Finley v. Hartsook

• Decision Date: 13 January 1947
• Docket Number: No. 11615.,11615.
• Citation: 158 F.2d 618
• Parties: FINLEY v. HARTSOOK et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

158 F.2d 618 (1946)

FINLEY v. HARTSOOK et al.

No. 11615.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

December 17, 1946.

Rehearing Denied January 13, 1947.

Frank B. Williams, of Springfield, Mo., and A. B. Honnold, of Tulsa, Okl., for appellant.

Leslie Humphrey, of Wichita Falls, Tex., James C. Wilson, Jr., of Fort Worth, Tex., and Dan Abbott, of Abilene, Tex., for appellees.

Before SIBLEY, WALLER, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

LEE, Circuit Judge.

This suit involves the validity of a sale of mineral interests in land in Texas by a foreign guardian of a non-resident ward, acting under authority of the probate court of the county in which the land was situated.

In the early spring of 1938 the appellant, a resident and citizen of Missouri, executed several conflicting oil and gas leases and agreements to different parties covering 266 acres of land owned by him in Archer County, Texas. He also disposed of royalty acreage and of oil payments provided for in one of the leases. In August, 1938, he was adjudged of unsound mind by the probate court of his home county, and one Charles Farrar, of Missouri, was appointed guardian of his person and estate. In the latter part of September of that year the same court adjudged him mentally restored. From this last judgment, Farrar, as guardian, appealed. While the appeal was pending, Farrar upon allegation that appellant was mentally incompetent, as his next friend and guardian, filed a suit in a federal court in Texas seeking cancellation of the leases, agreements, and deeds executed by appellant in the spring of 1938 affecting the 266 acres. A compromise judgment was entered in April, 1939, in said suit, setting aside certain leases and agreements and a deed to a royalty interest and sustaining a lease of the same period and awarding a recovery of certain oil payments to appellant. In May, 1939, Farrar, as Missouri guardian, petitioned the county court of Archer County, Texas, having probate jurisdiction, to be appointed ancillary guardian of the estate of his non-resident ward in that county. An authenticated transcript of the Missouri probate proceedings was attached. The petition was granted, and Farrar was appointed and qualified as guardian of appellant's estate in Archer County, Texas. A few days later Farrar made application to sell for cash at private sale certain oil payments and an interest in- the royalty owned by his ward to pay the attorney's fee, which he had approved, due for prosecuting the "as next friend" suit. The county court of Archer County granted the application, and in due course Farrar, as guardian, sold the oil payments and a quarter interest in appellant's royalty in the 266 acres; the county court confirmed the sale. The oil payments and the royalty interest were later by the purchaser assigned for value to appellees Hartsook and Egdorf.

Nearly six years later, appellant, upon being restored to his competency, brought in the court below the present suit against appellees, residents and citizens of Texas, to set aside and cancel the sales of the mineral interests made in the Texas guardianship proceedings and the assignment of said interests by the purchaser thereof to appellees Hartsook and Egdorf, and also for an accounting for rents and profits. The main grounds alleged were: (1) The appointment of Farrar as foreign guardian to appellant by the county court of Archer County, Texas, was void, as the transcript showed an appeal pending from the Missouri probate court judgment restoring appellant to his competency, and hence, the transcript showed that the Missouri guardianship was suspended. (2) The county court of Archer County, Texas, did not have the jurisdictional authority to appoint a Missouri guardian as general guardian of the estate of the appellant in Texas. (3) Since the Texas appointment was fraudulent and void, the procurement of an allowance in a probate court of an attorney's fee for services rendered in the "as next friend" suit was contrary to law. (4) The county court of Archer County, Texas, was without authority to authorize the sale of appellant's property to pay the attorney's fee arising out of the "as next friend" suit or to confirm such sale; the court's jurisdiction was limited to authorizing a sale solely for the purpose of removing the proceeds to the State of appellant's domicile. (5) Appellant and his Missouri attorney had no notice of the Texas probate proceedings. (6) Appellees Hartsook and Egdorf, who acquired from the purchaser at the guardianship sale, were not innocent purchasers.

Appellees denied the lack of jurisdiction in the county court of Archer County. They alleged that the Texas guardianship was general, not ancillary; that they were innocent purchasers; and that appellant was guilty of laches.

After a trial to the court, judgment was entered denying relief to appellant and quieting the title of appellees Hartsook and Egdorf to the property sold at the guardianship sale. Appellant prosecuted this appeal.

There is little conflict in the evidence; only questions of law are involved. In Texas, when a person has been declared to be of unsound mind by a probate court, an appeal in a subsequent proceeding from a judgment pronouncing him restored to competency is a trial de novo;¹ it suspends such judgment, leaves in effect the original adjudication of mental incompetency, and leaves the incompetent under guardianship.² In the absence of allegation and proof to the contrary, the Texas probate court could presume the Missouri probate law to be in accord with the local law.³ Hence, the Texas probate court, applying the Texas law in such matters, could disregard the judgment of the Missouri probate court restoring the appellant to his competency, as that judgment, suspended by the appeal, in no way affected the original adjudication of mental incompetency of the appellant or Farrar's appointment as his guardian. Moreover, in Missouri, as in Texas, an appeal from a probate court judgment does involve a trial de novo and apparently does suspend the probate court judgment. Referring to the Missouri statutory law, the Supreme Court of Missouri, in State ex rel Wilkerson v. Skinker, 344 Mo. 359, 366, 126 S.W.2d 1156, 1158-1159, said: "* * * in Hamilton v. Henderson, 232 Mo.App. 1234, 117 S. W.2d 379, 383, it is said that `Sections 1938, 285 and 292 R.S.1929, Mo.St.Ann. * * * pp. 2605, 181, 184 Mo.R.S.A. §§ 2100, 284, 291 provide for appeals from judgments of Probate Courts against a finding of restoration, as well as from the original adjudication of insanity, and that a trial de novo of his sanity shall be held in the appellate (circuit) court.' Said Sec. 1938 is part of Art. 3, entitled `Circuit Courts,' of Chapter 9, `Courts of Record,' R.S.1929. Subdivision four thereof reads that circuit courts shall have `Appellate jurisdiction from the judgment and orders of county courts, probate courts and justices of the peace, in all cases not expressly prohibited by law, and shall possess a superintending control over them, and a general control over executors, administrators, guardians, curators, minors, idiots, lunatics, and persons of unsound mind.' Sec. 292, referred to above, provides that upon the filing of a transcript and papers (on appeal from a lower court, as the probate court) the court having appellate jurisdiction (as in such case the circuit court) shall be possessed of the cause and shall try and determine the cause de novo. * * *."

In answer to the argument that an adjudication of insanity imposes great hardship on the person adjudicated to be insane, that court also said, at page 371 of 344 Mo., at page 1162 of 126 S.W.2d: "* * * But it is not for us as a court to determine the wisdom vel non of the statute. Our province is to construe it. We think it was intended to give and does give the right of appeal from a judgment of restoration under Sec. 493 Mo.R.S.A. § 492, as well as from a judgment adverse to the alleged insane...