Findling v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. (In re Malloy)
| Decision Date | 13 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | 358006,358021 |
| Parties | In re Guardianship OF MARY ANN MALLOY. v. AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant. DARREN FINDLING, Coguardian of MARY ANN MALLOY, a legally protected person, and DARREN FINDLING LAW FIRM, PLC, Plaintiffs-Appellees, and PATRICK MALLOY, Coguardian of MARY ANN MALLOY, a legally protected person, and KATHREN MALLOY, [1] Plaintiffs, In re Guardianship of DANA JENKINS. DARREN FINDLING, Guardian of DANA JENKINS, a legally incapacitated person, and DARREN FINDLING LAW FIRM, PLC, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Oakland Probate Court LC No. 2020-393904-CZ, 2020-393903-CZ
Before: SWARTZLE, P.J., and CAVANAGH and REDFORD, JJ.
In the cases before the Court, in the context of two persons who are the subject of guardianships necessitated by two different motor vehicle accidents, we address the powers and duties of a guardian under MCL 700.5314, and the distinction between the delegation of a duty and a power of a guardian under MCL 700.5103 and MCL 700.5106.
The matters arise out of separate motor vehicle accidents after which guardianships were established for the two wards. This Court ordered the consolidation of these two appeals. In re Guardianship of Mary Ann Malloy, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered July 5, 2022 (Docket Nos 358006 and 358021). In Docket No. 358006, defendant appeals by leave granted[2] the probate court's order granting the Malloy plaintiffs'[3] motion for partial summary disposition and denying defendant's countermotion for summary disposition. In Docket No. 358021, defendant appeals by leave granted[4] the probate court's order granting the Jenkins plaintiffs'[5] motion for partial summary disposition and denying defendant's countermotion for summary disposition.
Because we conclude that the trial court correctly determined that many of the duties performed on behalf of the wards were able to be delegated by the court-appointed guardian, we affirm in part. Because there is a factual question as to whether or not actions taken on April 23, 2019 and April 24, 2019, on behalf of both wards were delegable by the court-appointed guardian, we reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On August 10, 1979, Malloy suffered serious injuries including a traumatic brain injury from a motor vehicle accident. She is a legally incapacitated individual. She lived with her mother, who served as her coguardian and caregiver for approximately 40 years after the 1979 accident, though Malloy moved to a group home for 24-hour care and supervision after her mother sustained a fall. Plaintiff, Patrick, and Kathren, were later named Malloy's coguardians. The court appointed plaintiff, an attorney and professional fiduciary, as Malloy's legal guardian. Defendant is Malloy's no-fault insurer. Plaintiff provided legal and guardianship services for Malloy through plaintiff firm. Malloy's estate incurred fees and costs totaling $8,040.45 for services provided by her coguardians and plaintiff firm. Defendant refused to pay for the legal and guardianship services for Malloy provided by plaintiff and plaintiff firm. In six letters sent to plaintiff between August 13, 2019 and July 23, 2020, defendant indicated that it would "not consider reimbursement without additional information" because it did "not appear Ms. Malloy's guardian performed the guardianship services being claimed."
The Malloy plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendant in Oakland Probate Court, requesting that defendant pay Malloy's coguardians or plaintiff firm fees and costs associated with the care, recovery, and rehabilitation of Malloy in the amount of $8,040.45 plus interest, attorney fees, and costs. The Malloy plaintiffs alleged that defendant was "responsible for payment of fiduciary and attorney fees and costs incurred which are allowable expenses and that are reasonably necessary" for Malloy's care, recovery, or rehabilitation pursuant to MCL 500.3107. Further, the Malloy plaintiffs asserted that defendant refused to pay the proper no-fault benefits to the estate of Malloy, Malloy's coguardians, and plaintiff firm. Defendant filed an answer and asserted in its affirmative defenses that the "services allegedly provided by [the Malloy] Plaintiffs were not lawfully rendered."
The Malloy plaintiffs moved for partial summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(9) and (C)(10), arguing that fees and costs for a ward's guardianship "are allowable expenses compensable by the No-Fault Insurance Carrier under the no[-]fault act no matter who provides them." Further, the Malloy plaintiffs asserted that a guardian "may employ an attorney, perform work themselves, and/or employee [sic] others, and all of those services are compensable under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., if they are for the care, recovery and rehabilitation of the ward." Defendant responded to the Malloy plaintiffs' motion for partial summary disposition and filed a countermotion for partial summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(2). Defendant argued that no authority-including MCL 700.5103 or MCL 700.5106-supported the Malloy plaintiffs' claim that plaintiff could delegate his guardianship duties to employees at his firm. The probate court granted the Malloy plaintiffs' motion for partial summary disposition, reasoning that plaintiff did not violate MCL 700.5103 because he delegated only duties and not his guardianship powers, and he remained responsible for the delegated duties.[6]
On November 20, 2013, Jenkins suffered a traumatic brain injury as a pedestrian in a motor vehicle accident. The court appointed plaintiff, an attorney and professional fiduciary, as Jenkins's legal guardian because Jenkins is a legally incapacitated individual. Defendant is the no-fault insurer for Jenkins. Plaintiff and plaintiff firm provided legal and guardianship services to Jenkins, and Jenkins's estate incurred fees and costs in the amount of $28,853.59 between March 27, 2019 and February 1, 2020. Defendant refused to pay for services provided by plaintiff and plaintiff firm on behalf of Jenkins. In six letters sent to plaintiff between August 16, 2019 and June 17, 2020, defendant indicated that it would "not consider reimbursement" for "[g]uardian services completed by someone other than" plaintiff.
The Jenkins plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendant in Oakland Probate Court, requesting that defendant pay plaintiff or plaintiff firm fees and costs associated with the care, recovery, and rehabilitation of Jenkins. The Jenkins plaintiffs alleged that defendant was "responsible for payment of fiduciary and attorney fees and costs incurred which are allowable expenses and that are reasonably necessary" for Jenkins's care, recovery, or rehabilitation pursuant to MCL 500.3107. Further, the Jenkins plaintiffs asserted that defendant had refused to pay the proper no-fault benefits to Jenkins's estate, plaintiff, and plaintiff firm. Defendant answered the Jenkins plaintiffs' complaint. Defendant asserted that the "services allegedly provided by [the Jenkins] Plaintiffs were not lawfully rendered." The Jenkins plaintiffs moved for partial summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(9) and (C)(10), making virtually identical arguments as those made by the Malloy plaintiffs in their motion for partial summary disposition. Defendant responded to the Jenkins plaintiffs' motion for partial summary disposition and filed a countermotion for partial summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(2) similar to the response and countermotion filed by defendant in Docket No. 358006. The probate court heard the Jenkins plaintiffs' motion along with the Malloy plaintiffs' motion, and the court granted both motions in favor of the Malloy plaintiffs and Jenkins plaintiffs, and denied defendant's countermotions for summary disposition.
"This Court reviews de novo a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition." Powell-Murphy v Revitalizing Auto Communities Environmental Response Trust, 333 Mich.App. 234, 242; 964 N.W.2d 50 (2020) (citation omitted). A party may move for summary disposition when the "opposing party has failed to state a valid defense to the claim asserted against him or her." MCR 2.116(C)(9). "When deciding a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(9), which tests the sufficiency of a defendant's pleadings, the trial court must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and properly grants summary disposition where a defendant fails to plead a valid defense to a claim." Slater v Ann Arbor Public Schs Bd of Ed, 250 Mich.App. 419, 425; 648 N.W.2d 205 (2002). "Pleadings include only complaints, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints, answers to any of these, and replies to answers." Id. "Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(9) is proper when the defendant's pleadings are so clearly untenable that as a matter of law no factual development could possibly deny the plaintiff's right to recovery." Id. at 425426. When the trial court considers documentation beyond the pleadings, a motion for summary disposition is properly reviewed under MCR 2.116(C)(10). McJimpson v Auto Club Group Ins Co, 315 Mich.App. 353, 357; 889 N.W.2d 724 (2016).
A trial court may properly grant a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) "when the affidavits or other documentary evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Lowrey v LMPS &LMPJ, Inc, 500 Mich. 1,...
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