Finklea v. State, No. 20961

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
Writing for the CourtRHODES; LEWIS
Citation255 S.E.2d 447,273 S.C. 157
PartiesLarry FINKLEA, Appellant, v. STATE of South Carolina and South Carolina State Highway Department, Respondents.
Decision Date21 May 1979
Docket NumberNo. 20961

Page 447

255 S.E.2d 447
273 S.C. 157
Larry FINKLEA, Appellant,
v.
STATE of South Carolina and South Carolina State Highway
Department, Respondents.
No. 20961.
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
May 21, 1979.

Richard H. Warder, Greenville, for appellant.

Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod, Asst. Atty. Gen. Emmet H. Clair and Staff Atty. Betty J. Willoughby, Columbia, for respondents.

RHODES, Justice:

This is an appeal from a dismissal of appellant's application for post-conviction relief. We affirm.

Appellant received two traffic summonses for speeding and alleges that he requested a jury trial before the magistrate. He further alleges that he was not apprised of a trial date but, nevertheless, was found guilty on both charges in his absence. As a consequence, his driver's license was suspended[273 S.C. 158] for the accumulation of more than twelve points on his driving record. He has attacked these traffic offense adjudications on the ground of lack of notification as to the date of his trial.

Appellant initiated this proceeding under the South Carolina Post-Conviction Procedure Act, § 17-27-20 Et seq., S.C.Code of Laws (1976). The substance of § 17-27-20 is identical to the Uniform Act under which the Commissioners drafting that Act noted:

The aim of this section is to bring together and consolidate into one simple statute all the remedies . . . which are at present available for challenging the validity of a Sentence of imprisonment. (emphasis added). 11 U.L.A., Post-Conviction Procedure Act, § 1, p. 486.

Appellant's convictions and resultant license suspension are not within the purview of the Act. There is a clear distinction between the termination of a driver's license arising out of a series of traffic violations and the loss of liberty or imprisonment, or threat thereof, envisioned by the Post-Conviction Procedure Act. As was stated in Parker v. State Highway Department, 224 S.C. 263, 78 S.E.2d 382, 385 (1953):

The suspension follows as a consequence and effect of committing the offense. It is a forfeiture of the privilege to drive, due to the failure of the licensee to observe certain conditions under which the license was issued. The suspension constitutes no part of the punishment fixed by the court, nor is it an added punishment for the offense committed. It is civil and not criminal in its nature. (Citations omitted).

Our Post-Conviction Procedure Act is designed to incorporate all rights

Page 448

available under federal habeas...

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6 practice notes
  • Al-Shabazz v. State, No. 24995.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • August 23, 1999
    ...available for challenging the validity of the conviction or sentence." S.C.Code Ann. § 17-27-20(b) (1985); Finklea v. State, 273 S.C. 157, 255 S.E.2d 447 (1979) (aim of PCR Act is to consolidate in one simple statute all the remedies presently available for challenging the validity of ......
  • Jackson v. State, No. 24657
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • September 4, 1997
    ...a PCR applicant must meet the federal habeas corpus "in custody" requirement in order to have standing. See Finklea v. State, 273 S.C. 157, 255 S.E.2d 447 (1979). However, "[a] petitioner has standing to petition for PCR if he is in custody or the results of his prior convict......
  • McElrath v. State, No. 21447
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • May 12, 1981
    ...standing to bring this action in the absence of incarceration or direct [276 S.C. 284] threat of incarceration, citing Finklea v. State, 273 S.C. 157, 255 S.E.2d 447 In McDuffie v. State, S.C., 277 S.E.2d 595 (1981), we held that where an applicant for post conviction relief alleges in his ......
  • McDuffie v. State, No. 21436
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • April 22, 1981
    ...dismissing his application for post conviction relief because he lacked standing. We agree. The trial court, relying on Finklea v. State, 273 S.C. 157, 255 S.E.2d 447 (1979), held McDuffie lacked standing under the Post Conviction Procedure Act, S.C.Code § 17-27-10 et seq. (1976), because h......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
6 cases
  • Al-Shabazz v. State, No. 24995.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • August 23, 1999
    ...available for challenging the validity of the conviction or sentence." S.C.Code Ann. § 17-27-20(b) (1985); Finklea v. State, 273 S.C. 157, 255 S.E.2d 447 (1979) (aim of PCR Act is to consolidate in one simple statute all the remedies presently available for challenging the validity of ......
  • Jackson v. State, No. 24657
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • September 4, 1997
    ...a PCR applicant must meet the federal habeas corpus "in custody" requirement in order to have standing. See Finklea v. State, 273 S.C. 157, 255 S.E.2d 447 (1979). However, "[a] petitioner has standing to petition for PCR if he is in custody or the results of his prior convict......
  • McElrath v. State, No. 21447
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • May 12, 1981
    ...standing to bring this action in the absence of incarceration or direct [276 S.C. 284] threat of incarceration, citing Finklea v. State, 273 S.C. 157, 255 S.E.2d 447 In McDuffie v. State, S.C., 277 S.E.2d 595 (1981), we held that where an applicant for post conviction relief alleges in his ......
  • McDuffie v. State, No. 21436
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • April 22, 1981
    ...dismissing his application for post conviction relief because he lacked standing. We agree. The trial court, relying on Finklea v. State, 273 S.C. 157, 255 S.E.2d 447 (1979), held McDuffie lacked standing under the Post Conviction Procedure Act, S.C.Code § 17-27-10 et seq. (1976), because h......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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