Finley v. Fla. Parish Juvenile Det. Ctr., CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-726
| Decision Date | 30 August 2013 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-726 |
| Parties | DAVID FINLEY, JR. v. FLORIDA PARISH JUVENILE DETENTION CENTER |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
JOSEPH C. WILKINSON, JR.
Plaintiff, David Finley, Jr., filed a motion for new trial, Record Doc. No. 62, seeking reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) of the court's final judgment dismissing all of his claims. Record Doc. No. 61. The judgment was based on two court orders granting the first and second motions for summary judgment filed by defendant, Florida Parish Juvenile Detention Center (the "Center"). In granting the Center's first motion for (partial) summary judgment, the court dismissed plaintiff's race- and gender-based disparate treatment claims under Title VII and Section 1981. Record Doc. No. 37. The second order granted defendant's second motion for summary judgment and dismissed all of Finley's remaining claims. Record Doc. No. 60.
As to the pending motion for new trial, Finley received leave to supplement his motion with the deposition transcript of a non-party witness, Kelsie McDonald. Record Doc. Nos. 63, 64, 65. Defendant filed a timely memorandum in opposition to plaintiff's motion for new trial. Record Doc. No. 66.
This is an employment discrimination case brought by plaintiff, an African-American man, against his former employer. Finley's pro se complaint alleged five (5) numbered causes of action: (1) the Center discriminated against him in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 when it terminated his employment based on his race and/or gender; (2) defendant's disciplinary system had a racially discriminatory impact on African-American employees, including himself, in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (3) defendant's written and oral policies created an employment contract with Finley, which the Center breached by terminating him without cause; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (5) defamation. Complaint, Record Doc. No. 2, at pp. 4-10. Finley also claimed that defendant's wrongful conduct denied him due process. Id. at p. 2.
Finley's motion for new trial challenges the court's final judgment only as to his claims of disparate treatment based on race and/or gender, defamation and lack of due process. He does not challenge the judgment dismissing his disparate impact, intentional infliction of emotional distress and breach of contract claims. Record Doc. No. 62-1 at p. 5.
After the court granted defendant's first motion for summary judgment, Finley filed a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e), which the court denied. Record Doc. Nos. 38, 43. However, the court did not enter final judgment on its first summaryjudgment order because the Center had not moved for summary judgment on all of plaintiff's claims. Final judgment was not entered until after the court granted the Center's second summary judgment motion and dismissed the remainder of plaintiff's claims. Thus, despite Finley's previous motion for reconsideration, the court considers his current motion for new trial under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). This rule applies to motions filed within "28 days after the entry of the judgment," Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), which is the time frame within which Finley filed the instant motion, and is the rule that Finley cites in his memorandum.
The court does not consider Finley's motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), which applies to motions filed after the Rule 59(e) deadline has passed, and which defendant argues should be applied to the court's ruling on the Center's first motion for summary judgment. Because plaintiff's motion fails to meet the Rule 59(e) standards, it would also fail under the stricter standards of Rule 60(b), if that rule applied.
Having considered the complaint, the record, the prior orders of the court, the final judgment, the submissions of the parties and the applicable law, and for the following reasons, IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff's motion is DENIED.
Rule 59(e) provides that "[a] motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment." Finley's motion was filed within 28 days of the entry of final judgment on all of his claims. Therefore, Rule 59(e) applies.
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., No. 05-4182, 2009 WL 2447846, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 6, 2009) (quoting So. Contractors Grp., Inc., v. Dynalectric Co., 2 F.3d 606, 611 (5th Cir. 1993); Johnson v. Cain, No. 05-1943, 2007 WL 1741883, at *1 (E.D. La. June 14, 2007)) (citing Arceneaux v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 07-7701, 2008 WL 2067044, at *1 (E.D. La. May 14, 2008)) (emphasis added); accord McGillivray, 360 F. App'x at 537 (citing In re Benjamin Moore & Co., 318 F.3d 626, 629 (5th Cir. 2002)). Finley cites the first, second and third grounds in his motion for new trial.
Because a Rule 59(e) motion "calls into question the correctness of a judgment," it is permitted only in narrow situations, "primarily to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence." Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004) (quotation and citations omitted). "The granting of a Rule 59(e) motion 'is an extraordinary remedy and should be used sparingly.'" In re Pequeño, 240 F. App'x 634, 636 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Templet, 367 F.3d at 479); accord Ewans v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 389 F. App'x 383, 389-90 (5th Cir. 2010).
"A motion for reconsideration may not be used to rehash rejected arguments or introduce new arguments." LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 412 n.13 (5th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). "In Templet, [the Fifth Circuit] refused to reverse a district court's rejection of a Rule 59(e) motion when 'the underlying facts were well within the [plaintiffs'] knowledge prior to the district court's entry of judgment.'" In re Rodriguez, 695 F.3d 360, 371 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Templet, 367 F.3d at 479).
Finley argues that manifest errors of law and fact, the availability of new evidence and the need to prevent manifest injustice support his motion for new trial. Specifically, he contends that his motion should be granted because (1) the court should have given him more time to oppose defendant's first motion for summary judgment and to complete discovery after he retained counsel; (2) plaintiff's denial that he had made a sexuallysuggestive statement to McDonald in the work place, which was the basis for his termination, created a genuine issue of disputed material fact as to his race and gender discrimination claims; (3) the court granted summary judgment on Finley's due process claim without providing him with an opportunity to be heard, in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; (4) the court erred by concluding that plaintiff had no evidence to support the publication element of his defamation claim; and (5) he has produced new evidence to support his motion as to all three of the claims on which he moves for reconsideration.
The allegedly new evidence consists of the transcript of McDonald's deposition, taken on March 27, 2013, Record Doc. No. 65; pages 15 through 23 from the Center's employee handbook, Record Doc. No. 62-1;1 the declarations under penalty of perjury of six of defendant's former employees, Lillie D. Wheat, Ashley Piggott Smith, Brandon Taylor, Earl Olmstead, Duran Michael Mclin, and Lance Jackson, all dated April 30 or May 1, 2013, Record Doc. Nos. 62-2, 62-3, 62-6, 62-7, 62-8, 62-9; Finley's own declaration under penalty of perjury dated May 1, 2013, Record Doc. No. 62-4; and the declaration under penalty of perjury of Finley's wife, Shannon Finley, dated May 1, 2013, Record Doc. No. 62-5.
Finley represented himself during the first nine months of this litigation. He complains that, once he retained counsel, the court granted him only an additional three weeks, which fell over the Christmas and New Year's holidays, to respond to the pending summary judgment motion and only 90 additional days to complete discovery. Finley argues that the court "unfairly coupled the nine months the plaintiff proceeded pro se with the three months the plaintiff was represented by counsel" and that the court unfairly enforced procedural rules to his detriment. Record Doc. No. 62-10 at pp. 6-7. This argument appears to invoke the "manifest injustice" ground for altering or amending a judgment.
It is well established that "pro se litigants are not exempt from compliance with the relevant rules of procedure and substantive law." Price v. Porter, 351 F. App'x 925, 926 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 1981)); accord Rolen v. City of Brownfield, 182 F. App'x 362, 365 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Gordon v. Watson, 622 F.2d 120, 123 (5th Cir. 1980)); Hulsey v. State, 929 F.2d 168, 170 (5th Cir. 1991). "[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the relevant local rules of the district court are sufficient to provide pro se litigants with notice of the requirements of summary judgment." Hale v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs. Corp., 72 F. App'x 100, 101 (5th Cir. 2003) (ci...
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