Finley v. Huss

• Decision Date: 21 September 2020
• Docket Number: 2:18-cv-00100
• Parties: TIMOTHY FINLEY, #266147, Plaintiff, v. ERICA HUSS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

TIMOTHY FINLEY, #266147, Plaintiff,
v.
ERICA HUSS, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:18-cv-00100

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Northern Division

September 21, 2020

Hon. Gordon J. Quist U.S. District Judge

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

MAARTEN VERMAAT U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Timothy Finley, who is a prisoner in the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC), suffers from a number of serious psychiatric disorders. In 2016, while incarcerated at the Marquette Branch Prison (MBP), Finley repeatedly obtained razor blades, which he used to cut himself. He also swallowed these razor blades, which resulted in several emergency surgeries. During this same period, Finley committed a number of violations of prison rules. Thus, prison officials, and specifically Defendants here - Deputy Warden (DW) Huss, and Acting Deputy Warden (ADW) Schroeder - were confronted with a dilemma: what to do with a mentally ill prisoner who refused to follow prison rules and could not be housed in the general prison population. They chose - at least for a 3-month period at the end of 2016 and early 2017 - to place Finley in administrative segregation, a form of imprisonment involving periods of solitary confinement.

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Finley claims that Defendants violated his rights by placing him in administrative segregation rather than transferring him to a mental health unit. Finley says Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical issues and subjected him to cruel and unusual conditions of confinement, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, violated his rights to due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment during the hearings that resulted in his placement in administrative segregation, and denied him services offered by the prison, in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act (RA).

This report and recommendation addresses Defendants' motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 83) and Finley's motion to unseal his exhibit 18 (ECF No. 93).

In Defendants' motion for summary judgment, they argue that there is no genuine issue of fact (1) that Finley failed to satisfy the objective and subjective components of his Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference and conditions of confinement claims, (2) that Finley failed to establish a violation of his rights under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, (3) that both of Finley's constitutional claims are barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity, and (4) that Finley failed to show discrimination based on his disabilities under the ADA and the RA. (ECF No. 84.)

In response, Finley argues that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding his claims, and that Defendants are not entitled to the protections of qualified immunity. (ECF No. 88.) Regarding the Eighth Amendment claims, Finley points to his documented history of mental illness, his history of self-mutilation, and

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Defendants' conduct as evidence that establishes genuine issues of fact for both the objective and subjective components of his claims. Regarding his Fourteenth Amendment claim, Finley argues that there are genuine issues of fact as to whether a liberty interest was implicated and whether he received all the necessary procedural protections during his two Security Classification Committee (SCC) hearings. Regarding the ADA and RA claims, Finley contends that his mental illness is inextricably intertwined with his misconduct behavior. Consequently, he states that there are genuine issues of fact as to whether Defendants discriminated against him because of his disability. And finally, Finley asserts that Defendants are not entitled to the protections of qualified immunity because of controlling case law, or because there is a robust agreement among persuasive authorities that would place a reasonable officer on notice as to the unconstitutionality of his or her conduct.

In reply, Defendants contend that summary judgment is appropriate because the pertinent facts of the four claims are undisputed. (ECF No. 92.) Defendants also argue that the application of qualified immunity is appropriate.

In support of Finley's motion to unseal the photographs in his exhibit 18, he argues that the public's interest in the photos strongly outweigh any prison security concerns. (ECF No. 93.) In response, Defendants argue that there is no reason for the parties to deviate from their earlier stipulation to file the photos under seal, and that the public interest in the photos are outweighed by prison security concerns. (ECF No. 98.) Finley filed a reply that includes information from a person Finley identifies as an expert. (ECF No. 99.)

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The undersigned is aware of the difficulties prison officials face when deciding how to manage a mentally ill prisoner who is engaging in self-harm while also failing to follow prison rules. Nevertheless, as an initial matter, the undersigned concludes that there are genuine issues of fact as to Finley's Eighth Amendment claim. Finley's well-documented history of mental illness and self-mutilation triggers a genuine issue as the objective component of these Eighth Amendment claims; and Defendants' decisions to classify Finley into administrative segregation despite Finley's history is sufficient to create a genuine issue as to the subjective component. The undersigned concludes, however, that there are no genuine issues of fact as to Finley's Fourteenth Amendment claim or his ADA and RA disability discrimination claims. Based on the undisputed evidence, no liberty interest is implicated to establish a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment claim. Furthermore, the record before the Court indicates that Finley did receive due process regarding his SCC hearings, at least as to the September 27, 2016 hearing. But, regardless of these conclusions, the undersigned finds that Defendants' decisions with regard to handling a mentally ill prisoner who has also violated prison rules on numerous occasions are protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity. Finley's constitutional claims are barred because there is no controlling authority nor sufficiently robust agreement amongst persuasive authorities that would inform reasonable prison officials that classifying a mentally ill prisoner into administrative segregation is unconstitutional.

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In addition, based on the undisputed evidence, Finley's ADA and RA claims fail because the evidence shows that Finley was placed into administrative segregation because of his misconducts and not his disability.

The undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court grant Defendants' summary judgment motion (ECF No. 83), and grant in part and deny in part Finley's motion to unseal his exhibit 18 (ECF No. 93). If the Court adopts this recommendations, Finley's case will be dismissed.

II. Additional Relevant Procedural History

Prior to the filing of this action, Finley - as a pro se litigant - filed an earlier action that asserted the same claims against the same Defendants.^[1] (Case No. 2:16-cv-253, ECF No. 1.) The district court initially dismissed the case in a screening opinion and order, concluding that Finley had failed to state an Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claim. (Id., ECF Nos. 12, 13.) The district court also denied Finley's request to amend his complaint. Finley appealed that dismissal. The Sixth Circuit concluded that Finley had stated an Eighth Amendment claim. Finley v. Huss, 723 Fed.Appx. 294, 299 (6th Cir. 2018). The court of appeals vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case with leave for Finley to amend his complaint. Finley v. Huss, 723 Fed.Appx. at 299.

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On remand, the district court appointed counsel for Finley. (Case No. 2:16-cv-253, ECF No. 27.) The district court ordered Finley to file an amended complaint within 28 days. (Case No. 2:16-cv-253, ECF No. 32.) But, instead of filing an amended complaint, Finley voluntarily dismissed the action. (Case No. 2:16-cv-253, ECF No. 33.)

On June 28, 2018, Finley revived his claims against Defendants when he filed this action in federal court. (ECF No. 1.) On August 16, 2018, Finley filed an amended complaint. (ECF No. 10.) Defendants filed answers that included a number of affirmative defenses. (ECF Nos. 16, 21.) Later, Defendants filed an answer to the amended complaint. (ECF No. 22.)

On August 23, 2018, in the present case, the district court ordered Defendants to file a motion to consolidate this matter with two other actions: Finley v. Mleko, Case No. 2:17-cv-159 and Finley v. Salmi, Case No. 2:17-cv-149. (ECF No. 11, PageID.75.) This Court pointed out that those cases were also initiated by Finley and were based on claims relating to his “mental health treatment and prolonged solitary confinement” while housed at MBP. (Id.) Defendants filed the motion to consolidate along with a supporting brief. (ECF No. 18, 19.) The Court ultimately ordered the consolidation of Finley v. Mleko (Case No. 2:17-cv-159) and Finley v. Salmi (Case No. 2:17-cv-149), but ordered Finley v. Huss (Case No. 2:18-cv-100) to proceed separately. (ECF No. 26.) Accordingly, the issues in this action are not consolidated with any of Finley's other cases.

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The case entered early mediation on January 9, 2019, but failed to settle. (ECF Nos. 44, 50.)

Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment and supporting brief on November 27, 2019that is currently before the Court. (ECF No. 83, 84.)

III. Statement of Undisputed Facts

There are four relevant areas of undisputed facts: (1) Finley's history of mental illness and required medical treatments, (2) Finley's lengthy misconduct record, (3) the dates and personnel involved during Finley's September and October 2016 SCC hearings, and (4) the conditions under which Finley was held in administrative segregation.

First, the parties do not dispute that Finley was diagnosed with several mental illnesses or that Finley...