 22, 2013, Finch entered his ex-girlfriend's house by breaking through a window. His ex-girlfriend was home with her two children and was taking a shower. Finch met her at gunpoint as she exited the shower and threatened to kill her, her children, and himself. The ex-girlfriend attempted to calm Finch down, eventually resorting to sexual intercourse with him to alleviate the immediate threat of violence. Finch did not leave the home after having sex with the ex-girlfriend. He stayed the night, sleeping in the ex-girlfriend's bed with her, but positioning himself between her and the door so she could not leave without his knowledge. The next morning, Finch allowed the ex-girlfriend to leave for work. She took her nine-year-old daughter with her but was unable to wake up her teenage son, who was on medication. After leaving, the ex-girlfriend called the police, and Finch was subsequently arrested. Finch was charged with kidnapping, aggravated residential burglary, possession of firearms by certain persons, aggravated assault on a family or household member, and first-degree terroristic threatening.

Finch received court appointed counsel, and the matter proceeded to trial. At some point during the pretrial proceedings, Finch became frustrated with his court-appointed counsel. At a September 22, 2015 omnibus hearing, Finch requested to speak and informed the court that he wanted new counsel. R. Doc. 7-2, at 328. The trial judge denied the request. R. Doc. 7-2, at 328. At an October 19, 2015 hearing, Finch stated: "I want to represent myself then"; "I want to represent myself."; "I want to represent myself, Your Honor. And that's all I'm telling you"; and "I don't want no attorney." R. Doc. 7-3, at 10-12. The trial judge again dismissed the request on the basis that Finch had not properly cooperated with his Act 3 mental evaluation.² R. Doc. 7-3, at 15.

Thereafter, Finch filed a handwritten motion to waive counsel and proceed pro se, citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). R. Doc. 7-2, at 136. On March 10, 2016, the court conducted a hearing to discuss Finch's second Act 3 evaluation report, where Finch's counsel brought the pending motion to the court's attention. R. Doc. 7-3, at 40. The court and the prosecution acknowledged Finch's request, and the court engaged Finch in a colloquy regarding his knowledge of the judicial system. See R. Doc. 7-3, at 40-51. While Finch wished to proceed pro se, he inquired about the availability of "standby counsel." R. Doc. 7-3, at 50. Ultimately, the trial judge denied the motion "based on the seriousness of the offenses and the likelihood of [Finch] getting some serious time." R. Doc. 7-3, at 51. The case proceeded to trial with Finch's court-appointed attorney. The jury convicted Finch of aggravated residential robbery, aggravated assault on a family or household member, and first-degree terroristic threatening and was unable to reach a verdict on kidnapping, resulting in a mistrial on that charge.³ Finch received an aggregate sentence of life imprisonment plus 15 years and a $10,000 fine.

Finch appealed his conviction to the Arkansas Supreme Court, arguing that he had been denied his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation and that he had been prejudiced by juror misconduct. The Arkansas Supreme Court found that the trial court's inquiry "included irrelevant concerns, such as [Finch]’s level of education and technical legal knowledge, and the court's stated basis for denying the request ... was invalid." Finch v. State, 2018 Ark. 111, 542 S.W.3d 143, 145 (2018). The Arkansas Supreme Court nonetheless held, under its independent review, that Finch's request was not unequivocal and that "the trial court could have concluded that [Finch] had ‘engaged in conduct that would prevent the fair and orderly exposition of the issues.’ " Id. Based on these holdings, the Arkansas Supreme Court determined that Finch had not invoked his right to defend himself pro se. The court additionally found that Finch "could not show a reasonable possibility of prejudice" to succeed on his juror misconduct claim and affirmed his conviction. Id. at 149.

Finch then sought a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in federal court. Finch raised the same two issues as in state court: (1) that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation; and (2) that he was prejudiced by juror misconduct. In considering Finch's Sixth Amendment claim, the magistrate judge thoroughly reviewed and documented the state court proceedings. The magistrate judge determined that the Arkansas Supreme Court's legal framework under Faretta was reasonable in deciding whether Finch had invoked his right to waive counsel, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The magistrate judge went on to discuss the Arkansas Supreme Court's factual determinations, or lack thereof, under subsection (d)(2) in great detail. The magistrate judge determined that the Arkansas Supreme Court made three specific factual findings: (1) the trial court's questions to Finch were irrelevant; (2) Finch's requests to represent himself were equivocal; and (3) Finch was disruptive, preventing a fair and orderly exposition of the issues. The magistrate judge then considered whether Finch overcame the state court's presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) by clear and convincing evidence. The magistrate judge agreed with the determination that the trial court's questions of Finch were irrelevant, but she found that Finch had overcome the presumption of correctness of the latter two findings and that the Arkansas Supreme Court's determinations were unreasonable. The magistrate judge determined that Finch had unequivocally invoked his right to self-representation on multiple occasions, including in a written motion. The magistrate judge further found that the record does not reflect that Finch's behavior prevented "a fair and orderly exposition of the issues," especially in light of the more extreme misbehavior documented in the case law. Finally, the magistrate judge summarily found Finch's second claim to be without merit because the state court determined that Finch was not prejudiced by the juror misconduct and such determination was entitled to deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

The district court approved and adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation and granted Finch's habeas petition, directing the State to either release Finch or provide him with a new trial within 120 days of the order. The State appealed the district court's findings. Only Finch's Sixth Amendment claim is before this Court on appeal.

II.

"On appeal from a district court's grant of a habeas petition, we review the district court's findings of fact for clear error, and its conclusions of law de novo." Franklin v. Hawley, 879 F.3d 307, 311 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Escobedo v. Lund, 760 F.3d 863, 868 (8th Cir. 2014) ). However, because Finch's petition is based on a state court adjudication, we are further restricted by the limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Gray v. Norman, 739 F.3d 1113, 1116 (8th Cir. 2014). Section 2254 states, in part:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

(e)(1) In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) - (e)(1).

Section 2254(d)(1) clearly refers to situations where a "state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases" or where it "confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a...