Findlay v. Lendermon
| Decision Date | 28 November 2012 |
| Docket Number | CAUSE NO.: 4:10-CV-98-TLS |
| Parties | JASON FINDLAY, Plaintiff, v. JON LENDERMON, in his individual capacity as a Deputy Sheriff for the Tippecanoe County Sheriff's Office, and JASON HUBER, in his individual capacity as Lieutenant for the Tippecanoe County Sheriff's Office, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 21] filed by the Defendants on March 27, 2012, and a Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [ECF No. 31] filed by the Plaintiff on May 21, 2012.
On December 8, 2010, the Plaintiff, Jason Findlay, filed a Complaint [ECF No. 1] against Defendant Jon Lendermon in his individual capacity as Deputy Sheriff of the Tippecanoe County Sheriff's Office, raising claims for excessive force, false arrest, and wrongful seizure, all in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On January 25, 2011, Defendant Lendermon filed an Answer [ECF No. 8]. On August 17, 2011, the Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint [ECF No. 14] against Defendant Lendermon as before, and against Defendant Jason Huber in his individual capacity asLieutenant for the Tippecanoe County Sheriff's Office, raising claims for excessive force (Count I) and false arrest (Count II) against Defendant Lendermon, and a claim for wrongful seizure (Count III) against Defendants Lendermon and Huber. The Defendants filed an Answer [ECF No. 16] to the Amended Complaint on September 22, 2011.
On March 27, 2012, the Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 21] designating various exhibits, along with a Memorandum of Law in Support [ECF No. 22]. On May 21, after the Court granted the Plaintiff's requests for an extension of time in which to file a response to the Defendants' Motion, the Plaintiff filed a Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [ECF No. 31] along with a Designation of Evidence [ECF No. 34] and a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiff's Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [ECF No. 32], which was replaced by an Amended Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiff's Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [ECF No. 36-1] after the Court granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Amended Plaintiff's Memorandum [ECF No. 36]. The Defendants filed a Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 38] on June 7, 2012, and the Plaintiff, after the Court granted his requests for an extension of time in which to file a reply, filed a Reply Brief in Support of his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [ECF No. 43] on June 29. The Motions for Summary Judgment are fully briefed and ripe for this Court's ruling.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the facts supported by materials in the record show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The motion should be granted so long as no rational fact finder could return a verdict in favor of the party opposing the motion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A court's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence, to judge the credibility of witnesses, or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50; Doe v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 1994). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of proving there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); see also N.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(a) (). In response, the nonmoving party cannot rest on bare pleadings alone but must use the evidentiary tools listed in Rule 56 to designate specific material facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Insolia v. Philip Morris Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 598 (7th Cir. 2000); N.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(b) (directing that a response in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must include "a section labeled 'Statement of
Genuine Disputes' that identifies the material facts that the party contends are genuinely disputed so as to make a trial necessary"). According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56:
Although a bare contention that an issue of fact exists is insufficient to create a factual dispute, the court must construe all facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, view all reasonable inferences in that party's favor, see Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 491-92 (7th Cir. 2000), and avoid "the temptation to decide which party's version of the facts is more likely true," Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003) (). A material fact must be outcome determinative under the governing law. Insolia, 216 F.3d at 598-99. "Irrelevant or unnecessary facts do not deter summary judgment, even when in dispute." Harney v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 526 F.3d 1099, 1104 (7th Cir. 2008).
Summary judgment is the "put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of the events." Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted).
On September 25, 2009, the Plaintiff contacted the Tippecanoe County Sheriff's Department and requested that a law enforcement officer come to collect a field camera which the Plaintiff alleges had been abandoned on property belonging to his mother. The Plaintiff'sgrandmother, Elizabeth Howey, resided on the property in question. Defendant Lendermon, a Deputy Sheriff, traveled to the property to investigate.
This was not the first time Defendant Lendermon had heard about the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff's uncle, Clark Howey, lived adjacent to the property, and had previously complained that the Plaintiff was trespassing on his property and was responsible for acts of vandalism. Further, Clark Howey's son-in-law, Aaron Lorton, a City of Lafayette Police Officer, had previously reported violence and threats by the Plaintiff against members of his family. It is undisputed that prior to September 25, 2009, Defendant Lendermon had received emails from Lorton complaining about threats, violent behavior, trespassing, and vandalism by the Plaintiff. (See Brown Aff. ¶ 4 & Exs. 1-4, ECF No. 21-61 ; Lendermon Dep. 4:21-6:6, June 16, 2010.) Lorton had specifically requested additional Sheriff's Department patrols near his residence because he saw the Plaintiff as a threat and feared for the safety of his family.
As he traveled to the property, Defendant Lendermon spoke to Lorton, who advised him that the field camera found by the Plaintiff belonged to Lorton. Upon arrival at the property, Defendant Lendermon spoke to Clark Howey who informed Defendant Lendermon that he and Lorton had placed Lorton's field camera on his property to ascertain who had been trespassing. Clark Howey suspected the Plaintiff of the trespassing.
The Plaintiff arrived at the property shortly thereafter, and went immediately into thehouse where his grandmother, Elizabeth Howey, resided. He emerged with a video camera and recorded his subsequent conversation with Defendant Lendermon. In that conversation, the Plaintiff showed Defendant Lendermon where he had recovered the field camera, told Defendant Lendermon his understanding of the property lines, and stated that he had been previously warned by his uncle, Clark Howey, against trespassing on his property. It is undisputed that the video recording made by the Plaintiff contains all of these factual admissions by the Plaintiff. At this point, the Plaintiff returned to his grandmother's house, and Defendant Lendermon went to his car. In the car, Defendant Lendermon consulted by telephone with Defendant Huber and also the Sheriff's Department dispatch officer, who advised Defendant Lendermon that, according to the county's GIS website, the spot where the field camera had been recovered was indeed on Clark Howey's side of the property line. Defendant Lendermon and Defendant Huber therefore agreed that Defendant Lendermon should confiscate as evidence the video camera on which the Plaintiff had just recorded his statements about where he recovered the field camera and his statements about previous warnings against trespassing given to him by Clark Howey.
Defendant Lendermon went to the house on the property to recover the video camera. Elizabeth Howey—the homeowner who was 87 years old at the time—and the Plaintiff invited Defendant Lendermon into the house. Defendant Lendermon joined the Plaintiff and Elizabeth Howey in a kitchen which contained a kitchen table and a washing machine. The video camera was sitting on the kitchen table and was still recording. When Defendant Lendermon informed the Plaintiff that...
To continue reading
Request your trial