Finkle v. Carroll

• Citation: 315 Conn. 821,110 A.3d 387
• Decision Date: 24 March 2015
• Docket Number: No. 18976.,18976.
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Parties: Jennie FINKLE, Administratrix (Estate of Barbara A. Eckert) v. John F. CARROLL III et al.

315 Conn. 821

110 A.3d 387

Jennie FINKLE, Administratrix (Estate of Barbara A. Eckert)

v.John F. CARROLL III et al.

No. 18976.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Sept. 23, 2014.

Decided March 24, 2015.

James J. Healy, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was M. Caitlin S. Anderson, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Scott M. Karsten, with whom, on the brief, was Kateryna Lagun, West Hartford, for the appellees (defendants).

ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD, ESPINOSA and ROBINSON, Js.

Opinion

ROBINSON, J.

This certified appeal requires us to consider the application of General Statutes § 52–593,¹ the “wrong defendant” statute, in the context of municipal liability under, inter alia, General Statutes § 52–557n.² The plaintiff, Jennie Finkle, administratrix of the estate of Barbara A. Eckert (decedent), appeals, upon our grant of her petition for certification,³ from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court's award of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the town of Watertown (town) and John F. Carroll III, a police officer employed by the town. Finkle v. Carroll, 134 Conn.App. 278, 279–80, 37 A.3d 851 (2012). On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that § 52–593 did not save the present case from the applicable statute of limitations. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that § 52–593 applies to the present case because she failed to name Carroll as a defendant in her original action against the town and various other police officers and, therefore, would have ultimately “failed to obtain [a] judgment” in that original action insofar as Carroll was the factually correct defendant for the causes of action alleged therein. Guided by, inter alia, Cogan v. Chase Manhattan Auto Financial Corp., 276 Conn. 1, 882 A.2d 597 (2005), we agree with the defendants' contention that, given the theories of municipal liability raised by the plaintiff, in particular § 52–557n, the complaint in the original action contained the essential factual and legal components necessary for her to obtain full relief against one of the defendants therein, namely, the town. Accordingly, the plaintiff's failure to name Carroll as a party to the original action, or even to plead his specific involvement in the events leading to the decedent's death, would not have precluded her from obtaining a judgment therein, thus depriving her of shelter under § 52–593 in the present case. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following relevant undisputed facts and procedural history. “This action arose out of the killing of the decedent by her former boyfriend, Mark Tannenbaum. On the evening of September 28, 2002, Tannenbaum was called by the decedent's thirteen year old son, who told him that the decedent was not at home and that he needed relief from taking care of the decedent's and Tannenbaum's one year old child. When the decedent and a male individual drove up to the decedent's home, Tannenbaum approached the vehicle and began punching the windows of the vehicle. The decedent and the male friend then drove to the town's police department to file a complaint against Tannenbaum. While the decedent was speaking with Officer Christopher Marciano at the police department, her cell phone rang several times and Marciano heard a male voice yelling through the phone. The third time the decedent's phone rang, Marciano answered it and Tannenbaum stated, ‘I'll kill you.’ Marciano identified himself as a police officer and asked Tannenbaum for his location. Tannenbaum told him he was at the decedent's residence.

“Three officers, including Marciano, traveled to the decedent's residence and found Tannenbaum there. Marciano smelled alcohol on Tannenbaum's breath at that time and found him angry. Tannenbaum told the police that he wanted the decedent arrested for leaving the children in the residence alone. Tannenbaum was arrested and taken to the police station where he was processed. Later that evening, Carroll made the decision to release Tannenbaum on a promise to appear. Subsequent to his release from police custody, on the morning of September 29, 2002, Tannenbaum shot and killed the decedent at her home ... and then at another location committed suicide.

“On October 21, 2003, the plaintiff filed her initial action pursuant to General Statutes § 52–555 against the town and three police officers, Marciano, Officer David McDonnell and Sergeant David Bromley, alleging that they were negligent in charging Tannenbaum with one misdemeanor and releasing him from their custody without bond. On April 10, 2008, the plaintiff withdrew her initial action and commenced the present action on November 20, 2008, against the town and Carroll, pursuant to §§ 52–593 and 52–555. In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that Carroll, the ranking officer at the time of Tannenbaum's release from police custody, negligently exercised the duty of care he owed to the decedent by charging Tannenbaum improperly, releasing Tannenbaum without proper conditions and restrictions, and violating the town's family violence policy, which requires protection for identifiable victims like the decedent. This negligence allegedly resulted in Tannenbaum's killing of the decedent a short time after his release.

“The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the plaintiff's claims were barred by the statute of limitations found in § 52–555, and that the action was not saved by the provisions of § 52–593, the ‘wrong defendant’ statute. The court denied the motion. The defendants then filed a motion for summary judgment arguing, among other things, that the plaintiff's claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The plaintiff filed an objection to that motion. Thereafter, the court rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the ground that the plaintiff's claims were not saved by § 52–593. In its memorandum of decision, the [trial] court stated that ‘[i]n the original action, the plaintiff failed to name the very party, the defendant Carroll, who was responsible for releasing Tannenbaum on September 29, 2002.’ The court noted that ‘[t]he present case is not a situation where the plaintiff failed to name all of the potentially liable defendants.’ Nevertheless, the court, citing Billerback v. Cerminara, 72 Conn.App. 302, 308–309, 805 A.2d 757 (2002), concluded that the plaintiff's ‘failure to obtain a judgment of dismissal in her original action is fatal to satisfying all of the criteria set forth in ... § 52–593.’ ” (Footnotes omitted.) Finkle v. Carroll, supra, 134 Conn.App. at 280–82, 37 A.3d 851.

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court. In a unanimous opinion, the Appellate Court concluded that the trial court properly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, agreeing with their alternative ground for affirmance that “ § 52–593 does not apply to the present action because the plaintiff did not fail to name a proper party in the original action.”⁴ Id., at 283, 37 A.3d 851. Relying on our decision in Cogan v. Chase Manhattan Auto Financial Corp., supra, 276 Conn. at 1, 882 A.2d 597, and its decision in Iello v. Weiner, 129 Conn.App. 359, 20 A.3d 81 (2011), the Appellate Court disagreed with “the [trial] court's conclusion to the contrary,” and held that “the present case is a situation in which the plaintiff named some, but not all, of the potentially liable defendants. In both actions, the plaintiff alleged the legal theory of negligence—specifically, negligence in charging Tannenbaum with a misdemeanor and releasing him on a promise to appear.” (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted.) Finkle v. Carroll, supra, 134 Conn.App. at 284–85, 37 A.3d 851. The Appellate Court determined that Carroll's decision, as the ranking officer, “to release Tannenbaum ... was made ostensibly on the basis of information provided to him by Marciano, McDonnell and Bromley,” thus rendering those “original officers ... proper defendants under the legal theory of negligence due to their involvement in the process that led to Tannenbaum's release.”⁵ (Footnote omitted.) Id., at 285–86, 37 A.3d 851. Finally, the Appellate Court emphasized that, although “§ 52–593, a remedial statute, is construed liberally, it should not be construed so liberally as to render statutes of limitation[s] virtually meaningless,” and warned against the risk, which we observed in Cogan v. Chase Manhattan Auto Financial Corp., supra, at 11, 882 A.2d 597, that an overly broad reading of § 52–593 permitting “successive complaints ... naming different defendants, all of whom were proper ... could lead to unrestrained filings in cases with multiple defendants and open the door to endless litigation.”⁶ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Finkle v. Carroll, supra, at 288, 37 A.3d 851. Accordingly, the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Id. This certified appeal followed. See footnote 3 of this opinion.

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that, in concluding that this action was not saved by § 52–593, the Appellate Court improperly failed to apply the terms of that statute “liberally to embrace the facts of this case within the statute's remedial scope” to permit the plaintiff to correct her “innocent, reasonable, and good faith mistake.” The plaintiff contends that from the moment she filed the original action, she “intended to state a negligence claim against the officer with the ultimate authority to charge and release Tannenbaum,” and that claim “only comes into existence based on the acts and omissions of ... Carroll, the defendant missing” from the original action, particularly given her legal conclusion that none of the other officers named in the original action would be liable for Tannenbaum's release. The plaintiff emphasizes that, under Cogan v. Chase Manhattan Auto...