Finefeuiaki v. Maui Cmty. Corr. Ctr. Staff, CIV. NO. 18-00249 DKW-KJM

• Decision Date: 25 July 2018
• Docket Number: CIV. NO. 18-00249 DKW-KJM
• Parties: SIONE FINEFEUIAKI, #A1065183, Plaintiff, v. MAUI CMTY. CORR. CTR. STAFF AND AFFILIATES, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii

SIONE FINEFEUIAKI, #A1065183, Plaintiff, v. MAUI CMTY. CORR. CTR. STAFFAND AFFILIATES, Defendants.

CIV. NO. 18-00249 DKW-KJM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII

July 25, 2018

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT IN PART WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

I. INTRODUCTION

Pro se Plaintiff Sione Finefeuiaki is a pretrial detainee incarcerated at the Maui Community Correctional Center ("MCCC").¹ Finefeuiaki claims that seven unidentified MCCC "Staffs and Affiliates" ("Defendants" or "MCCC Staff") violated his constitutional rights when they denied him safe custody, housing, religious materials, mail, medical care, and family contact. Compl., ECF. No. 1.

For the following reasons, the Complaint is DISMISSED in part pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(a-b). Specifically, Finefeuiaki fails to state a claim in Counts IV, V, and VI and those claims are DISMISSED withoutprejudice. Finefeuiaki states a claim in Counts I-III and VII, and those claims may be served when the appropriate Defendants are identified.

Finefeuiaki may file an amended pleading that cures the deficiencies in those claims dismissed without prejudice on or before August 27, 2018. In the alternative, Finefeuiaki may notify the court in writing on or before August 27, 2018 that he elects to stand on his claims in Counts I-III and VII, and after he identifies the MCCC Staff members allegedly liable for these claims, the court will direct service.

II. STATUTORY SCREENING

The court is required to conduct a pre-Answer screening of Finefeuiaki's pleadings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune from suit. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing § 1915A(b)).

Screening under §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) involves the same standard of review as that used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (screening under § 1915(e)(2)); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (screening under§ 1915A(b)). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Rule 12(b)(6), in turn, is read in conjunction with Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Zixiang Li v. Kerry, 710 F.3d 995, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2013). Under Rule 8, a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, but at a minimum, a complaint must allege enough specific facts to provide both "fair notice" of the particular claim being asserted and "the grounds upon which [that claim] rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 & n.3 (2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 555 (Rule 8 pleading standard "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation"). The "mere possibility of misconduct" falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 555; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

Pro se litigants' pleadings must be liberally construed, and all doubts should be resolved in their favor. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Leave to amend must be granted if it appears the plaintiff can correct the defects in the complaint. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130.

III. DISCUSSION²

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must plead that a defendant, while acting under color of state law, caused a deprivation of the plaintiff's rights created by federal law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). An individual "causes" a constitutional deprivation when he or she (1) "does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which [the individual] is legally required to do that causes the deprivation"; or (2) "set[s] in motion a series of acts by others which the [individual] knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury." Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978) (citations omitted). Allegations regarding causation "must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts oromissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation." Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).

A. Eleventh Amendment immunity

"The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages in federal court against a state, its agencies, and state officials acting in their official capacities." Aholelei v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007). Defendants named in their official capacities are subject to suit under § 1983 only "for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief . . . to enjoin an alleged ongoing violation of federal law." Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 2013 WL 1767710, at *7 (D. Haw. Apr. 23, 2013) (quoting Wilbur v. Locke, 423 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Levin v. Commerce Energy Inc., 560 U.S. 413 (2010) ); see also Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989) ("[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office."); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

Because Finefeuiaki seeks damages only and does not allege an ongoing violation of state law, he fails to state a claim for damages against MCCC Staff named in their official capacities. These claims are DISMISSED with prejudice.

B. Counts I-III: Failure-to-Protect

On March 29, 2018, at 10:15 p.m., unidentified "backup" MCCC Staff prevented three inmates from entering Finefeuiaki's cell during a lockdown and took these inmates back to their own cell. Compl., ECF No. 1, PagID #6 (Count I). When they asked Finefeuiaki if he was okay, he replied, "No," without further explanation. Id. They closed Finefeuiaki's cell door. Five minutes later, the three inmates returned to Finefeuiaki's cell and assaulted him. Finefeuiaki claims that MCCC Staff had opened his door and allowed this to happen. Finefeuiaki was knocked unconscious, his face and upper body were bruised, and his previously fractured spine was reinjured. He was taken immediately to a hospital.

Finefeuiaki returned from the hospital at approximately 3:00 a.m., on March 30, 2018, and was rehoused in his original cell. Finefeuiaki requested a cell within view of a security camera, but was told that the door to the cell that he requested was broken. See id., PageID #7 (Count II).

The next morning, Finefeuiaki again asked to be moved to a different cell several times, because he felt unsafe being housed with convicted inmates when he was a pretrial detainee. His requests were denied. At approximately 10:15 a.m., Finefeuiaki was attacked in the shower by a "close custody and convicted inmate." Id., PageID #8 (Count III). MCCC Staff separated them and took Finefeuiaki backto the hospital. When Finefeuiaki returned, he was placed in an upstairs cell on "safe watch." Id., PageID #9.

The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects pretrial detainees' rights. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979). To state a failure-to-protect claim, a pretrial detainee must show that:

(1) The defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined;

(2) Those conditions put plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm;

(3) The defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable officer in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved - making the consequences of the defendant's conduct obvious; and

(4) By not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff's injuries.

Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1067-68, 1071 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 831 (2017). This requires "more than negligence but less than subjective intent - something akin to reckless disregard." Id.

Counts I-III state colorable failure-to-protect claims against MCCC Staff and may be served when Finefeuiaki identifies the MCCC Staff who are liable for his claims.

C. Counts IV and VI: Conditions of Confinement³

On April 5, 2018, Finefeuiaki was taken downstairs to be rehoused, but when he arrived, he said that he felt unsafe and wanted to remain upstairs in the safe housing cells. MCCC Staff escorted Finefeuiaki back upstairs to Cell #2, where he was housed with two other inmates. Finefeuiaki says that Cell #2 was: (1) a two-man cell that was not meant for three inmates; (2) too cold; (3) lacked running water in the sink (although it had a functioning toilet); and (4) monitored by security cameras. See Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID #9 (Count IV). He further complains that their bedding and all other items (except their clothes) were removed from the cell between 8:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m., and they could not receive mail or contact their families during that time. Id., PageID #11 (Count VI). Finefeuiaki remained in Cell #2 until Monday, April 9, 2018.

A pretrial detainee may be subject to the conditions of the jail as long as those conditions do not amount to punishment. Bell, 441 U.S. at 536-37; Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2475 (2015) ("[P]retrial detainees (unlike convicted prisoners) cannot be punished at all, much less 'maliciously...