Finlen v. Heinze

Decision Date21 July 1902
Citation69 P. 829,27 Mont. 107
PartiesFINLEN v. HEINZE et al.
CourtMontana Supreme Court

Appeal from district court, Silver Bow county; E. W. Hamey, Judge.

Action by Miles Finlen against F. Augustus Heinze and others. From a judgment in favor of defendants, plaintiff appeals, and asks for an injunction to preserve the subject to litigation pending appeal. Injunction granted.

This is an action in the nature of ejectment, in which the plaintiff seeks to recover possession of the Minnie Healy lode mining claim, situate in the Summit Valley mining district, Silver Bow county, together with damages for ores removed therefrom by the defendants. Pursuant to an application made at the time the action was brought, and after a hearing thereon, the district court issued an injunction to prevent the removal of ore from the property pendente lite. The defendants, in their answer, denied that Finlen had any title to or interest in the property, or any right to the possession of it; asserted title in themselves as against him; and demanded a decree against him requiring and directing him to assign to the defendant F. Augustus Heinze certain bonds and leases held by Finlen from the original owners of the claim, the said Heinze claiming to be entitled to such assignment by virtue of an agreement entered into between himself and Finlen, the conditions of which had been fully kept and fulfilled by Heinze. Upon the trial of the cause the district court found upon all the issues in favor of the defendant, and entered a decree accordingly. The decree enjoins the plaintiff from asserting any right to the claim by suit or otherwise, and from interfering in any way with the possession of the defendants. It also contains the following provisions "It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that if the plaintiff file herein within five days hereafter an additional undertaking on injunction in favor of the defendants F. Augustus Heinze and the Johnstown Mining Company inthe sum of fifteen thousand dollars, which amount may be increased in the discretion of the court, the court retaining jurisdiction therefore (jurisdiction with reference to the injunction and all matter pertaining thereto being retained by the court on the motion and application of the plaintiff herein), conditioned as required by law, and to pay the said defendants any damages' which they may have sustained by reason of the issuance of the restraining order and injunction herein or the continuance thereof, that the temporary injunction herein be continued restraining and enjoining all of the defendants from mining, carrying away or converting to their own use any ores or minerals from said Minnie Healy lode claim until the determination of any appeal which may be taken by the plaintiff to the supreme court from this judgment and decree, or until the further order of this court herein; provided, that said injunction shall not restrain or enjoin said defendants from doing any work or timbering in said claim, orin the openings therein, or the veins belonging thereto, which may be necessary to the proper care and preservation thereof; all ores taken out in doing same to be stores in or on said claim. If said plaintiff shall not give said additional undertaking as herein required, then the said restraining order and injunction shall thereupon be and become vacated and dissolved. It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that, if the defendants F. Augustus Heinz, and the Johnstown Mining company shall hereafter file herein an undertaking to the plaintiff in the sum of seventy-five thousand dollars subject to be increased in the discretion of the court, with two or more personal sureties, or with one surety company authorized to do business in the state of Montana, such undertaking to be approved by the judge of this court, and conditioned that said defendants will pay to the plaintiff the net value of all ores which may thereafter and during the pendency of such appeal or until the further order of this court herein be mined, carried away, or converted by them from said Minnie Healy lode claim, and also all damages and loss sustained by him by reason of the stay of the restraining order and injunction herein and herein ordered if it shall be finally adjudged ordetermined in this action that the plaintiff is entitled to prevail or recover a judgment herein, then said restraining order and injunction shall be and the same is hereby, stayed as against the said defendants until the determination of such appeal by the supreme court, or until the further order of this court herein; and said restraining order and injunction shall not, in that event, operate or be effective, after the giving or approval of the said undertaking, to restrain or enjoin said defendants F. Augustus Heinze or the Johnstown Mining Company from mining, extracting, carrying away, or converting to their own use the ores and minerals from said Minnie Healy lode claim and the veins belonging thereto during the pendency of such appeal, or until the further order of this court made herein that reference to said restraining order and injunction." The plaintiff thereupon appealed from the judgment and decree and from an order denying him a new trial. Upon filing the transcript in this court the plaintiff presented his petition, supported by affidavits, setting forth that the defendants had given the undertaking provided for in the decree, were engaged in mining the property in controversy and removing therefrom and converting to their own use valuable ores to the amount of not less than 400 tons per day, and that, as their mining operations progressed, and as all the valuable ore was removed from the various workings in the property from time to time, the defendants were destroying the said workings in order to prevent the plaintiff from ascertaining the amount and value of the ores removed therefrom in case he should finally obtain a judgment against the defendants in this action. Upon the showing thus made relief is demanded from this court by way of injunction to preserve the property pending a determination of the appeal. At a hearing had in this court the defendants filed counter affidavits denying all the charges made as to the destruction of the workings in the property, but admitting that they were mining and removing ores as alleged by the plaintiff.

W. W. Dixon, A. J. Shores, D. Gary Stivers, C. F. Kelley, and Forbis & Evans, for appeallant.

McHatton & Cotter, Toole & Bach, J. M. Denny, and C. R. Leonard, for respondents.

BRANTLY C.J. (after stating the facts).

The application presents three questions for determination: (1) Whether this court has power to grant the relief demanded; (2) whether, if it has, the facts shown justify its interference; and (3) Whether the plaintiff, by asking the trial court to retain jurisdiction of the case for the purpose of protecting the property pending the appeal, has foreclosed his application to this court for that purpose.

1. For answer to the first question reference must be had to the sections of the constitution containing the grant of appellate power to this court, and the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure enacted in pursuance of them. This grant iscontained in sections 2 and 3 of article 8, which declare:

"Sec. 2. The supreme court, except as otherwise provided in this constitution, shall have appellate jurisdiction only, which shall be co-extensive with the state, and shall have a general supervisory control over all inferior courts, under such regulations and limitations as may be prescribed by law.
"Sec. 3. The appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court shall extend to all cases at law and in equity, subject, however, to such limitations and regulations as may be prescribed by law. Said court shall have power in its discretion to issue and tohear and determine writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo-warranto, certiorari, prohibition and injunction, and such other original and remedial writs as may be necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its appellate jurisdiction."

The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure referred to, omitting parts not pertinent to this case, are the following:

"Sec. 21. The supreme court may affirm, reverse or modify any judgment or order appealed from, and may direct the proper judgment or order to be entered, or direct a new trial or further proceedings to be had. *** Its judgment in appealed cases must be remitted to the court from which the appeal was taken."
"Sec. 23. The supreme court may continue in force an injunction order made by a district court, or judge, or grant an injunction order and writ pending an appeal to the supreme court from an order of a district court, or judge, refusing or dissolvingan injunction, upon such terms and under such rules as the supreme court may establish. No action to obtain an injunction must be commenced in the supreme court, except in cases where the state is a party, or in which the public is interested, or the rights of the public are involved, but the proper district court has jurisdiction of all injunctions, and the commencement of all actions therefor, except as in this section provided."

Reference must be had also to sections 1722 and 1723, as amended by the act of the legislative assembly of 1899 (page 146). These enumerate the judgments and orders from which appeals lie, and provide when they may be taken. Subdivision 2 of the former provides that this court, or any one of its justices, may stay any of the orders enumerated therein.

The defendants argue that the constitutional grant of appellate power also expressly authorizes the legislature to impose limitations upon it, and to provide regulations under which it may be exercised, and that, as these...

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