Finley v. Astrue, 4:06CV01576 GTE/JTR.

Decision Date25 February 2009
Docket NumberNo. 4:06CV01576 GTE/JTR.,4:06CV01576 GTE/JTR.
Citation601 F.Supp.2d 1092
PartiesAmy FINLEY o/b/o Herself and W.F., a minor child, Plaintiff v. Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas

Kenneth E. Buckner, Buckner Law Office, Pine Bluff, AR, for Plaintiff.

Julia Denegre, Social Security Administration, Dallas Office of the General Counsel, Dallas, TX, Stacey Elise McCord, U.S. Attorney's Office, Little Rock, AR, for Defendant.

ORDER

GARNETT THOMAS EISELE, District Judge.

The Court has reviewed the Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition received from Magistrate Judge J. Thomas Ray. There have been no objections. After careful review, the Court concludes that the Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition should be, and hereby are, approved and adopted, in their entirety, as the Court's findings in all respects.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's Complaint (docket entry # 1) be and it hereby is DISMISSED, WITH PREJUDICE. Judgment shall be entered accordingly.

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS

J. THOMAS RAY, United States Magistrate Judge.

This recommended disposition has been submitted to United States District Judge G. Thomas Eisele. The parties may file specific objections to these findings and recommendations and must provide the factual or legal basis for each objection. The objections must be filed with the Clerk no later than eleven (11) days from the date of the findings and recommendations. A copy must be served on the opposing party. The District Judge, even in the absence of objections, may reject these proposed findings and recommendations in whole or in part.

I. Background

Plaintiff, Amy Finley, has appealed the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the "Commissioner") denying her claim for "mother's insurance benefits'1 and her minor child's claim for "child's insurance benefits."2 The Court's function on review is to determine whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole and whether it is based on legal error. Long v Chater, 108 F.3d 185, 187 (8th Cir.1997); see also, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). While "substantial evidence" is that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,3 "substantial evidence on the record as a whole" requires a court to engage in a more scrutinizing analysis:

"[O]ur review is more than an examination of the record for the existence of substantial evidence in support of the Commissioner's decision; we also take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from that decision." Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir.2001). Reversal is not warranted, however, "merely because substantial evidence would have supported an opposite decision." Shannon v. Chater, 54 F.3d 484, 486 (8th Cir.1995).

Reed v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 917, 920 (8th Cir.2005).

The parties do not dispute the facts in this case. Plaintiff and Wade W. Finley, Jr. ("Finley") were married on October 6, 1990. (Tr. 58.) On April 2, 2001, the couple met with UAMS physicians to discuss fertility treatments (Tr. 75) and, on May 1, 2001, they executed consent forms outlining the terms of their participation in the UAMS In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer Program.4 (Tr. 78-96.) In June of 2001, physicians used Plaintiff's eggs and Finley's sperm to produce ten embryos. (Tr. 75.) On July 2, 2001, two embryos were implanted in Plaintiff's uterus, while four were frozen for preservation.5 Plaintiff later had a miscarriage of the implanted embryos. (Tr. 75.)

On July 19, 2001, Finley died in Arkansas, without leaving a will.6 (Tr. 58.) On June 26, 2002, Plaintiff had two of the frozen embryos implanted in her uterus, resulting in a single pregnancy. (Tr. 75.) On February 14, 2003, Plaintiff obtained an Order from the Lonoke County Circuit Court which sought to establish the paternity of her unborn child:

[U]pon delivery of the child, borne by the [Plaintiff] now pregnant, that the State Registrar of the Arkansas Department of Health, Division of Vital Records, shall enter and state upon the certificate of birth that Wade W. Finley, Jr., now deceased, is the father of [W.F.]; [a]nd that, thereafter, all State and Federal Agencies, of the United States of America, shall uphold the findings of this Court's conclusion of paternity—in [Plaintiff] the mother and Wade W. Finley, Jr. the father—for any and all lawful purposes; and, that [W.F.] is the legitimate child of [Plaintiff] and Wade W. Finley, Jr. for any and all lawful purposes.

(Tr. 73.)7

W.F. was born on March 4, 2003. (Tr. 30.) On April 11, 2003, Plaintiff filed her claim with the Social Security Administration for mother's insurance benefits and child's insurance benefits, based on the earnings record of Finley. (Tr. 23.)

Under the Social Security Act, a child8 is entitled to benefits if he is the dependent child of an individual who dies while insured. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(d).9 In determining whether a claimant is the "child" of a deceased insured, the Commissioner must "apply such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property ... by the courts of the State in which [the insured] was domiciled at the time of his death[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A).10 In deciding whether the claimant has "inheritance rights as the natural child of the insured[,]" the Commissioner uses "the law on inheritance rights that the State courts would use to decide whether you could inherit a child's share of the insured's personal property if the insured were to die without leaving a will." See 20 C.F.R. § 404.355(b)(1).

During the administrative proceedings in this case, Plaintiff claimed that there were no Arkansas statutes specifically addressing the inheritance rights of a child conceived through in vitro fertilization ("IVF"). Thus, Plaintiff sought to rely on the Arkansas legitimacy statute which provides that "[a]ny child conceived following artificial insemination of a married woman with the consent of her husband shall be treated as their child for all purposes of intestate succession. Consent of the husband is presumed unless the contrary is shown by clear and convincing evidence." See Ark.Code Ann. § 28-9-209(c). Because W.F. was "conceived" by IVF prior to his father's death and while his parents were married, Plaintiff argued that W.F. should be deemed to have inheritance rights.11

Plaintiffs and W.F.'s claims for Social Security benefits were denied at the initial and reconsideration levels. On June 16, 2006, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") overruled those decisions and awarded mother's and child's insurance benefits. (Tr. 17-20.) On December 14, 2006, the Appeals Council found both claims to be without merit and reversed the ALJ's decision. (Tr. 5-13.)

After acknowledging the lack of a "clear definition" of "conception" under Arkansas state law, the Commissioner looked to "the generally accepted definition of the term in the medical community" and concluded that "conception" occurred when "the embryo was implanted in the mother's uterus after the wage earner died." (Tr. 11.) The Commissioner went on to find that: (1) Plaintiffs reliance on the Arkansas legitimacy statute was misplaced; (2) the Lonoke Circuit Court's Order was "not consistent with the law as enunciated by the highest court in the State of Arkansas" (Tr. 10-11); (3) W.F. was the biological child of Finley who was dead and no longer married to Plaintiff at the time that W.F. was conceived and born (Tr. 12); and (4) W.F. did not have "inheritance rights in [Finley's] estate" and thus did "not have status as the child of the wage earner pursuant to [42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A)]." (Tr. 12.) Because Plaintiffs claim for "mother's insurance benefits" was contingent on having "an entitled child of the wage earner in her care," the Commissioner also found that her claim must be denied. (Tr. 12.)

On October 13, 2006, Plaintiff filed her Complaint appealing the final decision of the Commissioner to this Court. (Docket entry # 1.) On May 24, 2007, the parties filed a Joint Motion requesting that the briefing schedule be stayed, and that the Court certify a dispositive question of law to the Arkansas Supreme Court pursuant to Ark. R. Sup.Ct. 6-8. (Docket entry # 14.)

In the parties' Joint Motion, they agreed that "[t]he determinative issue presented in this action is whether [W.F.] is entitled to inherit from [Finley] under Arkansas intestacy law." (Docket entry # 14 at ¶ 3.) They also agreed that "there is no controlling Arkansas precedent on the determinative issue that is directly on point." (Docket entry # 14 at ¶ 7.) Thus, they requested that the Court certify the question of "whether a child, who was created through IVF during his parents' marriage, but implanted into the mother's uterus after the father's death, can inherit from the father under Arkansas intestacy law as a surviving child." (Docket entry # 14 at 4.) According to the parties, the answer to this question would "resolve this action." (Docket entry # 14 at ¶ 7.)

On June 13, 2007, United States District Judge G. Thomas Eisele entered an Order granting the Joint Motion and certifying the following question of law to the Arkansas Supreme Court:

Does a child, who was created as an embryo through IVF during his parents' marriage, but implanted into his mother's womb after the death of his father, inherit from the father under Arkansas intestacy law as a surviving child?

(Docket entry # 16.) On June 28, 2007, the Arkansas Supreme Court accepted the certified question. Finley v. Astrue, 370 Ark. 429, 260 S.W.3d 717 (2007) (per curiam).

On January 10, 2008, the Court handed down its decision answering the certified question in the negative. Finley v. Astrue, 372 Ark. 103, 270 S.W.3d 849 (2008). According to the Court, the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
2 cases
  • Beeler v. Astrue
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • August 29, 2011
    ...that the SSA's interpretation of the statute is correct. Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49 (4th Cir.2011); see also Finley v. Astrue, 601 F.Supp.2d 1092, 1108 (E.D.Ark.2009) (questioning whether the Eighth Circuit would follow Gillett–Netting ). This court has suggested that all natural childr......
  • Me. Woods Pellet Co. v. W. World Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maine
    • June 27, 2019

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT